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INTRODUCTION 
Justification of an empirical investigation of 
developmental aspects of symbolic thinking 
Psychological studies of symbolism have for decades been dominated by 
psychoanalytically colored clinical approaches of an individual diagnostic 
interpretive nature, and by psychoanalytic and analytic-psychological 
interpretations of symbolic meanings of myths, fairy tales, folklore and 
the cultural manifestations of religion and art. 
Leading experimental psychological researches on motivation seem to 
accept the classical Freudian symbol interpretations as universally valid, 
without explicitly noticing the desirability of an empirical verification 
of their possible validity for the normal human being. Levy, however, 
did notice this desirability and in a simple but clear experiment checked 
the validity of Freudian sex symbols for fifth grade elementary school 
children. He found that — at least in the perspective of human 
development — there are reasons to doubt their universal value. (1) 
Levy's method of having children relate male and female sex symbols to 
boys and girls names, (in a somewhat different way earlier used by Kate 
Frank in a psychoanalytic experimentally based study of male and female 
meanings of symbolic paintings for college students, (2) , made us aware 
of the desirability of an explicit distinction between sex symbolism and 
symbolism of the sexes. 
Levy found no relation at all between sex symbolism and symbolism of 
the sexes for children of about ten years of age, and Kate Frank did find 
some evidence of a possible relation at the college age. In following up 
Levy's suggestion for further research on the developmental aspects of 
sex symbolism, this investigation of symbolic thinking found: no 
universal, but a relative high occurrence of such a relation at the college 
age; no relation, at least at the explicit expressed level, for early 
adolescents; and a slight relational possibility for educated adults of 
above college age. 
Gordon Allport stated in 1946 that, 
"Unless idiographic (particular) knowledge is fused with nomo-
thetic (universal) knowledge, we shall not achieve the aim of 
psychological science." (3) 
In some of his later publications, Allport brings forward the valuable 
notions that: a) in the mentally healthy person most of the motivation 
can be taken at face value; b) normal motivation has a present and future 
significance for the person that is by no means represented by a study 
of his past life; c) infantile fixations in the Freudian sense can and do 
occur. This presents a challenging problem of methodological approach 
and, consequently, psychological methods aimed directly at assessment 
of levels of explicit awareness have to be supplemented with indirect 
projective methods aimed at revealing subconscious aspects of the mind 
and reversed. (4, 5) 
Within the limits of research possibilities available, only some aspects of 
the methodological problems involved could be solved, and it was necess-
ary to limit our research to a pilot investigation of the following aspects 
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of symbolic thinking: a) developmental aspects of differences in associ-
ational and symbolic thinking in early adolescence and adulthood; 
b) relative validity of classical sex symbok in developmental perspective; 
c) relation of sex symbolism and symbolism of the sexes; 
d) development of symbolism of the sexes from early adolescence to 
adulthood, and e) sex differential aspects of symbolism of the sexes. 
Orienting Preliminary Research 
As a first orientation, a number of words pertaining to the classical 
Freudian symbolism were presented orally, in an individual setting to 
volunteering adults, for word association reactions; and for the indication 
of symbolic meanings as well as masculine of feminine meanings of the 
words concerned. The results of these orientation studies indicated that: 
a) promising differences might be found between intended associative and 
intended symbolic reactions; b) verbs might be less apt to induce the 
giving of symbolic meanings then nouns; c) word association reactions 
tend to occur easier if no article is added to the noun used as stimulus 
word; d) addition of the indefinite article seems to induce a sharper 
picture of what the stimulus noun indicates, and to facilitate the indication 
of symbolic meanings ; and e) some of the reactions would be so individu-
ally determined, that without further clinical personal investigation the 
relation between the stimulus word and the reaction cannot be inter-
preted or understood. 
As a further orientation a hundred nouns indicating classical sex symbols 
were presented in written form as a paper and pencil group-test to two 
classes of college students with written instructions to give a word-
association reaction to these words, (presented without an article), to 
give a symbolic meaning indication of these words, (presented with a 
preceding indefinite article, e.g. a rose, a stick, a gun), and to indicate 
a masculine or feminine meaning of the words concerned. 
The data of this orienting group research showed that without a further 
request to indicate why stimulus words were given a masculine of feminine 
meaning, little could be concluded concerning the motivations of the 
masculine or feminine meanings given. This request was added to the 
tests eventually used to investigate the five aspects of symbolism in word 
associations and symbolic meaning of words mentioned at the end of the 
preceding section. 
It was noticeable that among the hundred stimulus words used, there 
were some with ambiguous meanings, and that there were a number of 
words overlapping others in indicating the same type of Freudian sex 
symbols; consequently, the number of stimulus words was selectively 
reduced to an arbitrarily determined list of fifty nouns, which were then 
used as the basic research tool in our pilot investigation of symbolic 
thinking. 
Method of Approach 
A mimeographed testbooklet was made up, consisting of lists of the fifty 
stimulus words selected, instructions concerning the word association test. 
10 
the symbolic meaning test, and the masculine/feminine symbolic meaning 
test. This testbooklet was used as a paper and pencil group-test, in which 
the reactions had to be written in a scoring space next to the stimulus 
words concerned, by the participating subjects in a normal classroom 
situation. 
This impersonal group approach excluded the possibility of utilizing 
possible difference in reaction time to different stimulus words, as done 
by Jung who created a word association test primarily used as a tool for 
diagnosing individual psychological complexes, also successfully used as 
a lie detector (6, 7 ) . This approach also excluded the possibility of 
checking doubtful or 'unacceptable' reactions, as done in the method of 
Kent and Rosanoff who abo used the word association test primarily as 
a diagnostic tool, and elaborated Jung's original attempts of distin-
guishing word associations of certain groups as, e.g. normal and insane 
adults and normal and defective children (8) . The Kent-Rosanoff method 
is followed in the respect that only the actual content of the word-
reactions is taken into consideration, and that the data concerned are 
used for a comparison of groups. 
As mentioned above, no personal diagnostic use is made of the individual 
reactions. This for methodological reasons desirable supplementary 
approach had to be bypassed on ethical grounds. The participating 
students were informed at the beginning of the test that the test reactions 
would not be used for diagnosing individual personality aspects, and the 
authorities of the educational institutes, who were kind enough to allow 
us to test classes of their students, were informed that students particip-
ating woud only be asked to partake in a group-test experiment, and 
would not be made subjects of a personal diagnostic test. 
The exclusion of projective depth psychological approaches limits by 
necessity any conclusion to the levels of explicit awareness, and explicit 
expression, and we are well aware of the possibility that especially for 
subjects burdened with some psychological complex, the content of 
explicit expressions might not always be concurrent with psychological 
contents on lower levels of awareness. In this connection we refer to an 
empirically based remark of Gordon Allport concerning research meth-
odology in motivation, namely that: a normal well adjusted individual 
may on projective techniques either give material identical with that of 
conscious report, or give no evidence whatever of his dominant motives, 
and that a special value of projective tests is limited to revealing emotion-
ally laden material, that can come forward in projective responses that 
are contradictory to conscious report. (4) 
On the front of the mimeographed testbooklet, the following instructions 
were written: 
'On the next two pages a number of words are mentioned. Will 
you please read these, one by one, and write beside each word 
the first word that comes to your mind, immediately after 
reading the word. 
Don't think or reason about it, just put down the first word 
that comes to your mind, whatever it is. 
11 
Will you please carry over the carbon paper to the next page, 
so that all your answers are copied. Thank you.' 
On the next two pages were printed in three rows per page, with a space 
of about two inches long and two thirds of an inch high for writing the 
reaction to each stimulus word, the following fifty words: 
rose - ship - sausage - square - six - key - three - banana -
eagle - deer · circle - broom • gun - stick - bracelet - hand -
balloon - pocketbook - sabre - earth - flower - dustpan - mouth -
umbrella - dog - bee - necktie - room - chapel - pin - suitcase -
door - moon - peacock - hammer - serpent - dishwasher -
pocket - cat - one - butterfly - jewelcase - apple - house - sun 
foot - eight - machine - slipper - shoe. 
The word association test was followed by a symbolic meaning test, which 
was followed by a masculine/femine meaning test and the instruction to 
indicate why a masculine or feminine meaning was given. (Instructions 
to the several tests and the procedures followed will be described in the 
chapters concerned). On the last page of the booklet participants were 
requested to provide the following personal data: age, sex, married etatus, 
level of formal education, and occupation. 
They were also asked to provide the following information about their 
parents ; 
occupation and formal education of the father, and 
occupation and formal education of the mother. 
Of this personal information only the data about formal education, age 
and sex are considered in this study. 
For an approach to the developmental aspects of associative and symbolic 
thinking the reactions of a group of early adolescents were compared 
with the reactions of a group of educated adults. To realize a possible 
comparison of the reactions of these two groups, a classification of nine 
different categories was set up (categories concerned will be described 
in Chapter II, and the word association reactions as well as the symbolic 
meaning reactions given, were for each group classified per category. 
The number of reactions per category was expressed in percentages of 
the total number of reactions of each group, and these percentages were 
used as a basis for comparison. The reason for this limitation of the 
statistics involved to a simple comparison of percentages of reactions 
per category is that in this pilot study of symbolic thinking, outspoken 
differences (or outspoken lack of differences), in categories or in types 
of reactions, entail a wealth of illustrating evidence about several of the 
problems involved. There is also evidence of problematic aspects that in 
additional research might be suitably investigated by the exact mathe-
matical methods of modern statistics. 
In respect to the current over evaluation of the possibilities of exact 
scientific methodology in psychology Allport remarks: 
"In taking stock of the situation I observe how many of us 
seem to be so stupefied by admiration of physical science that 
* Remark: the use of a carbon, suggested by Dr. McGurk, experimental psychologist 
at Villanova University, proved to be a valuable suggestion. As the copy could be 
cut up in reactions to each stimulus word for each group tested, which facilitated 
the addition of reactions per word per group considerably, leaving the original copy 
of the protocol at the disposition of the experimenter. 
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we believe psychology in order to succeed need only imitate 
models, postulates, methods and language of physical science!" 
(9, p. 157) 
Erwin Straus states in this respect explicitly that even the hope that 
objective psychology may in some far future result in an exact psychol-
ogical science is a mistake, to quote: 
"Die objektive Psychology irrt gründlich, wenn sie sich damit 
tröstet, dass sie ihr physikalisches Ideal nur vorläufig noch 
nicht verwirklicht habe. Die Biologie kann nicht im Sinne der 
Physik exakt sein. Auch die Anwendungen der Mathematik, 
Messungen und Zeitbestimmungen machen die Biologie nicht 
exakt. Exakt ist ja nicht die Beobachtung und Induktion; віе 
ist bei aller Strenge und Genauigkeit wesenmässig unexakt, 
auch in der Physik. Exakt sind erst die mathematischen For-
mulierungen der Physik. In solchen Formeln jedoch, die den 
Gleichungen der Physik nachgebildet wären, lässt sich das 
Wesen der Lebenserscheinungen nicht ausdrücken". (10, p. 52) 
For an investigation of developmental aspects of sex symbolism (in the 
Freudian sense of symbols representing genital sex aspects), the number 
of explicit indications of sex symbolism in either the symbolic meaning 
test reactions, or in the indications of why stimulus words were indicated 
as masculine or feminine, were compared for the two groups mentioned 
above. As these types of reactions were completely lacking in the early 
adolescent group, and almost completely lacking in the adult group, a 
third group consisting of male and female college students was added for 
comparison. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, this group of late 
adolescent and young adult age subjects did produce a relatively high 
number of sex symbolic reactions, indicating that at a certain level of 
development sex symbol reactions are no\ an exceptional occurrence on 
the explicit expressed level. 
The aspects of development of symbolism of the sexes (in the sense of 
symbols representing the masculine or feminine way of existence) was 
approached in a procedure analogous to the method used for investig-
ating developmental aspects of associative and symbolic thinking. For a 
comparison of the indications of why stimulus words were given a 
masculine or feminine meaning, a classification of nine categories per-
taining to male and female symbolism was set up (categories will be 
described in Chapter V) , and the number of reactions per category, ex-
pressed in percentages of the total number of reactions of the group 
concerned, were used as a basis for comparison of the three groups of, 
early adolescents, late adolescents, and adults. 
A similar procedure was used in investigating sex differential aspects of 
symbolism of the sexes. Here the reactions per category were compared 
for the total number of male participants as a group, and the total 
number of female participants as a group. The findings of sex differences 
in symbolism of the sexes are also discussed in Chapter V. 
Due to the fact that the method of selecting the age groups concerned, 
limits any conclusions to normal American students in high schools, 
colleges and universities, and as practically all the participants are 
catholics, the groups selected might not even be representative of the 
student body as a whole. Consequently the evidence found in the data is 
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not of a general conclusive but of a particularly indicative nature. Further-
more, the research tool in the method followed, is aimed at levels of 
explicit awareness, and conclusions drawn on the grounds of the evidence 
presented have to pertain to that level. 
In connection with the above mentioned over-evaluation of exact scientific 
methodology in psychology, Calon remarks, that the everyday knowledge 
precedes the scientific knowledge, which has its starting point in the 
former, and has eventually to refer back again to the psychological 
knowledge of everyday life, if it will not become a 'life-foreign' scientific 
psychological knowledge (11, p. 107). Allport stresses a similar point 
of view, to quote: 
"The machine model in psychology had its origin not in clinical 
or social experience, but rather in adulation in the technological 
success of the physical sciences. Since psychologists, like every-
one else, are enmeshed in the prevailing ethos, they too, unless 
especially on guard, are likely to allow their subservience to 
technology to outrun their moral sense." (9, p. 157) 
The methodology followed adhered to the demands of exact experiment-
ation in that the method used provided objective observable data, in an 
experiment that can be repeated by any researcher interested in the field 
concerned. In any objective empirical method there is an aspect of un-
avoidable subjectivity, and a subjective element seems to be a necessity 
for a lifelike scientific psychological approach. In connection with the 
limitations of exactness in the methodology we quote the following state-
ments of Melvin Marx : 
"The ultimate aim of all natural science is explanation and 
understanding and not simply prediction and control in a 
practical sense, as is often assumed... It must be recognized, in 
addition, that some kind of bias, wether or not it is explicitly 
recognized, underlies all empirical measurements, regardless of 
how automatic and mechanical they may appear. It is thus not 
possible to separate «completely the empirical from the theo-
retical components of scientific inquiry. For methodological pur-
poses, however, it is desirable to delimit as clearly as possible 
the avowedly theoretical and the more strictly empirical, or 
observational components." (12, p. 5) 
Before presenting the more strictly empirical aspects of this investigation 
of symbolic thinking a discussion of the more theoretical aspects of 
attempting to distinguish the so often confused concepts of sign and 
symbol, and a description of what is considered to be the essential aspects 
of symbols and symbolism in the framework of this study, will be pre· 
sented in Chapter I. 
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CHAPTER I 
SIGN-SIGNAL-SYMBOL 
1. Sign as the product of a causal relation 
A sign indicates something else than what it is in itself, and it combines 
the functions of signifying and of indicating as its most essential char-
acteristics. The function of signifying serves the recognition of a 
cognition-content other then the sign itself, so for instance does smoke 
signify the related cognition-content of fire, and a frown signifies anger 
or perplexity. The function of indicating the cognition-content of what the 
sign signifies serves the purpose of suggesting a way of behavior related 
to what the sign signifies. The aspect of signifying is more dominant in 
signs as the product of a causal relation, whereas the aspect of indicating 
dominates more in signs as the product of a social contract and in signals, 
as will be discussed later. 
Smoke as a sign of fire, crying as a sign of suffering are instances of 
causal-relation-signs. Maritain deals in a scholastic frame of reference with 
the theory of signs, and without intention to become involved in the philos-
ophical problematics of Maritain's theory of signs, it is noticeable that 
the 'natural sign' is described by Maritain in a sense that is applied to 
signs as the product of a causal relation. Symbols are defined as 'sign-
images', based on a presupposed relationship of analogy, but the image 
character is not essential for signs (e.g. smoke is not the image of fire). 
In natural signs there is a real relationship between sign and cognition-
content, based on a really intrinsic proportion between signs and that 
which they signify, and not a purely ideal relationship existing as euch 
only in thought. To quote: 
"This real relationship is not a relationship of efficient causality. 
Everything is kept within the order of the Objective causality', 
or formal causality of knowing, not within the order of efficient 
or productive causality. When a sign produces an effect it is 
never insofar as it is a sign. The sign does not even produce as 
an efficient cause the knowing of the signified; it produces 
knowing only because, in the cognitive faculty, iL takes the place 
of the object, and thus makes the object present to that faculty, 
and because to this extent, it keeps itself within the same line of 
causality as the object (formal causality)." (13, p. 219) 
It seems that Maritain holds Objective causality' to be the same as 'formal 
causality of knowing', and that the sign does not produce that what it 
signifies (smoke does not produce fire), but that the sign makes the 
object (that what it signifies) present to the cognitive faculty. He explains 
later that the signified is present in the sign, and states: 
"There is thus a certain presence — presence of knowability — 
of the signified in the sign; the former is there in alio esse, in 
another mode of existence." (13, p. 220) 
This type of sign that serves primarily the cognition of what it signifies, 
and in which the cognition-content is based on a real causal relation with 
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the sign, is considered to be a sign as the product of a causal relation. It is 
noticeable that Maritain uses the term Objective causality' in a special 
philosophical sense, however in this study the term objective л ііі be used 
in the more psychological sense of 'not subjective or personally determined 
or caused'. Causes can be many and can be interrelated (e.g. symptoms 
in medicine, or blushing for anger as well as for shame), or causes can be 
misperceived as demonstrated in the classical experiments of Michette 
(14). The causal-relation-sign as such can take on any sign or signal 
function but serves primarily the function of the recognition of cognition-
contents. 
2. Sign as the product of a social contract 
A sign as the product of a social contract indicates whatever the groups 
concerned arbitrarily determine it to indicate. There is no necessity for a 
causal relation between this type of sign and what it signifies, and the 
universality of its meaning is limited to the groups determining its 
meaning and the individuals informed about its meaning. 
Signs entail a cognition-content, and this cognilion-content is in social-
contract-signs of such an objective nature that they deny the individual 
percipient the possibility of subjectively changing the socially accepted 
relation of the social-contract-sign and what it signifies. 
Social-contract-signs also entail a behavioral aspect in the respect that 
they intend to suggest to perceivers an immediate or mediated way of 
behavior related lo what the sign signifies. The percipient has in respect 
to this suggested behavior a relative freedom to follow the suggestion 
entailed or not, or to carry out the suggested behavior in a subjectively 
determined manner. 
Traffic signs are instances of social-contract-signs, and the group deter­
mined limitation of their meaning can be illustrated by the instance of 
the 'red-triangle-danger-stop' relation, clearly understood by Dutch 
drivers, but not having that evident meaning for a visitor from the United 
States where the red triangle is not used as a danger indicating traffic 
sign. It will also be evident that a Dutch driver in approaching the red-
triangle-danger sign, has subjectively a relative freedom to slow down 
and stop or not to. 
3. Sign as the product of an association 
This type of sign is related to what it signifies on the grounds of 
accidental, or purposively brought about experiences of togetherness. Nor 
do causal relations nor social contracts have to play a role in their 
creation, and these signs can be formed in the mind of one individual, 
and can have individual signification only. As an instance of an acci­
dental association sign is the rattle of my neighbour's garage door every 
weekday rooming, which signifies for me 'time to get up', and an instance 
of a sign-referent relationship based on purposively brought about 
togetherness in experience is the buzzer sounded by Pavlov before pro­
viding food to his dogs. 
Sign as described by behavioristic psychologists seems mainly to be 
understood as association sign. Morris in his classical study of sign 
language and behavior states for instance: 
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"If something, A, controls behavior towards a goal in a way 
similar to the way something else, B, would control behavior 
with respect to that goal in a situation in which it were 
observed, then A is a sign." (15, p. 7) 
The starting point here is obviously the observed behavior, and the 
relation of a sign and what the sign signifies is inferred from the similar 
way in which a sign, and what the sign signifies seems to control behavior. 
The aspect of a certain presence of the signified in the sign, mentioned 
by Maritain (quoted in Section 1, p. 15), is implicitly referred to by 
Morris when he states: 
"If anything, A, is a preparatory stimulus which in the absence 
of the object stimulus initiating response-sequences of a certain 
behavior family, causes a disposition in some organism to 
respond under certain conditions by response-sequences of this 
behavior family, then A is a sign." (15, p. 10) 
The distinction made by Maritain that the presence of knowability of the 
signified in the sign is a presence in another mode of existence, is im-
plicitly entailed in Morris' distinction between the object stimulus 
initiating response sequences of a certain behavior family, and the sign-
stimulus causing as a preparatory stimulus a disposition to respond by 
response-sequences of this behavior family. 
Osgood, who criticizes Morris' definition of signs as a possible ment-
alistic viewpoint, brings forward that the distinguishing condition of 
sign behavior is the presence of absence of a representational mediation 
process in association with the stimulus, and describes the essence of his 
mediation hypothesis in the following four points: 
"1. Stimulus-objects elicit a complex pattern of reactions from 
the organism, these reactions varying in their dependence upon 
presence of the stimulus-object for their occurrence. 2. When 
stimuli other than the stimulus object, but previously associated 
with it, are later presented without its support, they tend to 
elicit some reduced portion of the total behavior elicited by the 
stimulus-object. 3. The fraction of the total object-elicited 
behavior which finally constitutes the stable mediation process 
elicited by a sign will tend toward a minimum set by the descri-
minatory capacity of the organism. 4. The self-stimulation 
produced by sign-elicited mediation processes becomes conditi-
oned in varying strenghts to the initial responses in hierarchies 
of instrumental skill sequences." (16, p. 203, 204) 
Osgood, in trying to make explicit what may be implicit in Morris' term 
'disposition', considers association as conditional in the formation of 
signs (point 2) , and seems, despite his intention, not to have been able 
to avoid a mentalistic concept like 'self-stimulation' (point 4) . Osgood 
defines sign formally as follows: 
"A pattern of stimulation which is not the object is a sign of 
the object if it evokes in an organism a mediating reaction, 
this (a) being some fractional part of the total behavior elicited 
by the object and (b) producing distinctive self-stimulation 
that mediates responses which would not occur without the 
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previous association of non-object and object patterns of stimu-
lation." (16, p. 204) 
This operational definition, useful in a behavioristic experimental 
approach, overlooks the freedom of the individual to select among 
experiences in the associative creation of these signs, and it also eeems 
to overlook the freedom of the individual to react to signs when perceived 
in an individual manner or not to react at all. The possibility of individ-
ual selection of, as well as individual reaction to, is one of the character-
istics of signs as the product of association; Morris seems to have been 
aware of this as he states: 
"For something to be a sign the organism must be influenced, 
though it need not be a response." (15, p. 15) 
4. Signal, a sign as a substitute stimulus 
Where, as mentioned in Section 1 (p. 15), the functional aspect of signify-
ing is more dominant in signs, in signals the function of indicating the 
cognition-content in relation to the actual situation is more prominent. 
Signals serve primarily the purpose of suggesting a way of behavior 
related to what they, as signs, signify. Any sign functions as a signal 
when it is actually perceived and becomes behaviorally effective; in this 
sense all signals are signs and all signs can become signals. The stimulus-
response relation stressed by the behaviorists is much more obvious in 
signals than in signs. Pavlov's buzzer, for instance, can be observed to 
function as a substitute stimulus for the indicated object (food), and 
Morris' description of sign as, "controlling behavior in a way similar 
to that what the sign signifies, would control behavior in a situation in 
which it were observed' (quoted above, section 3, p. 17), can be readily 
observed in the function of signals. 
In the terminology of von Uexkiill (quoted by Buytendijk, 17, p. 36), 
one could say, when a sign psychologically moves from the "Umwelt" 
(environmental world), to the "Merkwelt" (attention world), and the 
"Wirkungswelt" (action world) of its percipient then it functions as a 
signal. So is, for instance, a traffic light flashing red, a sign indicating 
danger, it becomes, however, a danger signal for a driver who sees the 
red light, becomes aware of possible danger, and experiences the intended 
suggestion to slow down. The visual or auditory stimuli produced in 
some Skinner box experiments as signs of the availability of food, 
become signals as soon as the animal perceives these stimuli as signs of 
food being available and consequently presses the lever. 
The aspect of actually changing an indifferent situation into a meaning-
ful situation is considered by Erwin Straus to be the essential function 
of signal. Straus remarks that an indifferent situation does not mean a 
static environment, but a mental set directed towards meaningful possi-
bilities, in some not yet arrived or not yet perceived future situation. 
Situations are meaningful in which the subject is engaged in making, in 
vital or mental respect, aspects of the world at hand his own. In meaning-
ful situations the subject is directed towards the actual aspects of the 
situation; the actuality of the here and now dominates and the subject 
resents a change, or a change in mental set towards future possibilities. 
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The signal functions as a relation between these two types of situations 
and is, as in an indifferent situation 'pointing towards' a coining 
meaningful situation, related to both. Traffic signals indeed, indicate 
'possible danger ahead', and Pavlov's buzzer seems to indicate for the 
animal concerned, 'food not yet here but coming'. To function as signals 
in Straus' sense, signals must be perceived and conceived as signs of 
something else; hence too attractive or too frightening stimuli cannot 
function as signals as they draw too much attention to themselves. To 
quote Straus' essential definition: 
"Das Signal ist das mittlere Glied einer dreigliedrigen Bezieh-
ung. Es markiert den Übergang von einer indifferenten Situa-
tion zu einer differenten Situation, es steht zwischen beiden." 
(10, p. 82) 
The behaviorists have made learning, seen as the product of discernible 
environmental stimulation, a main field of study, and employ in condi-
tioning experimental stimuli as substitute stimuli in an actual situation. 
Hence Morris' suggestion to use the operationally more exact term signal 
instead of sign, seems in a behavioristic frame of reference worth-
while. (15) 
Signals remain in the individual's perception as well as the behavior stimul-
ating function in the service of a pragmatic purpose existing in the 
actual situation. From the developmental viewpoint this is stressed by 
Heinz Werner in his comparative studies of mental life; Werner speaks 
of "things-of-action" or "signal-things" dominating in a more primitive 
mental world, but also existing in the mental life of civilized men in 
familiar concrete situations: 
"One must bear in mind that even the most highly developed 
human beings, as in the case of primitive organisms, are con-
stantly in contact with things-of-action. So far as our activity 
is confined to an entirely concrete, familiar situation, the 
objects seem to guide, to steer, our action by virtue of their 
signal-qualities. When we are tired, an empty chair "invites" 
us to sit down. In such a situation the chair exhibits a "sitting-
tone" as Uexkiill has it, or a "demand character" or a "valence" 
(Lewin), which encourages us to sit down. Any stump in the 
woods may become a chair so far as its signal-quality (temp-
orarily creating by our need) is concerned." (18, p. 61) 
This aspect of actual concrete behavior stimulation in the most essential 
characteristic of signals. 
5. Signal as a substitute command 
Signals essentially differing from signs in their being related to the 
actual situation only, also differ from signs in the secondary aspect of 
their appearance, as many signals are characterized by a dynamically 
moving pattern of stimuli. It is illustrating in this respect that in the 
United States static traffic indicators like pained boards are known as 
traffic signs, but the constant changing traffic lights are called traffic 
signals. 
In appearance aspect, the signal, as such, stands most near the causal-
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relation-sign (limited in time and dynamic in character), in functional 
aspect it moves away from this and towards the social-contract-sign, with 
the dominating aspect of suggestion of behavior related to what it (as 
sign) signifies. In some instances, this aspect is so dominating that the 
cognition-content is solely directed towards the suggested behavior. In 
the red traffic light the "stop" behavior suggestion is dominating but 
still related to the primarily cognition-content of danger, the military 
signal for attack, however, can hardly be considered to entail any other 
cognition-content than the command to attack, and in baseball the signals 
given by the catcher are nothing more than commands for the pitcher to 
throw the next ball in a certain, in the type of signal as cognition-content, 
entailed way. 
Signals as substitute commands play an important role in everyday life as 
regulators of social relations, where people meet each other in functional 
roles. The signals given by traffic-policemen to drivers are role-relation 
regulators, and when the host looks at his watch he gives his guest a role-
relation signal which is a substitute command to leave. 
6. Sign and symbol confusion 
Signs (and signals) as indicators of something that they are not them­
selves, and as suggestors of behavior related to what they signify, are in 
cognitive and behavioral aspect servants of functional pragmatic relations 
of the individual and his world. An essential difference in symbols is that 
in the creation and use of symbolism we pass the borders of the prag­
matic and step into the realm of personal contemplation. Signs serve the 
recognition of what they signify and signals serve the stimulation of α 
concrete goal directed action in relation to what they as signs signify 
in the actual situation, but symbols enable a contemplating personal 
encounter which what they as 'sign-images' (Maritain, section 1, p. 15), 
represent. 
The behavioral world of signs and signals and the contemplating world 
of symbols are bridged by the cognitive function which pertains to both; 
but where a sign indicates something it signifies in the outside-world, 
the symbol represents the something it symbolizes in the inner-world. 
Erich Fromm states in this respect: 
"Symbolic language is language in which the world outside is a 
symbol of the world inside, a symbol for our souls and our 
minds." (19, p. 12) 
This aspect of symbolism, of pertaining to the personal inner-world, 
enables a contemplative encounter with what is symbolized. Buytendijk 
indicates in a phenomenological approach, that a persona] encounter 
presupposes the abandonment of a pragmatic positivistic attitude, to quote: 
"Elle exige cependant que nous abandonnions le point de Vue 
et la manière de voir du chercheur positiviste... Du fait que 
nous renonçons à l'attitude de l'observateur objectif, qui se 
retire à dessin de toute forme de relation d'être, il résulte en 
premier lieu que le monde phénoménal s'ouvre comme le nôtre 
avec une nouvelle signification immédiate." ( 20, p. 9) 
Morris notices from a behavioristic standpoint that symbols as a typical 
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human form of communication can not be approached by the exact 
methods of behaviorism, which are only suited to study animal behavior, 
to quote: 
"...non human beings seldom produce the signs which influence 
their behavior, while human individuals in their language and 
post-language symbols characteristically do this and to a sur-
prising degree. Here is a basic difference between men and 
animals, and until behavioral theory develops a semiotic 
adequate to this difference it will remain what it is today: 
'a careful study of animals and a pious hope for a science of 
the human person'." (15, p. 198) 
The essential human way of existence, conditional for a possible creation 
and use of symbolism, and the essential aspects pertaining to the personal 
world as a distinguishing characteristic of symbols might explain that 
some behavioristically oriented psychologists try to force symbols into 
the realm of sign and signal, and that deterministically oriented psycho-
analysts seem to make no clear distinction in the use of these terms. 
Mowrer, for instance, in a recent behavioristic publication (2) , tries 
to deal with symbolic (which in his sense seems to mean cognitive) 
processes in a stimulus-response frame of reference only, and the other-
wise, in the sense of William James, 'tough-minded' experimentalist 
Stevens (who follows Morris in stressing the need for a universal 
meaning of operational definitions and reports of experimental findings), 
seems to have no objections to using the terms sign and symbol, but 
obviously only in the meaning of signs, interchangeably. (22, p. 43—50) 
Freud makes such a changeable use of the term symbolic in relation to 
what he indicates as symbols and symptoms that it appears risky to state 
whether Freud had a clearly defined opinion about sign, symbol and 
symbolic. So, for instance, in his Vienna lecture on dream symbolism 
Freud states first: 
"You will remember that some time ago, when we were 
examining the different relations which exist between dream-
elements and the thoughts proper underlying them, I distinguish-
ed three relations: substitution of the part for the whole, 
allusion, and imagery. I told you then that there was a fourth 
possible relation, but I did not tell you what it was. This fourth 
relation is the symbolic, which I am now introducing... Sym-
bolism is perhaps the most remarkable part of our theory of 
dreams... since the relation between a symbol and the idea 
symbolized is an invariable one, the latter being as it were, a 
translation of the former, symbolism does in some measure 
realize the ideal of both ancient and popular dream-interpret-
ation, one from which we have removed very far in our tech-
nique." (23, p. 134, 135) 
And later: 
"We must admit also that we cannot at present assign quite 
definite limits to our conception of a symbol: for it tends to 
merge into substitution, representation etc., and even approaches 
closely to allusion." (23, p. 136) 
Is seems that Freud — in and outside the interpretation of dreams — 
uses the terms symbol and symbolic in the latter rather unlimited sense 
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of also possibly meaning, 'substitution, representation, etc.'. This flighty 
way of dealing with symbolism by Freud and his followers impressed 
Maritain a non-scientific, and he states in a generally positively colored 
critical study of Freudianism: 
"I t is in the technique of interpretation, and particularly in the 
use of symbolism, that Freud and his disciples have allowed 
themselves to indulge in arbitrary, obsessively dogmatic and 
pedantic extravagances that risk discrediting psychoanalysis and 
leave the best jests of Aristophanes and Molière far behind 
them". (24, p. 235) 
Existential-phenomenological psychologists such as Merleau-Ponty, seem 
to be so solely directed toward and engaged in the existential-personal 
aspects that the important pragmatic function of signs and signals is 
overlooked or not considered worthwhile for explicit attention. In contra-
diction to the behaviorisls we see here that sign and signal are pulled 
up over the pragmatic border into the existential world and are primarily 
or only considered in so far as they can become symbols. Brus, for 
instance, in a study of Merleau-Ponty's views on language states: 
"In empirism every relation is seen as evolving from blind-
working causes. Also an attempt is made to explain the knowing 
subject in this way. This means that all sense is reduced to the 
sphere of the "non-sens". Hence for empirism the problem of 
the sense does not really exist, which is revealed in the theories 
concerning symbol, language, perception, and thinking." (25, 
p. 43) 
"Here again we hear the main theme around which the theory 
of Merleau-Ponty is composed. What is valid for every express-
ion is also valid for the word, it is an aspect of a way of 
existence, of a behavior that realizes meaning and expression 
at the same time. The authentic word is not a sign, an outer 
accompaniment, a dress, a vehicle of the thought, it is the 
existence itself of the thought in the perceptible world." (25, 
p. 75 ; translations of this quotations by the author) 
AUport who defines symbols as : 
"...those self produced signs of signs which are man's prized 
and troublesome possession," 
did notice the confusion and states: 
"Perhaps the clearest symptom of the present conceptual con-
fusion in our field is the extent to which we confound symbols 
with signs, or — if one prefers Morris' terminology — symbols 
with signals." (9, p. 166) 
Despite the confusion AUport sees the beginning of a study of symbols 
emerge: 
"Though symbols are still confused with signals, we are 
beginning, through content analysis and interviewing, to study 
symbols both in their own right, and as the basic ingredients 
that they are in all complex conduct, including all morally 
relevant thought and behavior." (9, p. 169) 
7. Emblem, sign and symbol, in an essential human world 
Dumas, who remarks that emblems and symbols are often confused, 
describes emblem as follows: 
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"Quand on assimile les deux termes on oublie qu'un emblème 
n'est qu'un signe visible choisi pour représenter un parti poli-
tique ou religieux, une famille, une corporation, un homme et 
que, pour remplir ce rôle, comme l'indique très bien Hegel, il n'a 
pas besoin d'être une traduction par analogie de telle ou telle 
qualité essentielle. La confusion souvent faite entre les deux 
termes s'explique parce qu'un emblème peut, en même temps, 
être un symbole et que l'emblème peut contenir des dessins ou 
des formules symboliques: mais ces conditions ne sont pas 
nécessaires pour qu'il y a emblèmes." (26, p. 268) 
According to the way in which they are created, and according to the 
relative universality of their meaning, which is limited to the groups 
concerned and individuals informed, emblems would belong to the cate-
gory of social-contract-signs. Functioning as representations of what they 
indicate (an emblem function mentioned by Dumas), they differ essen-
tially from social-contract-signs as the percipients can subjectively change 
the content of the meaning of what the group represented by the emblem, 
symbolically means to them. This brings us inevitably to the role of the 
interpretation of experience in the history of percipients, described by 
Ogden and Richards as the key to be understanding of the sign situation: 
"Throughout almost all our life we are treating things as signs. 
All experience, using the word in the widest sense is either en-
joyed or interpreted (i.e. treated as sign), or both and very 
little of it escapes some degree of interpretation. An account 
of the process of interpretation is thus the key to the under-
standing of the sign situation... the effects upon the organism 
due to any sign, which may be any stimulus from without, or 
any process taking place within depends upon the past history 
of the organism." (27, p. 52) 
It is in its symbolic function, entailing a personal interpretation of 
experiences with what the emblem as sign indicates, that emblems enter 
the realm of contemplation, and of possible personal encounter. In this 
sense the Royal Standard is not an indication of, but a representation of 
the Queen of the Netherlands at Dutch military ceremonies, and the Star 
Spangled Banner does not indicate but rather represent the American 
nation at military ceremonies in the United States. These emblems in 
their role of symbols suggest a contemplation of what they represent, and 
enable their percipients a possible personal psychological encounter with 
what they mean to them. 
Stagner and Osgood demonstrated experimentally that experience with 
and information about a group indicated by an emblem can change the 
meaning of what an emblem signifies to its perceivers. This was seen, in 
their study of the changes in meaning, of American perception, of the 
Soviet emblem during World War II, where Russia was first an ally of the 
Nazis and later took sides with the Allied Western liberation powers. 
(28, 29) 
Dumas, who holds (like Maritain) that for symbols a relationship of 
analogy with that which they symbolize is essential (Dumas, 26, p. 266, 
267; Maritain, 13, p. 219), does consider emblems, and other signs, func-
tioning as symbols without a relationship of analogy with what they 
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symbolize, to be pseudo-symbols. He explains this possibility of functional 
symbolism on the grounds of association based on history and personal 
experience : 
"On arrive ainsi à cette conclusion que l'histoire, l'expérience 
sont créatrices de symboles ou tout au moins de signes que les 
associations d'idées qu'ils soulèvent nous font considérer comme 
des symboles. Mettons-nous que ce sont des pseudo-symboles qui 
n'ont la valeur logique des premiers, mais qui peuvent en 
exercer la fonction psychologique." (26, p. 268) 
Calon, however, does not seem to hold that analogy is a necessary and 
essential characteristic of symbols, he stresses the cognitive function and 
the aspect of "picturalizing", of presenting in a sensorial-perceivable way 
cognition-contents not pertaining to the senses, or not pertaining to the 
sense in which the "picture" is expressed (30, p. 69) . Emblems, as signs 
of a visual pistorial nature, are when functioning as symbolic for the 
group or institution which they indicate as signs, symbols 'par excellence' 
in the sense described by Calon. 
The emblem in its symbolic function makes its cognition-content con-
cretely perceptible, it embodies in the literal sense of this word, a content 
not pertaining to the senses, and presents in this embodiment the non· 
sensorial to the imagination of its perceiver. The emblem (as a symbol) 
does not appeal to the objective logical reasoning powers, but to the 
subjective personal affective imagining powers of the mind. As in sculp-
turing, the most outspoken embodying form of art, the sculptor can 
present a non-sensorial content in the most concrete form of chiseled stone 
or carved wood; so for instance the joy, happiness, and freedom of 
childhood are embodied in Willy Mignot's „Glijbaan" (picture, p. 4 ) . 
This carved piece of wood picturing children playing in the snow, does 
not stimulate any objective reasoning about children, but calls forward 
a wealth of affectively colored images of joy, freedom, and play, with an 
underlying sentimental tinge of childhood happiness as belonging to the 
personal past. It is in this way that the emblem embodies or picturalizes 
its cognition-content symbolically. 
8. Symbol, a pictorial representation of a referent as the product of 
association 
Pictorial pertains here to more senses than the visual; so, for instance, 
the hope of suppressed ones on liberation and final victory is as well 
picturalized in the theme of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, as in a picture 
of Winston Churchill with a finger-spread "V" formed in the greeting 
wave of his hand; and the beloved one is as well pictorially represented 
to the lover in the perception of the fragrance of her favorite perfume, 
as in the touch of a shawl, which is hers. The cognition is, as Calon 
states, incarnated in the perceptible (30, p. 69), which enables the sym-
bol to "re-present", or to renew actual psychological presentness, of the 
meaning of the referent symbolized in the mind of its perceiver in percept-
ible picture form. This enables its percipient to encounter in a psychol-
ogical sense the cognition-content existing in the picture and to create and 
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contemplate images of his own inner creation, about the referent repre-
sented by the symbol. 
The symbol, as a picture, appeals primarily to the imagination powers 
of the mind and leaves its peroeiver the freedom to encounter aspects of 
the referent of his own personal choosing, and to create, on grounds of 
his personal experience with the referent (as demonstrated by Stagner 
and Osgood (28, 29 ) ) , new meanings for the referent symbolized. 
The influence of personal experience and the role of history in the 
creation of meanings is in a double way applicable to the category of 
symbols as the product of association. Not only can the meaning of this 
symbol change on grounds of personal experience with the referent, but 
these symbols evolve through associations with experiences of the referent 
in the personal history of its users. Dumas, as quoted in the preceding 
section, states explicitly that history and experience are creators of 
association symbols, through the association of ideas which they raise. 
(26, p. 268) 
Association symbols, as personal creations, are particularly designated to 
function as means of inner-personal communication. This inner commun-
icative aspect is described by Calvin Hall for dream-symbols, the 
function of which Hall considers to be "the visual perceptualization of 
the abstracted conceptions of the referent, for the dreamer by the 
dreamer." (31, p. 42) 
Association symbols (like association signs, as mentioned in section 3, 
p. 16) can have individual meaning only. So, for instance, a little fisher-
men's village at the Italian Riviera is for my wife and me a symbol of 
paradise, as there we spent the happy weeks of our honeymoon; and for 
one of our friends the number 32 is a symbol of good luck, since once 
on the first night of a holiday trip he lost his money at the roulette table, 
and selling his car on the spot he gambled the money he obtained on 
number 32 and made a big gain, saving his holiday trip and more. The 
association symbol of the first instance can serve inner-personal and 
inter-personal communication, even when the group is limited to two 
people only, the latter only serves the inner-personal communication of 
the gambling friend, since this symbol does not have meaning to any-
body else. 
If Ponsioen, in a broad sociological approach to symbolism in society, 
states that all symbols have a participational function (32, p. 143), then 
he seems to overlook the association symbol which can have an inner-
personal function only, and is not necessarily directed towards the other, 
nor understandable for the other if he tries to interpret the meaning of 
such symbols on the grounds of analogy, or on the ground of known 
socially accepted forms of symbols. 
9. Symbol, a pictorial representation of a referent on grounds 
of analogy 
The symbol on the grounds of analogy could in a sense be considered an 
association symbol, created by means of a certain type of association. 
Dumas, as mentioned above, considers analogy symbols only as symbols 
in the proper sense of this word, and calls emblems and signs, functioning 
as symbols on associative-historical grounds, pseudo-symbols: 
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"J'écarterai donc, en principe, les symboles constitués par la 
simple association d'un signe et d'une chose signifiée, pour ne 
m'occuper que des symboles fondés sur l'analogie du signe et 
de la chose signifiée, sans négliger cette limitation que l'analogie 
doit faire passer sur le plan du sensible une chose qui n'y était 
pas." (26, p. 266, 267) 
In limiting symbols to sensorial representations, by means of analogy and 
of contents not pertaining to the senses, Dumas bypasses in his definition 
the symbolism entailed in synaesthesy and stressed by Calon as essenti-
ally symbolic (30, p. 69) ; he does, however, not bypass the problem 
involved and in an interesting phenomenological approach to inter-sense 
perception (26, p. 272, 281), makes worthwhile distinctions between 
supposed and real analogy in synaesthesy. So, for instance, those 
expressions are eliminated as non-analogous that appear to be based on 
analogy but, in fact, describe perceptions based on combinations of 
senses, like "the cool taste of menthol", in which the senses of taste and 
of temperature are actually combined in producing the sensation; or, 
"descending the gamut of tones", where auditive sensations are combined 
with the kinaesthetic sensation of the larynx actually moving from a 
higher to a lower position when lower tones are produced. 
This investigator agrees with Dumas' limitation of sensorial symbolism 
to perceived analogies between sensations of a different order: 
"Le symbolisme sensoriel ne commence que lorsque nous per-
cevons, entre des sensations d'ordre différent, des analogies de 
forme qui justifient la transportation des épithètes." (26, 
p. 275) 
A pictorial representation of a referent (here the sensation of another 
sense-organ) is involved, based on a perceived and/or expressed resem-
blance of some essential aspect of symbol and referent. Expressions euch 
as: screaming colors, bitter cold, heavy odors, are instances of synaes-
thetic analogy symbols. 
Another category of analogy symbols are the symbols representing a 
person, an object, or an activity on grounds of a resemblance of symbol 
and referent; e.g. chick for a young girl, king-size for a big cigarette, or 
"the ugly duckling" for a popular, technically reliable, but not too nice 
looking small French car, and "jumping ditches" (a boys' game entailing 
the risk of falling in the ditch), as a Dutch slang expression for repeat-
ingly overtaking on the highway if the oncoming traffic hardly allows 
this. Some of the Freudian sex symbols (like gun for penis, riding for 
intercourse), fall under this category, but we hold with Calvin Hall that 
these symbols do not symbolize their referents as such and objectively, 
but are subjective conceptions of the referent, and quote the following: 
"The images of a dream are the concrete embodiments of the 
dreamer's thoughts; these images give visible expression to that 
which is invisible, namely conceptions. Accordingly, the true 
referent of any dream-symbol is not an object or activity, it is 
always an idea in the mind of the dreamer. A visible object, 
gun, does not stand for another visible object, penis; rather it 
may stand for the dreamer's idea of penis, if he conceives of 
the penis as a dangerous weapon." (33, p. 102) 
Hall remarks further that in waking life abo, symbols are used for per-
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ceptualization of concepts (33, p. 103). This brings us to a third category 
of analogy symbols, namely analogy symbols as perceptible represent-
ations of abstract ideas. A wealth of symbols of this type are used in 
literature, art, religion, and everday life and the mentioning of instances 
as, a rose for beauty, white for purity, a lion for strength, might be 
superfluous. In this type of symbols the perceptible embodiment of the 
cognition-content of a non-sensorial referent is most evident, and for 
these referents of inner-life as Dumas states, symbolization is a constant 
necessity (26, p. 281). In concluding this discussion of sign, signal, and 
symbol, an attempt will be made to describe what are considered to be 
the essential aspects of symbolism within the framework of the present 
study. 
10. Symbolism defined 
Symbolism, as engaged in pictorially representing the meaning of a 
referent primarily appeals to the affective imagination powers of man; it 
does not convey objective logical abstract meanings, but subjective 
personally picturalized meanings. Maritain (who does not elaborate on 
his casual distinction of symbols as 'sign-images' based on a presupposed 
relationship of analogy (mentioned in section I p. 15), distinguishes 
later the 'logical sign' and the 'magical sign'. The former is described as 
"a sign for the intelligence... it relates to a psychic regime dominated by 
the intelligence", and the latter is described as "a sign for the imagin-
ation... it relates to a psychic regime immersed in the living ocean of the 
imagination" (13, p. 227, 228). Maritain considers the magical sign to 
belong to the mental regime of primitive man and to pertain to an 
inferior human condition; the viewpoint of this study is, however, that in 
symbolism, where the affective imagination powers also dominate, a high 
level of human thinking can be attained and realized. The latter is a 
viewpoint that is presented in Suzanne Langer's philosophical discussion 
of symbolism. 
Suzanne Langer notices that there is an increasing rapprochement 
between philology and psychology, and makes a worthwhile distinction 
between sign and 'discursive' and 'presentational' symbolism. She 
describes signs as 'signal-things' in the sense of Werner (quoted in section 
4, p. 19), and distinguishes the sign as "something to act upon, or a 
means to command action", from the symbol as "an instrument of 
thought", and holds symbols in general (like Hall quoted in the 
preceding section, p. 26) , that "it is the conceptions, not the things, that 
symbols directly 'mean ' " (34, p. 61) . Meaning is considered to have a 
logical and a psychological aspect, to quote the following: 
"These two aspects, the logical and the psychological, are 
thoroughly confounded by the ambiguous verb 'to mean'; for 
sometimes it is proper to say 'it means', and sometimes I mean . 
Obviously a word — 'London' does not 'mean' a city in just 
the same sense a person employing the word 'means' the place. 
Both aspects, the logical and the psychological, are always 
present, and their interplay produces the great variety of 
meaning-relations over which philosophers have puzzled and 
fought for the last fifty years." (34, p. 53) 
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It is not the intention of this investigator to mingle in a philosophical 
fight about meaning but it is noticeable that Suzanne Langer's worthwhile 
distinction between 'discursive' and 'presentational' symbolism, disting-
uishes the former as pertaining to more logical discursive knowledge, 
from the latter as pertaining to more psychological ineffable knowledge. 
'Discursive symbolism' can only communicate thoughts which can be 
described in a verbal language, and is as verbal symbolism bound by the 
discursiveness of a vocabulary and the logics of the rules of the syntax 
(34, p. 81, 82, 94). The 'discursive symbolism' as a means of communi-
cating logical thought, seems to be much in line with Maritain's concept 
of the 'logical sign', and since its function is primarily to signify 
cognition-contents for the logical reasoning powers of the mind, and not 
the representation of the conception of a referent for a possible personal 
encounter, 'discursive symbolism' is from the viewpoint of this study 
considered to belong to the world of signs. 
'Presentational symbolism' serves the communication of ideas that are 
ineffable and incommunicable by means of words, and does so by means 
of the use of non-verbal visual and auditive forms, as lines, colors, and 
music. The most radical difference between verbal and non-verbal forms 
is that non-verbal forms are not discursive, but they are, as Suzanne 
Langer brings forward, as capable of articulation as words, and very 
well suited to express and communicate ineffable feelings and ideas, 
which are too subtle to be expressed in speech. To quote: 
"but the symbolism furnished by our purely sensory appreci-
ation of forms is a non-discursive symbolism, peculiarly well 
suited to the expression of ideas that defy linguistic 'projec-
tion'." (34 p. 93) 
In this type of symbolism the psychological aspect dominates. This does 
not mean, however, that 'presentational' symbolism is illogical, as both 
aspects, the psychological and the logical, are always present in 'meaning'. 
To quote: 
"The recognition of presentational symbolism as a normal and 
prevalent vehicle of meaning widens our conception of ration-
ality far beyond the traditional boundaries, yet never breaks 
faith with logic in the strictest sense... No symbol is exempt 
from the office of logical formulation, of conceptualizing what 
it conveys; however simple its import, or however great, this 
import is a meaning, and therefore, an element for understand-
ing." 
Presentational symbols 
"are understood only through the meaning of the whole, through 
their relations within the total structure. Their very functioning 
as symbols depends on the fact that they are involved in a 
simultaneous, integral presentation." (34 p. 97) 
The non-discursive symbolism in which a conception of the referent is 
picturalized, which enables the possibility of a personal encounter of the 
conception of the referent, is what symbolism is considered to be within 
the framework of this study. The domination of the psychological aspect 
indicates that symbolism is relatively free of determination and can only 
exist or occur when the individual can give personal meaning to what a 
symbol represents. Where this aspect is outspokenly evident in association 
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symbolism, as association symbols are subjectively created in the personal 
history of their users on grounds of an experienced associating together-
ness of referent and symbol, does this also hold for analogy symbolism. 
The logical analogous resemblance of symbols and referent in analogy 
symbols, does not necessitate their symbolic function, but stimulates or 
facilitates their use. So for instance, Hall adds to his statement quoted 
above, concerning the gun as a sex symbol for a dreamer who conceives 
of the male genital as a dangerous weapon, the remark that: 
"Of course, gun may not represent a sexual conception at all but 
signify some non-sexual idea in the dreamer's thoughts." (33 
p. 102) 
The aspects of picturing or embodying cognition-contents in a percept-
ible picture, of engaging the imagination and of stimulating contempla-
tion of the referent symbolized, are interwoven by the imaginative func-
tion, which is envolved in all three of these essential aspects. It is the affec-
tive imagination that stimulates the actual psychological development 
of symbolism from the perception of the symbol to the contemplative 
thinking about the referent. 
Calon and Prick in their psychological discussion of basic concepts in psy-
chology remark that it is far from possible to always distinguish imagina-
tion clearly from perception and thinking, and bring forward that 
imagination is integrated in perception. The in perception integrated images 
are, however, not experienced as images, but have a functional value in 
influencing the perception, without the perceiver being aware of their in-
fluence. These integrated or implicit images are distinguished from the 
free created or explicit images, which in all kind of degrees can loosen 
themselves from the perceptual and play an independent role. (35, p. 129, 
130) 
The loosening of free created, explicit images from the implicit images 
influencing the perception of the symbol, is what actually occurs in the 
actual development of symbolism. Fantasy, as an outspokenly subjective, 
voluntary, creative form of imagination, plays an important role in the 
contemplative encounter of the conception of the referent, as pictorially 
represented by the symbol. 
On the basis of the preceding this investigator defines symbolism as 
'the psychological function of picturalized inner-personal and inter-per-
sonal communication', and summarizes its essential characteristics as 
a) an analogous resemblance or associative relation based on picturalizing 
of the conception of the referent; b) an appeal of this embodied repre-
sentation on the imagination powers of its perceiver; c) a stimulation of 
a contemplative encounter of the picturalized conception of the referent 
represented. 
Following this theoretical discussion, the next chapter presents the empiri-
cal data concerning differences in word association reactions between 
early adolescents and educated adults. 
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CHAPTER II 
A COMPARISON OF WORD ASSOCIATION REACTIONS OF 
ADOLESCENTS AND ADULTS 
1. Procedure 
As mentioned in the Introduction a group-test method was used, and on 
the front page of a mimeographed testbooklet the following instructions 
were given: 
"On the next two pages a number of words are mentioned. Will 
you please read these, one by one, and write beside each word 
the first word that comes to your mind immediately after rea-
ding the word. 
Don't think or reason about it, just put down the first word 
that comes to your mind, whatever it is". 
The instructions are obviously aimed at avoiding rationalizations and at 
stimulating spontaneous reactions to the stimulus words, which were pre-
sented on the next two pages, and as mentioned in the Introduction, per-
tined mainly to the classical Freudian sex symbolism. With a space of 
about two thirds of an inch high and two inches long for writing the 
reaction beside each word, the following fifty nouns were printed in three 
rows per page: 
rose — ship — sausage — square — six — key — three — 
eagle — deer — circle — broom — gun — stick — bracelet — 
balloon — pocketbook — sabre — earth — flower — dustpan 
— mouth — umbrella — dog — bee — necktie — room — 
chapel — suitcase — door — moon — peacock — hammer — 
serpent — pocket — cat — foot — eight — machine — shoe 
— slipper — one — dishwasher — pin — hand — banana — 
butterfly — jewelcase — apple — house — sun. 
This is a free association test in the sense that subjects were free to react 
with any word they liked, and were not bound to react with synonyms, 
opposites of other defined types of reaction ; it is not a test of free associa-
tion in the sense used in psychoanalytic and analytic psychological ap-
proaches, as there subjects are asked to go on associating to their own 
associative reactions to the stimulus word concerned. This useful method 
for diagnosing individual psychological complexes is not used in the 
present study of group differences, but might in further more advanced 
and more sophisticated group-differential studies be advantageously used. 
That is if a suitable procedure for group-comparisons of these strings 
of individual reactions to stimulus words can fe found. 
The word association reactions to the test described above proved to 
pertain only to a limited extent to symbolism in the sense described in 
the preceding chapter, and are mostly of a non-symbolic nature. As a 
basis for group comparison the reactions were classified according to 
nine categories. Four of these categories pertain to reactions of a non-
symbolic nature, and three pertain to symbolism, in the sense described 
in Chapter I. Two categories pertain to reactions in which the nature of 
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the relation is not evident to the experimenter, or where the subjects did 
not give any reactions at all, or put a question mark as reaction to the 
stimulus word concerned. 
2. Classification of reactions 
The following four categories are distinguished as non-symbolic: 
1. 'Concrete Aspect' 
The reactions indicate a concrete aspect of the object, plant, or animal 
indicated by the stimulus word, e.g. apple-red; and also reversed relation 
in which the reaction word embodies what is indicated by the stimulus 
word, as a concrete aspect, e.g. square-block, circle-ball. The reactions of 
this category do not pertain to symbolic representation, and the abstract-
ion activity involved does not go beyond the selection of a concrete aspect 
of the stimulus word, or a selection of the stimulus word as a concrete 
aspect of the word association given. As can be seen in Table 1 (33), 
this category contains, for both groups, a more dominant number of reac-
tions than any of the other categories distinguished, which appears to 
suggest that a noun as stimulus word in a word association test calls for-
ward primarily a pictorial image of whatever the noun indicates for the 
subject concerned. 
2. 'Concrete Category' 
Reactions are a concrete indication of something belonging to the same 
category as what is indicated by the stimulus word; e.g. rose-daisy, three-
four. There is an implicit indication of categorical thinking in the men-
tioning of something that belongs to the same category, but this categor-
ical thinking does not reach the explicit and logical abstract level of cate-
gorical thinking, as entailed in the reactions that are classified as abstract 
categorical thinking under category 4, and will be described there. 
3. 'Action Aspect' 
The reaction indicates an action of function aspect of what is indicated 
by the stimulus word, like: broom-sweeping, mouth-kissing, gun-fighting. 
In these associations the stimulus words function as an indication of 
something that is perceived as an 'action thing' or 'signal thing' in the 
sense of Werner's description in Chapter I. As these reactions do occur in 
the adolescent as well as in the educated adult group, it appears that Wer-
ner's statement that this type of reactions also occur on the high develop-
mental level of educated men is confirmed. 
4. 'Abstract Category' 
Reactions mentioning the logical category, to what is indicated by the 
stimulus word belongs in an abstract, essential, non-pictorial way to this 
category. For instance: rose-flower, three-number, dog-animal. The associ-
ations in this category are based on a level of abstract thinking in which 
rational, non-pictorial abstractions dominate, and as such differ essentially 
from the pictorial, concrete categorical thinking involved in the reactions 
of category 2, described above. 
The following three categories are distinguished in symbolism: 
5. 'Association Symbol' 
Stimulus words functioning as an association symbol, in the sense describ-
ed in Chapter I, for instance: eagle-U.S.A., rose-spring. 
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6. Object Алаіоку SymboiC 
Stimulus words functioning as an analogy symbol (as described in Chap­
ter I), represent the conception of an object or person, for instance: stick-
gun, rose-mother. The reactions in this category are abstract in the sense 
of perceiving an abstracted analogous resemblance in what is indicated by 
the stimulus word and the reaction given, and are concrete in the respect, 
that a concrete object or person is symbolized by the stimulus word. 
7. 'Abstract Analogy SymboF 
Stimulus words functioning as an analogy symbol represent an abstract 
idea, e.g. rose-beauty, circle-infinity. This from a developmental point of 
view highest form of symbolism relates the concrete object plant or 
animal indicated by the stimulus word, to the idea indicated by the 
reaction, by means of an abstraction of an aspect of the stimulus, which 
is perceived as representing an essential abstract aspect of the idea in a 
pictorial perceptible way. 
«. 'Not Evidene 
The 'Not Evident' category includes those reactions which through a lack 
of clarity or evidence concerning the associative grounds could not be 
checked further because of the limits of the method followed in this inves­
tigation; e.g., eagle-arithmetic, deer-salt. The reactions in this category 
might, as demonstrated by Jung, prove to be of great importance in a 
clinical individual diagnostic use of a word association test, however, this 
possibility is not checked any further in this pilot test. 
9. 'Question Mark' 
Question marks as reactions, or no reaction at all comprise the 'Question 
Mark' category. These reactions would also be of importance in a clinical 
individual approach, but remain, besides comparison of group-differences 
in the number of these reactions, outside further consideration. 
The word association of a group of early adolescents and a group of 
adults, were compared according to the number of reactions in each of the 
categories rescribed above. All reactions are classified by the experimenter 
which leads necessarily to arbitrariness in the classification. It is, for in­
stance, open to discussion whether a reaction such as: 'deer-hunting' 
should be classified as 'Action Aspect', as 'Association Symbol' or as 'Not 
Evident'. Since the scoring was done only by this investigator there should 
be a resultant sameness of classification for similar reactions, which will 
narrow the limits of the scoring range, and thus provide a reasonably safe 
basis for group-comparison. This process was further augmented by the 
category 'Not Evident' which did not force the experimenter to score any 
reaction under one or another specific symbolic or non-symbolic category, 
when it was not warranted or doubtful. 
3. Description of the groups compared 
The adolescent group consisted of one class of students of a catholic high 
school which consisted of 16 boys and 18 girls. This was an almost all 
white catholic group of average or higher intelligence with an average 
age of 14 years (range 13-15). This selection of a normal class of 8th 
grade junior high school students justifies the supposition that this group 
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might be representative of the normal early adolescent population of 
catholic junior high schools in suburban communities. 
The adult group consisted of a class of adult students attending psycho-
logy courses at the summer school of a catholic university. The group 
consisted of 11 men and 19 women. This second group was comprised 
of almost all white catholic students of average or higher intelligence, with 
a college education or better; with an average age of 28 years (range 
19-40). This selection of an accidentally available class of university sum-
mer school students, mostly professional school teachers, offer some 
grounds for the supposition that this group might represent American 
catholic school teachers. 
Table 1 
Word association reactions of early adolescent high school 
students and adult summer school students 
Nr. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
nr. 34, 
reactions 
Concrete aspect 
Concrete category 
Action aspect 
Abstract category 
Association symbol 
Object analogy symbol 
Abstract analogy symbol 
Not Evident 
Question Mark (?) 
Total concrete aspect 
(sum 1, 2, 3) 
Total symbolism 
(sum 5, 6, 7) 
Total not evident 
(sum 8, 9) 
High School 
average age 
è 
788 
245 
151 
306 
101 
20 
14 
56 
30 
1,700 
14 nr. 
'S 
11 
о 
46 
14 
9 
18 
6 
1 
1 
3 
2 
70 
8 
5 
Summer School 
30, average age 28 
aä 
551 
304 
141 
210 
131 
15 
49 
33 
66 
1,500 
-4 
¿»•s 
37 
20 
9 
14 
9 
1 
3 
2 
4 
66 
13 
7 
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The word association reactions of the high school group of early adoles-
cent age, and the summer school group of adult age, are compared 
according to the number of reactions in each of the categories described 
above, calculated as percentages of the total number of reactions given 
to the fifty stimulus words by the group concerned. 
4. Comparison of adolescent and adult word association reactions 
In Table I (p. 33) the following are reported: the total number of 
reactions per group, number of reactions per category, and percentages 
of the total number of reactions per group for each category; also the 
summed total percentage of the reactions of the categories 1, 2, and 3, 
as pertaining to concrete association aspects ; the summed total percentage 
of the reactions of the categories 5, 6, and 7 as pertaining to symbolic 
relations; and the summed total percentage of the reactions of the cate-
gories 8 and 9 as pertaining to relations that lack clarity either for the 
experimenter or for the participating subjects concerned. 
In comparing the percentages for the different categories for both groups 
(in Table I) , it is surprising that there are no greatly significant differen-
ces between the scores for any of the categories distinguished. It seems 
that the psychological activities involved in a simple word association test 
do not result in indications of different levels of associative thinking in 
educated adolescents and adults. 
The mental set resulting from the instruction to write down the first word 
that comes to the mind produces in both groups a majority of associations 
based on concrete aspects, with, at best, the indication of a possible 
slightly stronger tendency in the adolescents towards concrete thinking. 
It is remarkable that the adolescents show the same, or even a somewhat 
higher percentage based on abstract formal categorical thinking. It seems 
that a tendency towards abstract formal logical thinking is well developed 
at the age of fourteen, and that this form of thinking occurs as frequently, 
or perhaps even more frequently in early adolescence than at the adult 
age. The total percentage of symbolic reactions for adults is slightly 
higher, indicating at best, a possible tendency for adults towards more 
symbolic thinking. 
This notion of a possibly more concrete and more formal logical 
abstract thinking for adolescents and a possibly more symbolic mode of 
thinking for adults, will become apparent in the symbolic meaning test, 
which will be dealt with in the next chapter. At this point, however, the 
summarizing conclusion must be that the word association experiment 
indicates no evidence of any significant difference in concrete, abstract, 
categorical, and symbolic thinking between educated adolescents and 
adults in a mental set towards reacting with associations. 
5. Association defined 
The variation in associative reactions found in the simple experiment 
described above leads to an attempt at defining what is meant by associ-
ation in this study. The variation and sometimes vagueness of the mean-
ings of association in modem psychology necessitates a clarification of 
what psychological association is considered to be in the framework of 
this study. 
34 
Bleuler for instance, expected from the study of association a diagnostic 
too] that would enable the psychologist to assess the whole human being, 
as he states in the forword to Jung's association studies: 
„So spiegelt sich in der Assoziationstätigkeit das Ganze psy-
chische Sein der Vergangenheit und der Gegenwart mit allen 
seinen Erfahrungen und Strebungen. Sie wird dadurch zu einem 
Index für alle psychische Vorgänge, den wir nur zu entziffren 
brauchen, um den ganzen Menschen zu kennen". (6, p. 4) 
Jung realized something of this great expectation in the use of his word 
association test in therapeutic and forensic psychiatry; he demonstrated, 
at least in a psychoanalytic frame of reference, that complexes of the indi-
vidual did influence word association reactions. In his later years, Jung 
dropped his further studies of the possibilities entailed in his word associ-
ation test. He left to students interested in the diagnostic significance of 
word associations the finding, that unusual reactions in content, reaction-
time, or failure to react or to remember reactions given immediately after 
the test was finished, can be considered indicators of the personal psychol-
ogical complexes of the individual concerned. 
From the Leipzig laboratory came Wilhelm Wundt's experimental ap-
proach to association studies. He was stimulated by the expectation that 
association psychology would provide the key to an exact-scientific chem-
istry of the mind. This resulted in the well known laws of association, 
concerning the association of simultaneous, successive, resembling or con-
trasting images. These laws are implicity incorporated in the Gestalt 
psychological approaches to perception, and in the stimulus centered 
behavioral approaches to learning, as noted by Woodworth. (36, p. 131) 
Kouwer as a phenomenologist seems to return to the viewpoint of Bleuler 
and Jung of personal involvement in any association when he states: 
"But in every instance the question remains the same: why were 
these associations formed and not other ones, and why did just 
these facts grow to be so closely related? As in the case of 
synaesthesia, the causes must rather be sought in the nature of 
perception, in the function of color perception in the totality of 
the person. Perceiving is: perceiving through the emotional, 
motor, spiritual, and all other aspects of the person". (37, p . 54) 
Galon and Prick attempt to assimilate the associational laws into the 
phenomenological viewpoint. They state that in modem psychology the as-
sociation laws are formulated in such a way that they can be built into the 
theory that every experience involves the whole personality, seen as a 
structured unity, of which each part has the tendency to call forward, 
via the totality of which it is a part, other experience aspects. (35, p. 131) 
Rohracher in the 1960 edition of his "Einführung in die Psychologie" 
does not go so far as to state that all associations can be explained as a 
product of the whole personality of the associating individual. Rohracher 
describes 'simple associations', in which the associational laws and 
especially repetition play an important role, and he holds, from a 
developmental point of view, that these associations dominate on lower 
levels of intellectual development. 
A second category distinguished by Rohracher is 'resemblance associa-
tions'. The question whether resemblance is based on parts that are the 
same (red coat — red tie), or on a sameness of structural relations (big 
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circle — small circle), or a sameness in pregnant totality qualities, is 
considered by Rohracher, for the time being, an unsolved problem. As a 
last category Rohracher describes 'complex associations'. Complex is 
here not used in the clinical sense of Jung, but in the general psycholo-
gical sense of G. E. Müller, and characterized as a psychological constel-
lation of units that are more closely associated with one another when 
they are parts of this constellation than when they are parts of different 
'complexes'. 
Complex associations can be either of a 'Gestalt' nature (association 
based on a belongingness to a same concrete perceptual totality), or of a 
'meaning' nature (based on the relation of the meaning of the associating 
parts). To quote Rohracher: 
"Immerhin lässt sich zusammenfassend als bisher gesichertes 
Ergebnis feststellen: komplexe Assoziationen entstehen aus der 
gestaltmässigen oder sinnhaften Zusammengehörigkeit ihrer Ein-
zelheiten; gestaltmässige Zusammengehörigkeit liegt vor, wenn 
die Beziehungen der Einzelheiten zueinander früher einmal 
wahrnemungsmässig gegeben waren, wobei räumliche oder zeit-
liche Nachbarschaft eine entscheidene Rolle spielen; sinnhafte 
Zusammengehörigkeit ist gegeben, wenn die Bedeutung der Ein-
zelheiten die gegenseitige Beziehung herstellt. Das Letztere ist 
das Ordnungsprinzip unseres gesamten begrifflichen Denkens; 
der Sinn eines Gedanken steuert die Reproduktion anderer Ge-
danken". (38, p. 261, 262) 
In checking the empirical findings of this study against Rohracher's clear, 
compact and matter-of-fact description of association it is noticeable that 
'simple' associations dominate in the reactions to the word association 
test. For instance the reactions of the categories 1, 3 and 5, of Table 1, 
which fall under Rohracher's description of simple association, cover in 
the adolescent group more than sixty percent of the total number of reac-
tions, and in the adult group over fifty percent. There is no reason to 
believe that personal involvement plays an important part in the formation 
of this type of associations, but there is evidence to suppose that aspects 
of the stimulus do play a dominating role. 
The frequency tables of reactions per stimulus word on the Kent-
Rosanoff test offer a wealth of evidence that simple associations domi-
nate, the responses and that primarily the stimulus determines this type of 
association. If one, for instance, notices that from a thousand reactions to 
the word 'needle', 160 were 'thread', 152 'sharp', 147 'pin' and 242 'sew', 
or 'sewing', then the domination of the stimulus in the formation of simple 
associations must be accepted as a fact. Consequently, following Jung, 
Kent and Rosanoff do not give diagnostic value to what they call 'com-
mon' reactions, but consider only unusual 'individual' reactions as of pos-
sible pathological significance (8, p. 547). The latter indicates the possi-
bility of individually determined reactions, which lead in Rosanoffe 
research to group differences between normal and insane people and as 
such are of diagnostic importance. Diagnostic possibilities are, however, 
not the subject of the present study.* 
* Remark: The nature of the influence of different types of stimuli on the level 
of associative thinking stimulated seems to be in need of further investigation. We 
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Resemblance associations (in which as mentioned by Rohracher the 
nature of the resemblance relation is problematic) overlap simple and 
complex associations. They occur in the following: 'Concrete Aspect' cate-
gory (e.g. apple-red. square-block) ; in the concrete pictorial logical 
classification of category 2 (e.g. square-rectangle, suitcase-bag) ; in the 
Object Analogy Symbols of category 6 (e.g. stick-gun, rose-mother) ; and 
in the Abstract Analogy Symbols of category 7 (e.g. rose-beauty). It is 
possible to include under this type of associations reactions indicating a 
contrast, as they are basically products of a resemblance expressed in a 
contrasting way, like: square-round, one-couple, earth-sky. The problem 
remaining concerning resemblance is: what type of resemblancee is to 
be found under what type of circumstances? It was noted, for instance, 
that a mental set towards symbolic thinking produces a higher frequency 
of essential analogous resemblance relations, than a mental set towards 
associative thinking, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
Complex associations of a 'Gestalt' nature (described by Rohracher as 
belonging to a same concrete perceptual totality) were found in reactions 
as: moon-sky, door-room. Complex associations of a 'meaning' nature 
(based on a relation of the meaning of the associating parts) are given 
in reactions such as: circle-infinity, flower-love, and rose-mother, flower-
my father. 
The aspect of the personal individual determination of associations which 
is stressed by phenomenological psychologists, seems to be most domi-
nant in the complex associations based on 'meaning'. The meaning here 
seems primarily to be given or chosen by the associating individual, who 
creates a meaningful relation between the images concerned, using the 
possibilities included in his images of both stimulus and reaction. The 
data of word association tests indicate that this type of associations can 
occur, but in a mental set towards reacting with the first word that comes 
to mind after reading the stimulus word, do they form a small minority 
of the total number of reactions obtained in this way. This seems to indi-
cate that normally a person does not associate — or at least not express 
associative reactions in a clearly personal way, unless the stimulus, the 
situations, the mental set or certain attitudinal preoccupations stimulate a 
personal way of reacting. In this respect the illustrating remark made by 
Strasser, and related by Buytendijk, in a context dealing with phenomeno-
logical methodology is applicable, in that 
"in the same type of neurotic patients they dealt with, Freud 
never noticed indications of inferiority complexes and Adler 
never noticed indications of Oedipus complexes", (translation 
of quote by author (39, p. 7)) 
Association in a very general sense indicates only that psychological con-
tents are somehow linked in the mind. In this sense association is only a 
find for instance, if we add the reactions to the two words indicating birds in our 
test (eagle and peacock), and the reactions to the two words indicating insects 
(bee and butterfly), in both groups that the number of reactions falling under the 
categories of simple associations (1, 3 and 5), totals only 29 for the birds but 95 
for the insects. On the other hand the number of reactions indicating a logical 
formal abstract relation (like 'bird' and 'insects' of category 4) totals 82 for these 
birds and only 14 for the insects. One can speculate about the reasons for these 
differences, but further research will be necessary before any explanation can be 
much more than speculative guesswork. 
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statement about the fact of the link but explains, as such, nothing, as noted 
by Galon and Prick (35, p. 30). In this broad meaning, association would, 
for instance, cover logical relations, symbolic relations, accidental relations, 
and in short, as Bleuler (quoted above) would have it, associational activ-
ity would reflect the total psychological reality of past and present. Such 
a broad concept is not practical, and following the suggestion of Dumas 
(quoted in the preceding chapter), this study will limit the concept of 
association to those relations that are based on repeated experience of 
simultaneous or successive togetherness of the images linked together. 
This would cover Rohracher's simple associations, resemblance associa-
tions in so far as the resemblance is based on parts that are the same, 
and the complex associations oí a 'Gestalt1 nature, based on belongingness 
to a same concrete perceptual totality. 
In summarizing the findings of this study it is noticeable that in the word 
association test simple associations dominate in both the adolescent and 
the adult group, whereas formal logical abstract and symbolic reactions 
abo occur in a mental set towards associative thinking, but to a far much 
lesser extent. The following chapter will be a discussion of the findings 
concerning the symbolic meaning reactions to the same fifty stimulus 
words as used in the word association test. 
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CHAPTER III 
A COMPARISON OF SYMBOLIC MEANINGS OF WORDS 
FOR ADOLESCENTS AND ADULTS 
1. Procedure 
The word association test as described in the preceding chapter was 
immediately followed by a symbolic meaning test, carried out on the 
same groups of adolescents and adults in the same session. The written 
instruction presented, in a mimeographed test booklet containing the 
same fifty nouns as selected for the word association test, was worded 
as follows: 
"On the next two pages a number of objects, plants, and animals 
are mentioned. 
Will you please write down beside each of them, what it sym-
bolically means to you. 
For instance, 'a lion' might have a symbolic meaning for you 
such as 'strenght', 'courage', 'fierce', 'nobility' or something 
else. Don't reason about it but fill in the first symbolic meaning 
that comes to your mind. Also, 'a rose' might symbolically 
mean to you something such as 'love', 'beauty', 'tenderness', 
or something else. But whatever symbolic meaning each object, 
plant, or animal mentioned might have for you, no matter how 
intimate you find it, please write it down. Please read the words 
one by one and write down the symbolic meaning immediately 
after reading the word. Give only one symbolic meaning for 
each of the objects, plants, or animals mentioned". 
The instructions are intended to stimulate a mental set towards symbolic 
thinking and they were given so explicitly and elaborately so that the 
subjects would avoid persevering in the set directed towards associa-
tional thinking in the preceding word association test. The first stimulus 
word of the test (a rose) was used as an example of symbolic meanings 
in the instructions, so that the intention or set towards symbolic thinking 
might be strengthened from the beginning of the test. (The possible 
influence this might have had on the reactions to the word concerned 
could not be checked and is left outside further consideration). 
The stimulus words in this test were provided with an article since the 
preliminary research, mentioned in the Introduction, indicated that the 
addition of the indefinite article might stimulate a more concrete pictor-
ial image of what the stimulus words indicate. That a more concrete 
type of stimuli can result in a more concrete type of reaction is demon-
strated by Dorcus, who found that the mentioning of colors as stimulus 
words seems to stimulate color naming as associations (like: white-
black, red-blue), but that the presentation of colored objects stimulates 
associations connected with colored objects (like: blue paper-ribbons, 
red paper-fingernails) (reported by Osgood, 16, p. 217, 218). 
The above mentioned supposition, that the addition of an article might 
give the noun as stimulus a more concrete pictorial character, seems to 
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be indirectly supported from the linguistic theory expounded in a recent 
inaugural address at Nijmegen University, on the origin and functions 
of the definite article in English. In this address Storms indicated that 
the article developed from the demonstrative pronoun and does have 
the double semantic function of, on the one hand, individualizing and 
familiarizing what is indicated by the noun, and on the other hand 
generalizing the meaning of the noun. Storms' explanation of this double 
semantic function rests on the texts of early English picture books; these 
texts start with a demonstrative pronoun referring to the plant, animal, 
or object pictured, followed by the use of the article in the description 
of the properties of the plant, animal, or objects concerned. 
This led Storms to the conclusion that: 
"The original use of the demonstrative pronoun weakens and the 
general meaning of the context leads to the generalizing function 
of the article; from this herb, this animal (pictured or discuss-
ed) we come to the betony grows in the meadows; the hart 
has two natures; etc." (40, p. 19) 
The problem of the more or less picturalizing influence of the definite 
article, dealt with by Storms, and the indefinite article as an addition to 
the nouns used as stimulus words in his study, leads to problems of a 
more philological nature that will not dealt with in this investigation; 
it is possible, however, that a statistical experimental approach to this 
problem, might result in a sharpening of this research tool for the 
investigation of the psychological nature of symbolic reactions to nouns. 
The symbolic meaning reactions were classified according to the same 
categories as described in the preceding chapter, and are in numbers per 
category and percentages per category of the total number of reactions 
per group, reported in Table 2 (p. 41). 
2. Adolescent and adult symbolic meaning of words 
The data of Table 2 show contrasting differences between the symbolic 
meaning reactions of adolescents and adults. The contrast between 26% 
for the adolescent and 11% for the adults in the 'Concrete Aspect' cate-
gory is unmistakable evidence that adolescents think more in a concrete 
manner than adults do. The figures for categories 2 and 3, also pertain-
ing to relations of concrete aspects, confirm this evidence, and conse-
quently a comparison of the sum total of these three categories, with a 
total of 39% for the adolescents and only 16% for the adults, leaves 
no doubt about the more concrete manner or adolescent thought, at 
least within the framework of this investigation. 
In the preceding chapter it was noted that the adolescent has a stronger 
tendency towards logical, formal abstract categorical thinking in word 
associations than the adult, and this is also confirmed in the symbolic 
meaning reactions of the early adolescents where the number of reactions 
indicating logical abstract thinking are higher for the adolescents than 
for the adults. The percentages for category 4 (pertaining to abstract 
categorical reactions as rose-flower, three-number) are 14% for the 
adolescents and 9% for adults. 
The educated adult thinks, however, much more in abstract analogous 
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TabU 2 
Symbolic meaning reactions of adolescent high school students 
and adiät summer school students 
High School 
nr. 34, average age 
Number of reactions 1,700 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
Concrete aspects 
Concrete category 
Action aspect 
Abstract category 
Association symbol 
Object analogy symbol 
Abstract analogy symbol 
Not evident 
(?) Question Mark 
Total concrete aspect 
(sum 1, 2, 3) 
Total symbolism 
(sum 5, 6, 7) 
Total not evident 
(sum 8, 9) 
It if 
'B éS. 
я 
450 
76 
142 
236 
262 
40 
307 
80 
107 
Summer School 
14 nr. 30, average age 28 
І 
1 
'S 
# 
26 
4 
8 
14 
15 
2 
18 
5 
6 
39 
36 
11 
1,500 
3 t 
u 
•з: 
¿s. 
г 
168 
19 
57 
132 
262 
53 
661 
46 
102 
é 
e 
-S 
11 
1 
4 
9 
17 
4 
44 
3 
7 
16 
65 
10 
symbolic relations than does the adolescent. In fact, in relative and 
absolute figures, it is so predominate that abstract analogy symbolism 
seems to be the characteristic mode of symbolic thought for the educated 
adult. The percentages for category 7 (pertaining to reactions as rose-
beauty, circle-infinity, of 18% for the adolescent group and 44% for the 
educated adults, can be considered unmistakable evidence that analogy 
symbolism dominates the symbolic thought of the educated adult. 
The findings mentioned above indicated that, in intended symbolic-
thought, the early adolescent thinks significantly more in concrete rela-
tions, somewhat more in logical abstract categories, but considerably 
less abstract analogous symbolic, then does the educated adult. This 
leads us to believe that the tendency towards formal abstract thinking 
might have to be considered a developmental bridge leading from a do-
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minantly concrete associative way of thinking towards the dominant ab-
stract analogous symbolic way of thinking, that is characteristic for the 
symbolic thinking of the educated adult. 
The fact that the figures for category 5, pertaining to association sym-
bolism, are almost equal for both groups (15 and 17%), strengthens 
the likelihood of the above supposition. The adolescent is equal to the 
educated adult in association symbolism when he can develop the sym-
bolic relation through repeated contiguous presentations of the images 
of referent and the symbol (e.g. umbrella-rain, rose-spring). The adult, 
however, surpasses the adolescent, in applying abstractive powers to an 
immediate relating of personally abstracted essentials of the conception 
of a referent and the picturalized image of a stimulus, perceived as a 
symbol for this referent (e.g. circle-infinity, flower-love). 
The development of thinking from early adolescence to adulthood ap-
pears not to move towards more formal abstract categorical thinking, 
but towards integrating formal abstraction powers into the personal, 
picturalized contemplative way of thinking entailed in analogy symbol-
ism. The figures for category 7 (pertaining to abstract analogy symbol-
ism), of 18% for the adolescent group and 44% for adult group, seem 
to indicate that the adolescent is approaching, but that the educated 
adult has arrived at, the level of abstract symbolic thinking that is char-
acteristically his own. 
It is remarkable that despite the instructions to give only symbolic mean-
ings, a considerable number of reactions in both groups fall under each 
of the categories distinguished. A number of the adult reactions and even 
more of the adolescent reactions remain on the level of simple associa-
tions of concrete aspects. A variety of explanations for these findings 
are possible: symbolism may be a rather difficult concept, that is not 
clearly understood by some of the participants; or that, as discussed in 
the preceding chapter in connection with the influence of the stimulus 
word on the type of association, some of the nouns do stimulate symbolic 
and others non-symbolic thinking. It seems most likely that, with an 
additional influence of the factors mentioned above, differences in intel-
ligence levels between participants may explain the variations in the 
levels of intended symbolic reactions. Since the intelligence level of none 
of the participants is below average, and since no further information 
about differences in intelligence among participants is available, the 
above mentioned supposition cannot be checked. 
Summarizing the evidence entailed in the symbolic meaning test, the 
findings are that in intended symbolic thinking, the adolescent thinks 
evidently more concretely, somewhat more formally abstract, but signifi-
cantly in a less abstract symbolic manner than the educated adult, whose 
intended symbolic thinking can be characterized as primarily abstract 
symbolic. 
3. A comparison of symbolic meanings and word associations 
A comparison of the data of Table 1 (p. 33) and Table 2 (p. 41) shows 
the two different modes of intended associational and intended symbolic 
thinking. Associations of concrete aspects dominate in the word associa-
tion test in both groups (sum total for the categories concerned, 70 and 
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6 6 % ) , indicating that regardless of the age difference, the intention to 
react with the first word that comes to mind, leads to a dominating 
inclination towards simple concrete associations. 
The symbolic meaning test reactions show in comparison with the word 
association reactions a considerable drop in concrete associative think-
ing, with however, significant differences between the reactions of the 
adolescent and the adult group. The adolescents drop in concrete thinking 
from 70 tot 39%, and the adults from 66 to 16%. There is considerable 
increase in symbolic reactions in the symbolic meaning test, with signi-
ficant differences between the adolescent and the adult group being 
noted. In adolescents the increase in symbolic reactions is from 8 to 
36%, but in adults it is from 13 to 6 5 % . There is also considerable 
difference in the types of symbolic reactions between adolescents and 
adults. Whereas the adolescent group produces 15% association sym-
bols, 2 % object-analogy symbols and 18% abstract-analogy symbols, 
the figures for the adult group are 17% association symbols, 4 % object-
analogy symbols and 4 4 % abstract-analogy symbols. This indicates that 
in a mental set towards symbolic thinking, the adolescent is not only 
less able than the adult to think symbolically, but he is also less able to 
think on the high developmental level of analogy symbolism, which is 
the characteristic way of symbolic thinking of the educateci adult. 
It should be noted here that the differences in reactions to the word associ-
ation test and the symbolic meaning test, found between the reactions 
of early adolescents and educated adults, are evidence that the symbolic 
meaning test is a much more suitable instrument to differentiate between 
levels of intellectual development, than the word association test. Since 
an investigation of developmental aspects of symbolic thinking is the pri-
mary purpose of this study, a further discussion of the empirical find-
ings will follow. 
Is is remarkable that the 'Action Aspect' reactions (e.g. broom-sweeping, 
gun-fighting) remain on the same numerical level for adolescents in both 
tests (9 and 8 % ) , and drop for adults from 9 % in the word association 
test, to 4 % in the mentally more difficult symbolic meaning test. This 
might (within the limits of the problematic statistical value of these 
small absolute numbers) confirm Werner's statement (quoted in Chap-
ter I p. 19), that 'things-of-action' or 'signal-things' are perceived more 
on lower levels of mental development, but do also occur in the most 
highly developed human beings. It is noticeable that the formal logical 
abstract reactions of category 4 (e.g. rose-flower, dog-animal) show 
(also with problematic statistical value), a like picture; dropping for 
adolescents from 1 8 % in the simpler word association test, to 14% 
in the mentally more challenging symbolic meaning test, and dropping 
for adults form 14 to 9%. Intrigued by this concurrency we follow 
Werner's line of thought in offering the following possible explanation: 
as action aspects, as described by Wemer, are in familiar situations 
stimulated by signal qualities of the 'things-of-action', it is possible that 
the formal abstract aspects of some stimulus words, have a signal quality 
in respect to formal logical abstract thinking. Logical, categorical, scien-
tific thinking is a familiar situation for high school students, in that they 
pursue the basic principles of science in their daily schoolwork. The 
choice of a formal abstract categorical relation is hence, especially if the 
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Stimulus word has signal qualities in that direction, a relatively easy one. * 
In comparing the figures for association symbolism (category 5), in 
the word association test and the symbolic meaning test, it is notewor-
thy that in a set towards associational thinking, the association symbol 
dominates significantly over the analogy symbol. As can be seen in 
Table 1, in the preceding chapter (p. 33), the adolescent group gives 
a total of 8% symbolic reactions, 6% association symbols, and in the 
adult group, a total of 13% symbolic reactions, and 9% association 
symbols are given. In the symbolic meaning test, however, the percen-
tages for the categories concerned show that a different picture appears, 
as can be seen in Table 2 (p. 41). For the adolescents the number of 
association symbol reactions increased to 15%, but this is less than half 
of the total of 36% of symbolic reactions in the adolescent group. For 
the adults there is an increase to 17% association symbols, but this is 
only about one fourth of the total of 65% symbolic reactions. Analogy 
symbolism, which is quite behind association symbolism in frequency, 
in a mental set directed towards associative thinking, takes the lead in 
intended symbolic thinking in the adolescent, and becomes the dominant 
form of symbolic thinking in the educated adult. This finding confirms 
the viewpoint of Dumas that associations symbols as pseudo-symbols de-
velop in and represent a lower form of mental activity than analogy sym-
bols, which Dumas holds (as mentioned in Chapter I) to be truly sym-
bolic. 
Object Analogy Symbols (so accentuated in Freudian sex symbolism) 
remain on a low level of frequency in both tests. In the word associa-
tion test the total for both groups combined is 2%, and in the symbolic 
meaning test the total for both groups combined is 6%. It seems that, at 
least without stimulation in that direction, this type of symbolism occurs 
rather seldom,and that it occurs even less frequently in intended associ-
ative thinking than in intended symbolic thinking. 
Abstract Analogy Symbols, while showing a very low frequency in the 
word association test (total for both groups combined 4%), do however, 
as mentioned before, become the most frequently used form of symbol-
ism in the symbolic meaning test (total both groups combined 62%). 
The significant difference between the 18% for the adolescent and 44% 
for the adult group would tend to indicate that this form of symbolic 
thought is typical for the educated adult group. 
Summarizing the findings, it is noteworthy that the differences in the 
levels of thinking between educated adolescents and educated adults 
which were slight in the reactions to the word association test, became 
striking in the symbolic meaning test. The adolescent thinks, evidently, 
much more in simple associations of concrete aspects than the educated 
* Remark: We checked, for instance, the reactions to the stimulus-words 'six' and 
'broom' and found that 'six' resulted in not a single Action Aspect and 25 Abstract 
Category reactions in the word association test, and only 1 Action Aspect and abo 
25 Abstract Category reactions in the symbolic meaning test. 'Broom', however, 
resulted in 28 Action Aspects and not a single Abstract Category reaction in the 
word association test, and also 28 Action Aspects and only 1 Abstract Category 
reaction in the symbolic meaning test. This is as an illustration, but more conclusive 
evidence, however, would require a special investigation directed to this problem, 
which falls outside the scope of this study. 
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adult, and is somewhat more inclined towards formal logical abstract 
categorical thinking. He is as much inclined to think in association 
symbols as the adult, but the educated adult surpasses him in displaying 
almost twice the inclination towards symbolic thinking in general, and 
more than double the inclination towards thinking in abstract analogy 
symbolism. The development of thinking from early adolescence to adult-
hood seems to move not towards more formal abstract categorical think-
ing, but towards integrating formal abstraction powers into the perso-
nal, picturalized, contemplative way of thinking entailed in analogy sym-
bolism. 
If an attempt is made, on the grounds of these findings, to picture the 
thinking world of the early adolescent, then it seems that he stands, in 
a literal sense, more objectively in the world, which he seems to exper-
ience as standing opposite him; it is a world of objects in which he 
sees primarily concrete aspects which he can relate in simple associa-
tions. It is a world that he has structured in formal logical abstract 
categories, in which he can classify objects of the world around him. 
In relying on repeated experiences of symbol and referent he can 
encounter a symbolic world in non-essential relations, but he has also 
started to apply his abstraction powers in a personal way in the realization 
of the highest form of symbolism of which he is also capable. The 
educated early adolescent has obviously found his way towards a per-
sonal, picturalized, contemplative way of thinking, characteristic of the 
analogy symbolism that dominates in the symbolic thinking of the 
educated adult. 
Since the influence of attitude and set on thinking have been repeatedly 
mentioned, in this and the preceding chapter, and will be again mentioned 
in the chapters to follow, it seems that a clarification of what, in the 
present study, is meant by these terms is appropriate, before proceeding 
with a discussion of sex symbolism and the symbolism of the sexes in a 
masculine and feminine symbolic meaning test. 
4. Attitude and set distinguished 
The varied and sometimes overlapping meanings given to attitude and set 
necessitate a differentiating description; Crijns for instance, discussing 
attitude in a social psychological setting, states explicitly that the term 
"attitude" has come to be defined in many different ways, and he 
indicates implicitly in the remark: "The term 'attitude', in the sense of 
mental set or 'Einstellung', dates back to the early nineteenth century..." 
(41, p. 89) that attitude and set can also refer to the same concept, 
which is understandable as both belong to the field of intentionality. One 
can, however, distinguish the two concepts, at least within the framework 
of symbolic thinking, as to different modes of intentional existence, within 
the broader concept of intentionality in general, which indicates a psy-
chological direction, a being directed towards something. Even the general 
idea of intentionality as explicitly introduced in psychology by Brentano 
needs differentiation in essentially different modes of intentional existence, 
as demonstrated by Calon and Prick who clearly distinguish in Brentano's 
intentionality the two aspects of A, "the intentional existence of objects", 
and B, "the intentional existence of subjects directed towards objects" 
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(35, p. 80). Mode A, the intentional existence of objects, is not the 
physical existence of objects as such, but pertains to the way in which 
objects, towards which a subject directs itself intentionally, exist in the 
mind of the subject concerned. Symbols, as picturalized representations 
of conceptions of the referent exist 'par excellence' in this intentional 
mode; a symbol does not exist as such but only exists in the mind of a 
subject that gives symbolic meaning, in an expressing or in a perceiving 
way, to an object of stimulus. Mode B, the intentional existence of sub-
jects, is not the existence of subjects as such (man, boy, girl), but per-
tains to the psychologically being directed towards the object of the 
subject. To this subject mode of intentional existence belong attitude and 
set which will be distinguished further on the grounds of some essentially 
different aspects. 
An attitude is a mode of intentional subject existence of a relatively 
stable endurance. Attitudes do not change immediately with changes in 
the situation, or changes in actual interest, as mental sets do, but they 
can change and as a rule gradually do so. Sometimes this occurs through 
growth and psychological development (the attitude towards sex of a boy 
of ten is different from the attitude towards sex of a young man of 
twenty). Also this sometimes occurs through social-environmental factors 
(the attitude of an atheist towards religion can change if he lives for a 
longer time among truly religious people). Attitudes are, as Crijns states, 
value orientations (41, p. 91) , and this, in relation to symbolism, is the 
most essential aspect. The value orientation brings the attitude into the 
realm of the inner-self. As stated by Rutten: "Attitude always implies a 
personal concern" (42, p. 441). It is this aspect that explains the motiva-
tional force and emotional load of attitudes, as any action or thought 
emanating from, or any environmental stimulation related to attitudes, 
involves the personal aspect of self-accepted values. Attitudes, as be-
longing to the inner-self remain usually on the lower levels of awareness, 
in that once they are created and accepted they are taken for granted, like 
the manner of one's speech, and unless situational factors, like a reproach 
about a certain attitude draws attention to its existence one is hardly 
aware of it. One is, however, more aware of the values involved, and it is 
the change in values that results in the change of attitudes involved. 
A mental set is also a mode of intentional subject existence but it is 
essentially different from attitude in several respects. The mental set is 
not of stable endurance, a change in the external or internal situation will 
change the mental set. If a science teacher leaves the lecture room to go 
and watch a football match, then his mental set changes from being 
directed towards science, to being directed towards watching the game; 
his appreciating attitude towards science, however, remains the same. One 
might be mentally set towards going on with an interesting book, but an 
internal change of hunger will change the set towards obtaining a meal. 
Sets are not value orientations, but task or activity orientations, and as 
such much less personal than attitudes. Attitudes and sets are closely 
related in the respect, that certain attitudes will stimulate sets towards 
certain tasks or activities that are directed towards the values entailed in 
the attitude concerned. 
One is usually not aware of the mental set as such, but of the task or 
activity to which the set is directed. One usually has, for instance, little 
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awareness of a mental set towards finishing a once started task, until the 
possibility to finish this task is, through outer interference, made im-
possible; then one experiences the frustation of the continuation of a 
mental set, without the possibility of applying this set to the task it is 
directed to. Sets and attitudes, related in their communual aspect of being 
modes of intentional subject existence, could be distinguished on the 
grounds that the mental set, as a task orientation, is primarily directed 
towards the actual situation while the attitude, as a value orientation is 
primarily directed towards the inner-self. 
In his discussion of 'Die Einstellung', a German term covering a number 
of modes of intentional subject existence, including attitude and set, 
Rohracher makes some worthwhile observations on function and levels 
of awareness of mental sets. In dealing with awareness, Rohracher 
reports the findings of a mental set experiment carried out by Strohal 
in 1933, in which in a kind of tachistoscope common words like that 
child, field, wheel, mouth, song, etc. were presented one after the other. 
If an 'R' (first letter of the German word for rhyme, 'Reim') Was 
presented in between, then the participating subjects had to find a word 
that rhymed with the following words, and if a 'T' (first letter of the 
German word for part, 'Teil'), was presented in between, then a part of 
what was indicated by the words that followed had to be mentioned by 
the participants. At intermittent intervals the presentation of words would 
be stopped (announced by a ground signal), and the participants had to 
describe what they experienced, when they had to change their mental 
set from rhyming to mentioning parts. As Rohracher (who was a part-
icipant in Strohal's experiment) reports, the participants indicated that 
the mental set was experienced as present, not on a level of explicit 
awareness buth rather on a level of implicit awareness in the background 
of consciousness. This form of awareness, differing both from clear 
awareness and non-awareness, is the characteristic form of awareness of 
sets, indicated by Rohracher as 'mitbewusst', which could be translated as 
'implicit-awareness'. 
Another aspect mentioned by Rohracher on the grounds of which set and 
attitude can be differentiated, is the neurophysiological motor aspect 
involved in sets. This is seen in the behavioral, objective observable, 
and subjective noticeable tensioning of body and face muscles in a 
'mental fighting set' (Rohracher), which is not traceable in, for 
example, a republican or democratic attitude. 
The function of 'Einstellung' is defined by Rohracher on the one hand 
as the selection of certain experience contents, and on the other hand as 
giving these experiences only a certain meaning: 
"die Wirkung der Einstellung besteht darin, dass aus den ob-
jektiv gegebenen Erlebnismöglichkeiten nur bestimmte Erleb-
nisinhalte bewusst werden oder dass sie nur in bestimmter 
Bedeutung aufgefasst werden". (38, p. 330) 
The aspect of intended selection of only certain experience contents be-
longs primarily to the changeable task and activity directed mental set, 
while the aspect of giving experiences only a certain meaning belongs 
primarily to the durable value oriented attitude. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A DEVELOPMENTAL COMPARISON OF THE EXPRESSION OF SEX 
SYMBOLISM FROM EARLY ADOLESCENCE TO ADULTHOOD 
1. Procedure 
The symbolic meaning test as described in the preceding chapter was 
immediately followed by a masculine or feminine symbolic meaning test, 
carried out by the same early adolescent high school group, the same 
adult summer school group and, as mentioned in the Introduction, by a 
group of college students. The same fifty nouns used in the symbolic 
meaning test were used as stimulus words, and the written instructions, 
immediately following the symbolic meaning test in the test booklet 
described before, were worded as follows: 
"On the next two pages you will find the same number of 
objects, plants and animals mentioned. Please fill in beside each 
word whether the object, plant, or animal has a masculine or 
feminine symbolic meaning for you. Mark an M, if masculine; 
mark an F if feminine. If you cannot feel or decide whether 
some of them have either a masculine or a feminine symbolic 
meaning, then please put a question mark (?) beside the word. 
Don't think about it, just write down beside each word whether 
it has a feminine or masculine meaning. If you are in doubt, 
fill in with a question mark ( ? )." 
The instructions intended to elicit masculine and feminine reactions only 
for those stimulus words that held either a clear masculine or a clear 
feminine meaning for the participants. 
Immediately following this tests, participants were requested to indicate 
why they applied a masculine or feminine meaning to the words concern-
ed. This request, also included in the afore-mentioned test booklet was 
worded as follows: 
"Will you please indicate on the list, which you marked M 
(masculine) and F (feminine), the reason why the objects, 
plants, and animals appeared to have either a masculine or 
feminine symbolic meaning to you. 
If, for instance, a lion was given an M (masculine) meaning 
because of strength, then write down the reason, i.e., because 
of strength. Do not think too long about it. If you have doubts 
and cannot decide why, then just put a question mark (?) after 
the word." 
The admonition 'not to think too long about it', was intended to serve 
two purposes: to prevent or limit possible rationalizations and to prevent 
some of the participants from taking too long a time in deciding and 
going over the time limit set for administering the tests — that of a 
normal lecture hour. Only those reactions are scored as sex symbols 
which mention either male or female genital sex aspects or in which 
sexual activities were explicitly indicated; reactions that 'might' have 
entailed sex symbolism were not counted. For instance, acceptable react-
ions included: stick-penis, circle-vagina, room-sexual intercourse. But 
other reactions which might have held sexual symbolic meaning, such as 
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key-motel, key-with my key, were excluded, since sexual activities were 
not indicated as such. * 
The procedure followed has the advantage that evidence used indeed 
indicates sex symbolism in the minds of the subjects and not the exper-
imenter's interpretation. Obviously, this procedure limits conclusions to 
those drawn from explicitly expressed sex symbolism. 
2. Se* symbolism in the Freudian sense 
It is, as mentioned in Chapter I, difficult to state whether Freud adhered 
to a clear and stable concept of symbolism, since he considered a variety 
of psychological relations such as "substitution, representation, etc." 
(23, p. 136) as symbolic. LaPiere's remark that: "...anything that may 
be said about Freud's ideas can be contradicted by citations from Freud: 
and no one has yet been able to interpret Freud in a way that is acceptable 
to all Freudians" (43, p. 34), seems to apply to his varying use of the 
term symbolism. We venture to state, however, that Freud seems to have 
insisted on analogy in sex symbolism, even when the analogy was very 
far-fetched. Despite the fact that Freud did not define exactly what he 
meant by symbolism, he must be credited with introducing symbolism 
into psychology, emphasizing its importance, and demonstrating its psy-
chological influence, long before other than psychoanalytically oriented 
psychologists recognized it. As late as 1947, Allport states: "we are 
beginning to study symbols... as the basic ingredients that they are in all 
complex conduct...". (9, p. 169) 
Freud leaves little doubt that he considered genital sex symbols as the 
central and dominant factor of symbolism. LaPiere called Freud's pre-
occupation with sex "a fixation that is close to monomaniacal", but even 
as a sociologist who is not a proponent of psychoanalysis, he feels obliged 
to state that "...even the most ardent anti-Freudian must admit that 
Freud's treatment of sex was sceptic rather than pornographic" (43, p. 
61). LaPiere, as a sociologist, considers Freud's occupation with sex in 
relation to the abnormal sexual preoccupation of the neurotic patients 
with whom the latter mainly dealt. In addition to the fact cited by 
LaPiere, does it seem that Freud's idea that sexual frustrations are 
central in the aetiology of neurosis, originated when he was still a student 
of psychiatry, and that casual remarks made by leading medical men at 
that time turned his attention in this direction. He states this clearly in 
his address on the history of the psychoanalytic movement in 1914. Citing 
Charcot's remark: "Je vous assure vous y arriverez... dans des cas pareils 
(hysteria) c'est toujours la chose génitale, toujours, toujours, toujours", 
and Breuer's notion: "These things (nervousness) are always 'secrets 
d'alcove' ", and the remark of Chobrak about a patient suffering from 
anxiety, married to an impotent husband : "He is no good if he can't cure 
her after so many years (or marriage), the sole prescription for such a 
malady is familiar enough to us, but we cannot order it, it runs: R. Penis 
* Remark: As mentioned in the Introduction, the method followed did not allow 
checking of doubtful reactions. One can suppose that subjects may have held more 
sex symbolic meanings than they did express explicitly: for instance, one of the 
participants mentioned after handing in the completed test that the reaction 'I can't 
say that' should be altered to read "male genital". 
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normalis, dosim repetatur!", he reported that Breuer and Chobrak later 
denied having made the above remarks, and that Charcot would have 
denied this had Freud only met him again. (44, p. 294, 295). 
Freud, as a student of psychiatry, was impressed ben these remarks and 
followed up their consequences with relation to the study of neurosis, 
to quote: 
"I have certainly not disclosed the illustratious parentage of 
this scandalous idea in order to saddle others with the respon-
sibility for it. I am well aware that it is one thing once or twice 
or even oftener to give words to an idea that comes in the form 
of a fleeting inspiration, and quite another to intend it seriously, 
to take literally, to pursue it in spite of all difficulties, into every 
detail and to win it a place among accepted truths. It is the 
difference between a casual flirtation, and solemn matrimony, 
with all its duties and difficulties, 'to be wedded to an idea' 
is not an uncommon figure of speech". (44, I, p. 296) 
In relation to Freud's quotation of these remarks of Charcot, Breuer and 
Chobrak and his reaction to them, is is noteworthy that it is not the 
concept of sexuality in general nor the psychological aspects of sex but 
'la chose génitale' OÍ such that is adapted by Freud as the cornerstone 
of his theories on the aetiology of neurosis. 
In view of the 'solemn matrimony' quoted above, it is not surprising that 
Freud finds sexuality at the basis of every form of neurosis; and where 
it is not explicitly present, he finds it implicitly existent, in a 'substitu-
ted, represented, etc.' symbolic way. At the beginning of this century, 
when Freud had developed his psychoanalysis into a recognized psychia-
tric method, he state as his view on the part played by sexuality in the 
aetiology of the neuroses: 
"When this irreplaceable method of investigation (psychoana-
lysis) is used, one learns that the symptoms represent the pa-
tient's sexual activity, either the whole of it or a part of it, and 
are rooted in the normal or the perverse component-instincts 
of sexuality." (44, I, p. 281) 
By this time, psychoanalysis had branched out into a general theory of 
psychology, and Freud has extended his 'solemn wedded spouse' from 
the psychiatric clinic into the 'psychopathology of everyday life' (45), 
at the same time broadening his symbolism beyond sexuality and ap-
proaching normal human behavior from a neurotic point of view. Here 
lies the basis for Maritain's remark (quoted in Chapter I) , that the 
psychoanalytic interpretation of symbolism must be considered as a 
non-scientific play that 'leaves the best jests of Aristophanes and Molière 
far behind them'. That Freud, after extending psychoanalysis into 
general psychology (and into a cultural, almost religious movement with 
which we are not concerned here), did give symbolic sexuality a high 
ranking place in his system can hardly be doubted, as instances of this 
stand out throughout his work. 
Since Freud in his Vienna lecture on dream symbolism (23, Ch. 10) at 
least summarized his views on sex symbolism, this lecture offers a basis 
for discussion. Therein, he described symbolism as 'a constant and 
invariable relation between a symbol and the idea symbolized' and 
stated: 'the relation is one of comparison' (23, p. 134, 136). Symbol 
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is given a sign-character here in the objectively determined and con-
stant, invariable relation to what it means; and an analogy-character, in 
so far that it relates to its comparant on grounds of resemblance. 'The 
dreamer is not in the least aware that he is using symbolism', and, 'he 
cannot be made aware of this by the process of free association', there-
fore, it is the analyst solely who determines whether symbolism, and 
which symbol were used by the dreamer, who is even actually unwilling 
to recognize the symbolism he used when it is brought to his notice by 
the analyst' (23, p. 134, 135, 136, 141). Therefore, it is the analyst who 
perceives and determines a symbolic resemblance, one which is not 
evident at all to — and, on the contrary, denied by — the dreamer. The 
latter is more easily recognized when a consideration is given to some 
of the comparisons which, for the psychoanalyst, are based on evident 
sex symbolism: they are so far-fetched that it is not possible for any 
objective observer to notice the resemblance, or to accept it, even as 
a possibility. 
Freud, who later stated that symbolism also occurs outside dreams (23, 
p. 114, 148), holds that the number of things which are symbolically 
represented in dreams is limited. 
"Some symbols pertain to the human body as a whole, parents, 
children, brothers, sisters, birth, death and nakedness, but the 
majority of dream symbols pertain to sex in a genital sense". 
(23, p. 136, 137) 
Freud held to a physical resemblance, even when he, as a sharp observer, 
had a fleeting or casual impression that it was the conceptions of sexu-
ality that were represented in the symbols (23, p . 134, 140) (a notion 
that Hall worked out and made one of the pillars of his theory of 
dreams). (31, 33) 
The following constitutes examples of Freudian sex symbols: for the male 
genital as a whole, the number three-resemblance: the "threeness" of 
testicles and penis; for the penis 1) anything that resembles it in form 
(sticks, umbrella's, poles) ; 2) anything that resembles its piercing 
function (knives, daggers, guns, pistols) ; 3) anything that resembles its 
erection function (pulley, lamps, balloons, aeroplanes). (23, p. 137, 138) 
Whereas most of the above mentioned symbols evidence some form of 
resemblance even Freud noticed that certain other male sexual symbols 
like 'reptile', 'fish' and 'serpent' are 'less easy to understand', and that 'it 
is certainly difficult to devine why hats and cloaks are used as male 
sexual symbols' even when 'their symbolic meaning is quite unquestion-
able'. (23, p. 139) 
Freud seems to have been less aware of the fact that most of his female 
genital symbols are also difficult to understand: whereas apples and 
peaches for breasts and mouth and pockets for female genitals are 
evident enough, diversive types of containers as 'boxes, suitcases, cup-
boards, rooms and ships', are certainly not more evident as female 
genital symbols than cloaks as male genital symbols, neither are 'houses' 
and 'churches' (23, p. 139). Even though 'wood' and 'paper' and objects 
made from these materials such as tables and books, cannot possibly be 
constructed as resembling the female genitals. 
Freud, for instance, traces the word 'wood' etymologically back to the 
Greek word for material, jumping from there to the Portugese He of 
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Madeira, the name of which was originally supposed to pertain to the 
woods on this island. Wood being 'madeira' in Portuguese, is traced 
back through the Latin word 'materia' to 'mater', from which word 
'mother' is derived (23, p. 142, 143). We must leave the etymological 
reasoning involved to the judgement of linguistic scholars, but it must 
be noted that Freud here, at best, has traced the word 'wood' back to 
'mother', which is far from showing any resemblance whatever between 
table and female genital. 
It is not necessary to cite further instances of Freudian etymological and 
culture-historical sex symbol tracing; but it is important to point out 
that Freud in his amateurish delving in the specialized fields of philology 
and cultural history makes hismself an easy victim for non-pro-Freudian 
scholars specialized in these fields and indeed risks discrediting psycho­
analysis, as Maritain stated (quoted in Chapter I). 
Freud did recognize that some of his supposed genital sex symbols could 
sometimes symbolize the whole human being, without reference to 
genital aspects themselves, but he did not give this fact any further 
consideration; note the following quotation: 
"An instance of an obscure symbol of this kind is the 'hat'; or 
perhaps head-coverings in general; this usually has a masculine 
significance, though occassionally a feminine one. In the name 
'cloak' betokens a man, though perhaps sometimes without 
special reference to the organs of sex. It is open to you to ask 
why this should be so." (23, p. 14Ю) 
Freud does not attempt to answer the question 'why' but proceeds with 
a description of other more or less obscure sex symbols. 
Freud also noticed some evident association symbolism, relating some 
of his supposed genital resemblance symbols to the whole person; but, 
he disregarded the evident non-genital association symbolism as super­
ficial, to adhere to his preconceived idea of genital resemblance. To 
quote : 
"The fact that in dreams a room represents a woman you may 
be inclined to trace to the German colloquialism by which 
Frauenzimmer (lit. 'woman's room') is used for Frau, that is 
to say, the human person is represented by the place assigned 
for her occupation. Similarly, we speak of the Porte, meaning 
thereby the Sultan and his government, and the name of the 
ancient Egyptian ruler, Pharaoh, merely means 'great court'. 
...But I think this derivation is too superficial, and it strikes 
me as more probable that the room came to symbolize woman 
on account of its property of enclosing within it the human 
being." (23, p. 145) 
It is obvious that Freud implicitly mixed the symbolism of the sexes 
— symbols representing masculine and feminine existence, which will be 
dealt with in the next chapter — with genital sex symbolism. When and 
where he became aware of this possibility, he tried explicitly to see 
genital analogy symbolism, even when a possible resemblance called for 
wide interpretation (like in 'room'), and often when no resemblance 
was indicated at all (like in 'cloak'). It seems that Freud could not or 
would not divorce himself from 'solemn matrimony' with the influence 
of genital sex aspects, which in his early days put him on a track that 
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led first to psychoanalysis as a psychiatric tool, later to a general 
theory of psychology, and, finally, to that which brought him the fame 
of his later days, psychoanalysis as a cultural movement. 
Later in this chapter, Freud's notions on sex symbolism will be further 
discussed and in the next chapter some remarks on the relation of 
Freudian sex symbolism of the sexes will be introduced, but first it is 
necessary to discuss the explicit sex symbol reactions resultant in the 
tests administered during the present investigation. 
3. Expressed sex symbol reactions from early adolescence to adulthood 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the early adolescent group and the 
adult group expressed virtually no sex symbolism at all, and for a possible 
developmental comparison of this aspect of symbolic thinking, a group 
of late adolescents and young adult undergraduate college students were 
added to the groups mentioned above. 
This undergraduate collegegroup (like the early adolescent high school 
group and the adult summer school group, described in Chapter II) 
consisted mainly of Catholic white students of average or higher intell-
igence. The average age was 21 (with a range from 19 to 26 years) ; 
the total number tested was 81 (48 of which were male and 33, female 
students). The group represented according to chronological age, and 
supposedly also from the point of view of psychological development, an 
overlapping from late adolescence into early adulthood. The random 
selection from available undergraduate classes at a Main Line college 
and university ensures (within the limits of number and location) that 
this group will not essentially differ from the normal catholic college 
population. 
The explicitly expressed sex symbol reactions of the three groups are 
reported in Table 3 (page 54). Indicated are: the number of sex symbol 
reactions per age group; the number of sex symbols that pertain to 
either male or to female genital aspects or to sexual activities; the total 
number of reactions for the three groups together; and the number 
of sex symbols given by male and by female students. 
As can be seen from Table 3, the early adolescents expressed no sex 
symbolism at all. They distinguished men from women in appearance 
as well as character quite well (as will be seen in the next chapter) ; but 
despite the for boys conspicuous genital development and the beginning 
of spontaneous erections normal to that age, and the often reported use 
of vulgar, obscene language among the members of the lower high 
school grades, none of the latter appeared in their explicitly given 
expressions. One might suppose that a possible explanation for this could 
be that the environment in which the test was conducted — that of a 
normal classroom — may have prevented the use of vulgar expressions. 
A second explanation might be that, since most of their reactions seem 
to be remote, even from a possible relation to the area of sex in the 
narrow sense, the field of obscenity does not have a personally accepted 
and personally valued meaning for the normal early adolescent. Sports, 
space travel and an enterprising existence as a boy in a boyish way from 
the point of view of the boys, and beauty, tenderness, and a ladylike 
disdain for the rough ways of boys, to the girls, seem to encompass the 
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Table 3 
Sex symbol reactions of high school · college - and summer school 
students 
a) High school, numbering: 34, average age: 14, number of reactions: 
1,700, 
total number of sex symbol reactions: none 
b) College, nr.: 81 , average age: 21 , nr. reactions: 4,050, 
total nr. of sex symbol reactions in symbolic meaning test: 13 (male 
genital sex: 8, female genital sex 1, sex activity S: 4 ) , 
total nr. of sex symbols reactions in male female symbol test: 70 
(male genital S: 42, female genital S: 11, sex activity S: 17) 
c)Summer School, nr.: 30, average age: 28, total nr. reactions: 1,500, 
total nr. of sex symbol reactions in symbolic meaning test: 1 (male 
genital S: 1) 
total nr. of sex symbol reactions in male female symbolic meaning 
test: 1 (sex activity S: 1) 
Total nr. of sex symbol reactions: 85 
Of this number, 78 reactions were given by male students, 
7 by female students 
more personal coloring of their reactions to the other sex. The picture 
of love is for them related to and embedded in beauty, tenderness and 
protection and cannot be related to the genital aspects, which seem to be 
regarded as 'foreign' and not as aspects of their own personal existence. 
For a younger group (fifth grade elementary school children of approx-
imately ten years of age), the likelihood of the absence of genital 
awareness is demonstrated by the experiment of Levy, mentioned in the 
Introduction. Levy presented a number of drawings of Freudian male 
and female sex symbols to a class of children of this age, with instruct-
ions to match them with names of boys or names of girls. There was no 
evidence of any inclination to match male genital symbols with boys' 
names or female genital symbols with girls' names. The nature and 
scope of this experiment leave room for doubt about the possibility of 
genital awareness at that age (Levy is well aware of that and reports 
the need for further research), but as far as his evidence goes, it entails 
no indication of awareness in that direction. 
The college group, especially the males, provides us with a number of 
sex symbol reactions; and it seems that for this group, as compared to 
the others, sex in the genital sense holds the most existential meaning. 
It is remarkable that the boys give, as a rule, male sex symbol reactions, 
offering relatively few female sex symbol reactions. This could be a 
symptom of psychological immaturity, but it may also be explained on 
the grounds that the male genitals have a more conspicuous nature, in 
shape as well as function; the latter is further substantiated by the 
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fact that the girls do give some male genital reactions but no reactions 
pertaining to female genital sex aspects. 
Calon, in distinguishing obscenity in adolescents, for whom the genital 
aspects are not yet integrated in the total person, from obscenity in 
adults, who in obscene thinking separate these aspects deliberately from 
the totality of the whole moral person, holds that obscenity in adults is a 
symptom of fixation on a level of sexual development, in which these 
aspects are not yet integrated in the moral total person. As we have no 
reason to believe that the college group selected suffered as blatantly 
from fixations as the relatively high number of sex symbol reactions 
would indicate, we consider this as an indication that the college 
population, and especially the males, even when their average age is 
about twenty-one, are not yet sexually matured in that they do not-
possess an adult attitude toward sex. This seems more true since the 
girls, who supposedly mature earlier with respect to sexuality, expressed 
much less sex symbolism and, in so far as they did express it, showed a 
greater tendency towards integrating sex aspects into a personally played 
love-game. As an illustration, take, for instance, the difference in reactions 
between boys and girls to the stimulus word 'key': the boys give 'M-sex 
act', 'M-penis', 'F-invitation to sex'; but the girls react with 'F-female, 
often a determining factor in a union of the sexes', and 'M-man won't 
stop until he gets what he wants'. 
The aspect of sexual immaturity entailed in the more non-personally 
integrated sexual thinking of the college boys does not seem to indicate 
accidental fixation on an earlier level of a rather immature mode of 
sexual existence by the members of this group. A supposed prolonged 
psychological adolescence — for the, according to calendar age, young 
adult college population — is confirmed by the findings concerning 
sexual maturation. The college boy did not seem to have realized as yet 
a complete integration of the genital sex aspects into the whole moral 
person, and insofar as he has realized this integration, he seems to slip 
out of it easily. A personal encounter with another as a person (in the 
sense described by Buytendijk in his phenomenological study of human 
encounter) (20) seems, at least with regard to sexual roles, to be still 
difficult for him and more in the nature of a challenge of a mode of 
encounter yet to be realized than a non-problematic developmental 
achievement already gained as his inner undisputed own. 
This developmental level, in which the genital aspects are integrated in 
the whole moral person (who is also viewed as such with regard to 
sexual roles), seems to have been realized by the members of the adult 
group tested. Sex symbolic reactions for this group are almost non-
existent, a fact which seems to indicate that obscene thinking is an 
exceptional occurrence at least among educated people of adult chrono-
logical age and might, when it exists, as Calon states, very well indicate 
a fixation on an earlier level of development. 
It will be clear that a personally integrated existential encounter of 
another with regard to sexual activities can only be realized in a person-
ally created married life, where, in the psychological freedom of the 
moral and existential protection of the beloved one, the other is met on 
the level of shared personal sexual existence. The psychological encounter 
of the other, however, in his or her moral existence as a man or a 
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woman, can be realized in any human encounter by any sexually 
integrated and fully mature person. As the adult group tested consisted 
mainly of Catholic teachers, we are apt to believe that Catholic teachers 
do reach a high level of sexual maturity, hesitating, however, without 
basis of further research, to make this a general statement. 
We are well aware that in the above discussion — referring to Melvin 
Marx's statement quoted in the Introduction — we went further into 
'theoretical components' than is warranted by 'the more strictly empirical, 
or observational components' of the investigation; summarizing the 
strictly empirical findings on expressed sex symbolism, the tests showed 
that: a) the early adolescents did not express any sex symbolism at all, 
b) the male college students especially reacted with a considerable 
numer of sex symbols. From this evidence it has been concluded that 
sex symbolism, at least at the explicit expressed level: is not yet psycho-
logically alive at an early adolescent age; alive, but not very well 
integrated for college students, and no longer problematic for educated, 
mature adults. 
We will now turn to a further discussion of the relative validity of the 
classical Freudian sex symbols. 
4. Sex symbolism as a possibility 
More than forty of the fifty stimulus words used in the tests were 
classical Freudian sex symbols, and twenty of these did indeed function 
as sexually symbolic in the tests concerned. This indicates that for some 
of his symbols at least (and especially some of the male ones), Freud's 
statement about 'a constant and invariable relation' between sex symbols 
and referent (mentioned in section 2 of this chapter) might have some 
empirical basis. So, for instance, the majority of male sex symbol react-
ions are covered by the stimulus words 'banana', 'sausage' and 'stick'. 
The relation is however, far from 'constant', since only the college group 
members produced these reactions; nor is it 'invariable', since, for 
instance, 'sausage' is seen as male, on the ground of association with a beer 
picnic, where the drinking of beer is combined with the eating of frank-
furters, and also seen as female in association with cooking. 
Then again, within the narrow field of sex symbolism as such, there is 
no 'constant and invariable' relation between symbol and referent. Take, 
for instance, the five sexually symbolic reactions to 'key' ('certainly a 
male symbol', Freud says, 23, p. 141), quoted in the preceding section, 
two of which pertain to 'female'. Further instances are that 'balloon' 
(male, according to Freud) was cited three times as female (breasts and 
pregnant) and only once as male (and then not in connection with 
erection, as Freud suggested, but in the very material resemblance of 
condome) ; and the (in Freud's opinion) female 'apple' is reacted to as 
male (testicle), while the (again according to Freud) female 'pocket' is 
also seen in connection with the male genitals. 
The evidence found leads tot the conclusion that there is no 'invariable' 
relation between classical Freudian symbols and the genital sex aspects 
which according to Freud they represent, and that this relation is not of 
a 'constant' nature. The evidence does indicate that the stimulus words 
concerned can. in one or another associative or analogical relation 
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function as sex symbols and can represent one or another aspect of the 
conception of genital sex hold by the subjects concerned. 
The principle of comparison and the relation of resemblance, as the 
only ones acceptable for Freud in sex symbolism (mentioned in section 
2), can be applied to some of the male sex symbols that are based on a 
form resemblance (as mentioned above) but do not pertain to the 
majority of female sex symbols nor to symbols representing sexual 
activity, since in the latter case the relation evidently is mostly based on 
association. Jewelcase, for instance, which Freud calls "another note-
worthy symbol of the female genital organ" (23, p. 139), is, as a 
jewelry container, primarily related to women on the grounds of the 
fact that women wear jewelry (and in fact is explained as such an 
associative relation in most of the reactions). Freud evidently mistakes, 
in this case an unmistakable association symbol representing femininity 
for a genital resemblance relation which cannot be seen without Freu-
dian spectacles. 
So are reactions such as 'sexual intercourse' and 'woman's place of 
seduction' in réponse to 'room' evidently association symbols in which 
'room' represents the sexual activities, on grounds of an accidental 
relation with the place concerned. Freud insists that these symbols must 
be seen as genital resemblance symbols, a fact which must be considered 
as the product of Freud's attitude and set towards genital sex and as a 
result of his 'solemn matrimony' with these aspects in regard to his 
theory of neurosis (described in section 2 of this chapter). 
As Freud especially in his earlier works repeatedly demonstrates him-
self to be a sharp and original observer of psychological relations, it 
seems wortwhile in discussing his preoccupation with sex, to give due 
consideration to the fact signalled by LaPiere: that Freud dealt mainly 
with sexually preoccupied neurotics. The presumption that neurotics are 
more than normally preoccupied with sex is supported by empirical 
evidence. So discovered Charney, in comparing the number of manifest 
sex responses to the Rorschach test of matched groups of normal veterans 
and veterans being treated as non-psychotic patients in the mental clinic 
of a veterans' hospital, that the number of sex responses given by the 
latter was significantly higher. (46) 
The fact that Freud dealt with hundreds (or perhaps thousands) of 
neurotic patients does not make the conclusions based on his observations 
any more valid for the normal child or adult. We refer in this connection, 
to the famous Kinsey Report that was considered to represent the вех 
life of Americans; but despite the fact that an impressive number of 
thousands of people were interviewed, the report actually represents 
only these people who, selected by a snowball method, are willing to talk 
about the intimacies of their supposedly personal sex life, quite a special 
group of people, in America as elsewhere. 
That Freud's psychoanalytical mental set towards genital sex aspects, 
met by an excessive preoccupation with sex in most of his patients 
seems to explain quite well his tenacity in holding on to this principle 
and giving it a dominating place in his theories on neurosis, dream 
symbolism, the psychopathology of everyday life, and in his views on 
the general psychology of the normal human being. 
After the unceasing emphasis of psychoanalysts on the supposedly un-
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doubtable correctness of the dogmatic views on sex symbolism hold by 
the founder of their movement, a considerable number of psychologists 
(involved in theoretical as well as in applied psychology) seem to have 
taken a universal validity of the classical Freudian sex symbols for 
granted. The valuable observation that the mistaking of opiniated view-
points of authorities in some field of psychology for valid scientifically 
established facts can and does lead to an undermining of the advancement 
of scientific psychological research is introduced in another context by 
the experimentalist McGurk (47, 48), and Levy warned of the danger 
that conclusions based on data in which the Freudian sex symbols are 
taken for universally valid might not refer to facts but rather to a 
possibility of facts, not checked empirically. 
This danger is not hypothetical, since, for example, the McClelland-
Atkinson group — a vanguard in advancing modern psychological 
approaches to motivation — seems to have overlooked this idea so 
important to empirical research. We refer in this connection to studies 
by Clark, Beardslee and others (49, 50, 51, 52), in which the use of 
Freudian sex symbolism in Thematic Apperception Test stories is taken 
for granted to indicate mental preoccupation with sex. 
Take, for instance, one of Clark's experiments (50), aimed at invest-
igating the degree to which inhibition of the sex motive occurs in fantasy 
by means of the Thematic Apperception Test. Clark reports the following 
procedure: two comparable groups of male college students were given 
the TAT, one group without preceding sexual arousal, the other group 
immediately after sexual stimulation of their task was to grade eight 
pictures of attractive nude females according to their degree of attract-
iveness. Physical aspects of the nudes — projected life size on a large 
screen — had to be mentioned as an explanation of why a certain degree 
of attractiveness was given. These groups were tested in lecture halls at 
regularly scheduled class meetings. As a basis for comparison, two other 
comparable groups of male college students were given the same tests in 
two different fraternity houses at night in a beer-party atmosphere, 
during which the students were allowed to go on drinking beer during 
the test. * 
The TAT stories were analyzed and scored on manifest sex imagery and 
on sexual symbolism (the latter understood in the psychoanalytic sense). 
Clark obviously had doubts about the value of Freudian sex symbolism, 
insofar as he did not trust the sexually symbolic value of the mere 
mention of objects as determined by Freud to represent sex, but he 
evidently (and remarkably) trusted their sexually symbolic value when 
* Remark: in describing these procedures, we refer to the disgust expressed by 
Maritain concerning some of the methods used by some psychoanalysts in attempts 
to verify the value of Freudian symbolism and quote: "Before concluding, and to 
touch, in passing, upon the question of moral licitness, I would like to mention 
the way certain investigators proceed on the pretext of being scientific". After 
describing some of the disgusting experiments involving hypnotized or (as such) 
defenseless mental patients, Maritain concludes: "This sort of experimentation on 
poor, sick people, who are treated as specimens and whose imagination is un· 
doubtly harmed, raises questions about the moral assumptions animating the 
experimenters" (24, p. 243) ; and we question whether Maritain's observation does 
not hold for normal human beings used as subjects, as well. 
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they were utilized or involved in some action that could (again in a 
psychoanalytic sense) be interpreted as sexually symbolic. To quote: 
"That is, isolated objects which fulfilled the requirements for 
sexual symbols were scored only if they appeared in a symbolic 
context that could be interpreted as signifying intercourse, 
masturbation, tumescence-de-lumescence cycles, and so on. For 
example, if in response to picture 14, a person wrote that this was 
a boy looking out of his dormitory window, this was not scored 
as symbolic, but if this were a thief climbing up to go through 
the window in order to steal the jewels in the house this was 
scored as symbolic." 
And further: 
"In essence what we scored for was not the mere presence of 
isolated objects that could or could not be symbols, but for 
themes that could be interpreted in a symbolic fashion". (50, 
p. 49) 
Clark includes the latter in his data, which he presents an impressive 
statistical manner, as evidence for the role of inhibition in manifest and 
'symbolic' sexual imagery. 
Clark, who did not trust the Freudian-determined sex symbols as such, 
did trust the also-Freudian-determined actions that are, in psychoanalytic 
interpretation, supposed to be symbolic of sex. To quote Freud on the 
subject of sexually symbolic activities: 
"Gratification derived from a person's own genitals is indicated 
by any kind of play, including playing the piano. The symbolic 
representation of onanism by sliding or gliding and also by 
pulling of a branch is very typical. A particularly remarkable 
dream symbol is the falling out or extraction of teeth; the 
primary significance of this is certainly castration as a punish-
ment for onanism. Special representations of sexual intercourse 
are less frequent in dreams than we would expect after all this, 
but we may mention in this connection rhythmical activities 
such as dancing, riding and climbing, and also experiencing 
some violence, e.g. being run over. To these may be added 
certain manual occupations and of course being threatened 
with weapons..."; 
and: 
"...the act of mounting ladders, steep places or stairs is indubit-
ably symbolic of sexual intercourse. On closer reflection we 
shall notice that the rhythmic character of this climbing is the 
point in common between the two, and perhaps also the 
accompanying increase in exaction — the shortening of the 
breath as the climber ascends" (23, p. 140, 141). 
It apparently never dawned on Clark that the 'symbolic' themes he did 
accept as evidence were as much based on psychoanalytic interpretation 
as the 'symbolic' objects he did not accept as evidence. We will not 
follow Clark's interesting discussion of the data developed from his 
experiment, but it is important to notice that Clark found it difficult to 
explain the statistical relationship found between manifest and symbolic 
sex, as when he stated: "This curvilinear relationship is rather a curious 
finding" (30, p. 52). It apparently escaped Clark's notice that supposedly 
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sexually symbolic objects used in supposedly sexually symbolic themes 
could perhaps or perhaps not have functioned as symbols of sex, and 
that the data concerned did not pertain to facts but to possibilities of 
facts. The danger signalled by Levy and McGurk is in fact not a hypo­
thetical supposition but exists as an underminer and antagonist of the 
advancement of the psychological study of symbolism and motivation. 
In recapitulating the investigation thus far of Freudian sex symbolism 
on the explicitly expressed level the principle findings are: 
a. Freudian sex symbols do not have a universal validity. 
b. Some of the Freudian sex symbols can for subjects with a mental 
set towards sex function in one way or another as symbolic for one 
or another aspect of sex. 
с The relation of resemblance, insisted upon by Freud, holds only for 
some of sex symbols; with regard to many others, the relation is 
based on non-analogous associations. 
d. Freudian sex symbols are not 'constantly' nor 'invariably' related to 
sex, and their use cannot be considered as reliable evidence of sex-
related mental activity. 
It is stated above that Freud casually mentioned that sex symbols 
sometimes represent the whole male or female person, but he included 
implicitly symbolism of the sexes — symbols representing a male or 
female person, or masculine and feminine appearance aspects, or mascu­
line and feminine character qualities — in what he insisted had to be 
genital sex symbolism based on resemblance. We feel that it is important 
to stress the necessity of distinguishing sex symbolism from symbolism of 
the sexes, and the findings of the investigation concerning the latter will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SYMBOLISM OF THE 
SEXES FROM ADOLESCENCE TO ADULTHOOD 
1. Procedure 
In this chapter developmental aspects of and sex differences in expressed 
symbolism of the sexes will be discussed. As mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, symbolism of the sexes pertains to symbols representing the 
conception of the male or female person. The symbolic representation of 
what is considered to be a masculine or feminine way of existence can 
be embodied in a varied number of aspects, such as: a masculine or 
feminine person (e.g., father, mother) ; masculine or feminine appearance 
aspects (e.g., big, beautiful) ; masculine or feminine character qualities 
(e.g., strong, capricious) ; masculine or feminine activities (e.g., hunting, 
sewing) ; and a number more. 
Sex symbolism in the Freudian sense pertains to one of the aspects of 
the male and female existence in which masculinity or femininity can 
be symbolically expressed of perceived, but it is, as will be discussed in 
section 3, rather unfrequently used for this purpose. Where sex sym-
bolism on the one hand can be considered as an aspect of symbolism of 
the sexes, there is, on the other hand, the essential distinction that in 
sex symbolism, the male or female genitals or genital activities are sym-
bolized, but in symbolism of the sexes, the conceptions of a masculine 
or feminine way of existence are represented in the symbol. The 
percipience of the latter in the masculine or feminine symbolic meaning 
test (described in section 1 of the preceding chapter), as expressed by 
the participants in the several age groups tested, will re reported and 
discussed in the sections of this chapter. 
The information 'why' stimulus words were indicated as either masculine 
or feminine in the masculine or feminine symbolic meaning test 
(described in section 1 of the preceding chapter), was used for a 
comparison of the reactions of the male and female participants of the 
three groups combined. The reactions of the three age groups were 
compared as a basis for a discussion of developmental aspects of 
symbolism of the sexes (section 2 of this chapter), and the reactions of 
the total number of male and female participants of the three groups 
combined were compared as a basis for discussion of sex-differential 
aspects of symbolism of the sexes (section 5). 
The information 'why' stimulus words were given either a masculine or 
feminine meaning is classified according to the following nine categories, 
three of which pertain to association symbolism, four of which pertain 
to analogy symbolism, and two of which pertain to non-evident and un-
expressed reactions. 
A) Association Symbolism: 
1. Association with object used by men or women. 
Symbolism is based on association with an object used or made by either 
men or women: e.g., an umbrella-female-used by women; a machine-
male-made by men. 
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2. Association with male or female activity. 
Symbolism is based on association with supposedly male or female types 
of work or activity: e.g., a deer-male-hunting; a broom-female-sweeping. 
3. Association with male or female person. 
Symbolism is based on association with male or female person; e.g., a 
serpent-male-Satan; an apple-female-Eve. 
B) Amdogy Symbolism: 
4. Analogy with masculine or feminine appearance. 
Symbolism is based on a resemblance to an aspect of male or female 
appearance; e.g., a square-male-angular: a rose-female-beauty. 
5. Analogy with masculine or f emine character. 
Symbolism is based on analogy with supposedly masculine or feminine 
character aspects; e.g. an eagle-male-domineering; a peacock-female-
vanity. 
6. Analogy with male or female function. 
Symbolism is based on analogy with a male or female function; e.g., 
a door-male-protection; the earth-female-life giving. 
7. Amdogy with male or female sex aspects. 
Reactions pertain to Freudian sex symbolism, and the indication of 
masculine or feminine attributed to the stimulus word concerned is 
based on analogy (or association) with genital sex aspects; e.g., a banana-
male-penis; a circle-female-vagina. The majority of the reactions of this 
category pertain to male genital analogy symbolism. The low total number 
of sexually symbolic reactions did not warrant a division expressed in 
percentages in an analogy and association sex symbol category; and 
including the latter under this one category has no consequences for the 
group comparisons for which these data are used. In including sex 
symbolism under the classification categories of symbolism of the sexes, 
we consider sex symbolism from the viewpoint of being an aspect of 
the latter, whereas in section 3 the differential aspects between sex 
symbolism and symbolism of the sexes will be discussed. 
C) Reason for masculine or feminine symbolism not evident or not 
expressed: 
8. Reason for masculine or feminine symbolism not evident. 
In this category are scored the reactions in which either a masculine or 
feminine meaning is given and a reason 'why', but in which the reason 
'why' can not be classified under one of the categories described above; 
e.g., a dog-male-think of him as male; a pocket-female-feminine; a mouth-
male-man. These are mainly reactions in which the reason given is vague 
or nondescript. 
9. Reason for masculine of feminine symbolism not indicated. 
This category pertains to reactions in which a masculine or feminine 
meaning is given, but in which the explanation 'why' is omitted or 
indicated with a question mark. Subjects might, in some of these react-
ions, have been aware that they were not aware of 'why' they indicated 
the stimulus word concerned as masculine or feminine; in others, the 
subjects might have been well aware of 'why' the word concerned was 
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given a masculine of feminine meaning but were not inclined or not 
willing to express this explicitly. 
As the participants were supposedly normal students, we have no reason 
to suppose that the neurotic mechanism of repression played an impor-
tant role in the 'not evident' or 'not expressed' reactions. One of the 
participants, however, made a remark (mentioned in section 1 of the 
preceding chapter, p. 49) indicating that the normal human free choice 
not to express that of which one is aware was responsible for at least 
one of these reactions. 
In connection with the 'question mark' category 9, we would like to 
draw attention to the fact that in the masculine or feminine symbolic 
meaning test answers can be question marks in two instances. A question 
mark can be given in answer to the question 'why' a stimulus word was 
given a masculine or feminine meaning; these question mark reactions 
are scored under category 9. A question mark can also be given as an 
answer to the earlier question of whether the stimulus word has either a 
masculine or feminine symbolic meaning; these question mark reactions, 
indicating that no explicit masculine or feminine meaning could be 
given to the stimulus word, consequently obtained no further indication 
'why'. The latter question mark reactions are scored separately and are 
reported in numbers and percentages of the total number or reactions 
per group as 'male or female meaning not indicated', in the second line 
of Table 4 (p. 63 ) . 
As the reactions classified according to the categories described above 
pertain only to reactions in which a male or female meaning was given 
in the first place, reactions in which no male or female meaning 
Table 4 
Malelfemale symbol reactions of high school - college · summer school 
students 
No. reactions 
No. male or female meaning 
not indicated 
No. masculine & feminine 
reactions 
1) Association object used 
2) Association activity 
3) Association person 
4) Analogy appearance 
5) Analogy character 
6) Analogy function 
7) Analogy sex 
8) Not evident 
9) ? 
High School 
Average age 14 
nr. 34 
1,700 
315 
1,385 
280 
131 
35 
237 
196 
37 
0 
97 
372 
College 
Average age 
% 
19 
% 
20 
9 
3 
17 
14 
3 
0 
7 
27 
nr. 81 
4,505 
439 
3,611 
730 
521 
225 
599 
569 
169 
70 
193 
535 
Summer School 
21 Average age 
% 
11 
% 
20 
14 
6 
17 
16 
5 
2 
5 
15 
nr. 30 
1,500 
393 
1,107 
145 
75 
41 
151 
205 
26 
1 
77 
386 
28 
% 
26 
% 
13 
7 
4 
14 
19 
2 
0 
7 
35 
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was indicated were deduced from the total number of reactions per 
group, and the percentages for each of the categories were calculated 
from this total number of male and female meanings given per group. 
No distinction was made in the scoring of symbolic meanings as to 
whether stimulus words were indicated as male or as female (this will 
be done in relation to a comparison of sex differences, in section 5) , 
and reactions were scored under the categories concerned, regardless of 
whether they pertained to a male or female meaning. 
2. Comparison of early adolescent, college age, and adult symbolic 
meanings of the sexes 
In studying the data of Table 4 (p. 63) it is noticeable that for a 
considerable number of stimulus words, no male or female meaning is 
given (for high school, college and summer school groups, respectively: 
19, 11, and 26 per cent). This reveals that despite the fact that most of 
the stimulus words pertained to Freudian sex symbols, a masculine or 
feminine meaning of these words was far from always evident for the 
subjects participating in this test. As subjects can have had little or no 
reason not to express a masculine or feminine meaning of the words 
concerned if they were aware of one, we suppose that suppression of 
expression of meanings they were aware of played little or no role in 
this test. 
The high percentages of question mark reactions in answer to the 
question 'why' a masculine or feminine meaning was given (category 9, 
in order of increasing group age, respectively: 27, 15, and 35 per cent), 
indicates that it was often difficult for the subjects to express explicitly 
'why' stimulus words appeared to have a masculine or feminine meaning. 
This may have been so for a number of reasons; subjects might indeed 
have been not aware of a reason 'why'; subjects might have been aware 
of more than one reason as a possible reason 'why' and hesitant to choose 
one or the other; subjects might have been aware of a reason 'why' but 
not inclined or not willing to express the reason concerned explicitly on 
paper. Within the limitations of the research method followed, there was 
no possibility to check directly whether mainly a non-awareness of 
reasons or an inclination not to express reasons explicitly explains these 
relative, and especially for early adolescents and educated adults, absolute 
high figures of non-indicated reasons 'why' a masculine or feminine 
meaning was given to the stimulus words concerned. This forced us to 
infer indirectly a possible explanation from a comparison of the figures 
for the different groups concerned, being well aware that the explanations 
concerned are interpreted and not based on direct evidence. 
In studying a comparison of the figures concerned for the three age 
groups, it is most remarkable that the figures for not indicating a male 
or female meaning, as well as the figures for not indicating a reason 
'why' a masculine or feminine meaning was given to stimulus words, 
show the greatest variation in absolute and relative changes between the 
groups, much greater than the changes in number of reactions for any 
other category. The percentage for male or female meaning not indicated 
drops from 19% in the early adolescent group to 1 1 % on the late 
adolescent and early adult college age, to increase steeply to 2 6 % for 
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the adult group. The percentages for 'no reason why' a masculine or 
feminine meaning is given (category 9) are in absolute numbers higher 
for the three groups but show in relative relation an almost identical 
picture as the figures for no masculine or feminine meaning given. The 
'no reason why' percentage drops from 2 7 % for the early adolescents to 
15% for the late adolescents and early adult college students, to increase 
to 3 5 % for the adult group. 
Seeing the obvious correspondence between the relative relation of the 
figures for both types of non-indicative reactions in the three groups, 
we suppose that mainly a non- or not-clear awareness of masculine or 
feminine meanings and of reasons why a masculine or feminine meaning 
was given is responsible for the high frequency of the answer concerned. 
This will, as remarked above, most likely hold for instances in which 
participants did not indicate a masculine or feminine meaning of 
stimulus words, and seen from the viewpoint of the almost perfect 
correspondence in change in the three groups for both types of non-
indicative reactions, this will most likely be the explanation for the 
majority of 'no reason why' indications as well. 
The absolute figures for the 'no reason why' indications of category 9 
are in each group about forty per cent higher than the figures for lack 
of indicating a masculine or feminine meaning (percentages for the 
early adolescents, college age and adult groups, respectively: 19 and 27, 
11 and 15, 26 and 35 per cent). This leads to the supposition that, 
besides the factor of non or not-clear awareness being responsible for 
the majority of 'no reason why' indications, an unwillingness to express 
reasons that some of the subjects were aware of might have had an 
additional influence in producing the relative and absolute high numbers 
of reactions in the 'no reason why' category, number 9. 
As mentioned above, the differences between the lack of masculine or 
feminine meaning indications and the 'no reason why' indications stand 
out as indicating the greatest differences between the three age groups 
concerned. In noticing that the college group scores considerably lower 
than the other two groups in both types of non-indicative reactions, we 
venture to suppose that a strong attitudinal inclination towards orientation 
in masculine and feminine aspects of the human existence at the late 
adolescent and early adult levels, explains the relatively low score for 
non-indicative reactions of college age students. The supposition that the 
college age level can be distinguished from early adolescence and mature 
adulthood by a mental set that is outspokenly directed towards sexual 
differences is strengthened by the finding that only the college students 
produced sex symbol reactions in a sufficient number to be expressed 
according to a percentual score ( 2 % ) . This supposition is also 
strengthened by the findings that the perception of symbolism of the 
sexes based on male or female activities (category 2) , based on associa-
tions with male or female persons (category 3 ) , and based on analogy 
with male or female functions (category 6 ) , is, in comparbon with the 
two other age groups tested, most high at this age. 
In comparing the reactions of the early adolescent group with the 
college age group, it is noticeable that apart from the differences in scores 
in non-indicative answers in the college group, the differences in ccores 
among the several categories are relatively small. As can be seen in 
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Table 4 (p. 63) , where the drop in 'no reason why' reactions (category 
9) equals 12 per cent, there is only a slight drop in the reactions included 
in category 8 ('not evident' reactions) of 2 per cent. In checking vhe 
corresponding increase in the other categories, it becomes evident that 
category 1 (pertaining to objects used by either male or female) and 
category 4 (pertaining to resemblance with male or female appearance 
aspects), do not increase for the older group but remain equal to the 
early adolescent level. This seems to indicate that the early adolescent 
is as well capable as the college student to symbolize masculinity and 
femininity in associations with objects used by either men or women 
and in analogies with masculine or feminine appearance aspects. Increases 
are found in the other categories but remain per category relatively 
slight (ranging from 2 per cent to 5 per cent). The 2 per cent increase 
in category 7 (sex symbolism) represents an addition to the categories 
used by the early adolescents, since sex symbolism was not expressed at 
all by that age group. 
The supposed strong attitudinal interest in sexual differences at the 
college age level does not lead to an increase in perception of symbolism 
of the sexes in simple associations with objects used by men or women 
or in resemblances with regard to appearance aspects of men or women 
but does lead to an increased awareness of supposedly masculine or 
feminine activities and functions, of persons acting in a male or female 
role, of masculine and feminine character aspects, and of sex symbolism. 
It seems that in and through the increased interest in sexual differences, 
a slight but noticeable restructuring of masculine and feminine values is 
developing in the period from early adolescence to late adolescence and 
early adulthood. 
A comparison of the data concerning the college age group and the 
mature adult group reveals quite a different picture. Here we find notice-
able differences that indicate a hierarchical restructuring of values with 
regard to aspects of the masculine and feminine existence. In checking 
the figures of Table 4 (p. 63) , the difference in non-indicative answers 
between these two groups (as mentioned before) is most striking. An 
increase in no male or female meaning indicated from 11 per cent at the 
college age to 26 per cent at the adult age and an increase in 'no reason 
why' (category 9) from 15 to 35 per cent for those two groups respect-
ively are indicative of a change in attitude towards the masculine and 
feminine aspects of human existence. It is possible to suppose that the 
high number of 'no reason why' reactions (36 per cent) might be ex-
plained on the grounds of a stronger inclination among educated adults 
towards not expressing symbolic meanings that they were aware of but 
did not consider proper for explicit expression. But the early adolescents, 
in comparison with the college students, also show a considerable increase 
in 'no reason why' reactions (as discussed above), and it can hardly be 
expected that a critical attitude towards expressing symbolic meanings 
would be typical for an early adolescent as well as for a mature adult. 
Furthermore, the relative increase of reactions of no indication of male 
or female meanings is higher than the relative increase in 'no reason why' 
reactions (in percentage: no indicating of male or female meanings 
increased from 11 per cent tot 26 per cent, and 'no reason why' (category 
9 ) , from 15 to 35 per cent). As discussed above, it is hardly feasible 
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that subjects avoided expressing a masculine or feminine meaning for 
stimulus words if they were aware of one, and upon checking the 
corresponding figures in the 'no reason why' category, we, as mentioned 
before, suppose that a non- or not-clear awareness of a reason 'why' was 
mainly responsible for the majority of the reactions concerned. This 
leads us to believe that the strong attitudinal interest in sexual differences 
typical in the late adolescent and early adult period (as discussed above) 
has subsided among the educated adults participants of the mature age 
group, and that sex-differential values have obtained a more relative 
relationship to other values in the life of educated adults. 
A comparison of the data pertaining to the college group and the educ-
ated adult group concerning the other categories involved shows notice-
able differences, revealing a hierarchical structuring of sex-differential 
values at the adult age. Where a comparison of the data of the categories 
1 through 8 in Table 4 (p. 63) between the early adolescent and the 
college age group shows equal figures for category 1 (pertaining to 
associations with objects used by either men or women) and for category 
4 (pertaining to a resemblance of masculine or feminine appearance 
aspects) and a more or less slight increase for the remaining categories, 
a comparison of the data for the categories concerned between the 
college group and the educated adult group give a much more varied 
picture. 
Categories 1 and 2 (pertaining to simple associations with objects used 
by men or women and with supposedly male or female activities) both 
show a considerable drop of 7 per cent (respectively: from 20 to 13 
per cent and from 14 to 7 per cent). This indicates unmistakably that the 
educated adult is much less inclined than the student of college age to 
perceive symbolism of the sexes in simple associations. Categories 3, 4, 6 
and 1 show a slight drop of 2 or 3 per cent (respectively: from 6 to 4 
per cent, from 17 to 14 per cent, from 5 to 2 per cent, and from 2 to 0 
per cent). This indicates that the aspects of association with male or 
female persons, resemblance in appearance aspects, and analogy with 
supposedly male or female functions play a lesser role in the represent-
ation of the masculine and feminine existence at the mature adult age 
level than at the college age level and that the expression of sexually 
symbolic aspects disappears almost altogether among participants in the 
adult group. 
In connection with the generally decreased figures for the categories 
distinguished (understandable since an increase in 20 per cent in the 'no 
reason why' reactions of category 9 and an increase in 2 per cent in the 
'not evident' reactions of category 8 calls for a corresponding decrease 
in the remaining categories), it is remarkable that category 5, pertaining 
to the percipience of an essential analogy with supposedly masculine or 
feminine character aspects, shows an increase of 3 per cent, raising this 
category to a dominating 19 per cent, well above the percentage for the 
other categories distinguished. This indicates unmistakably that for 
educated adults, the psychological aspect of differences in character 
between the masculine and feminine existence is the leading aspect on 
the grounds of which masculinity and feminity are symbolically 
represented. 
Viewing the above described development of symbolism of the sexes in 
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the light of Galon's definition of human development as "the completing 
of the self in which more manifold and varied relations are accentuated. 
and in increasing self-determination hierarchically structured" (53, p. 7) 
(translation of quotation by author), we notice that a hierarchical struct-
uring of relations is especially realized during the period covered, in 
more than one way. 
In the development from early adolescence to late adolescence and young 
adulthood, the symbolism of the sexes seems to widen with the additional 
variation of sexually symbolic thinking, and, hierarchically, values en-
tailed in the differential aspects of a masculine and feminine existence 
seem to take a more dominant place. The developmental change from late 
adolescence and young adulthood to mature adulthood leads to a hier-
archical structure in which sexual differences are given a place of much 
less dominant importance. Also, symbolism of the sexes as such changes 
in hierarchical structuring during this period, as a dominance of associ-
ative and analogous symbolism related to concrete aspects in early 
adolescence and young adulthood becomes less important than character 
analogy symbolism in the determination of the symbolism of the sexes 
by the mature adult. 
Galon mentions further that there is not only a developmental change in 
formal characteristics but also a change in contents in the developmental 
human hange from mystic infrahuman to mystic suprahuman levels, 
concerning which he quotes from Heidegger's Der Feldweg: 
"Das Wachsen heisst, der Weite des Himmels sich öffnen und 
zugleich in das Dunkel der Erde wurzeln; das alles Gediegene 
nur gedeiht, wenn der Mensch gleich recht beides ist: bereit 
dem Anspruch des höchsten Himmels und aufgehoben im Schutz 
der tragenden Erde." (68, p . 7) 
Aspects of this range 'from earth to heaven' in the development of sym-
bolism of the sexes will be mentioned later in this chapter. 
3. The relation of sex symbolism and symbolism of the sexes 
Freudian sex symbolism related to concrete biological primary sex char-
acteristics seems, as the figures of Table 4 on page 63 indicate, to play 
an unimportant role in symbolism related to masculine and feminine 
aspects in general, at least on the expressed level. Despite the fact that 
most of the stimulus words pertain to Freudian sex symbols, the explicit 
sex symbol reactions are limited to 2 per cent for the college group, none 
at all for the early adolescents, and one single sex symbol reaction in the 
adult group. 
In checking on to what extent masculine meanings are given to the 
stimulus words indicating Freudian male sex symbols and feminine mean-
ings to Freudian female sex symbols, we find anything but an evident 
relation. The Freudian female symbol 'apple', for instance, is seen in 
almost an equal number of reactions as having a male or female meaning. 
The number 'three', so stressed by Freud as a universally valid male 
genital symbol, is also indicated in almost an equal number of instances 
as having a masculine or feminine meaning. Freud's female 'door' and 
female 'machine' are, in the majority of cases, given a masculine meaning, 
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and Freud's male sexually symbolic 'balloon' is seen by the majority of 
participants as a feminine symbol. 
We find, however, as could be expected, that tools used in masculine 
trades, which Freud likes to consider as symbolic for the male genital, 
do function as symbols for a masculine existence; and so implements 
that are used in a supposedly feminine activity such as housekeeping do 
function as female symbols, regardless, however, of a possible resem­
blance to male or female genitals which Freud holds to be the grounds 
for their symbolic function. Thus 'dustpan' is seen as a female symbol, 
which could, if one preferred to think along the Freudian line of sex 
resemblance, possibly be linked to female genital aspects; but 'broom', 
with a, from the Freudian sexually symbolic point of view, obvious male 
genital resemblance, functions, contrarily, in the majority of reactions 
as a female symbol. It is evident from the above that the relation en­
tailed in their use in masculine or feminine activities provides the grounds 
on which tools and implements function as male or female symbols, as is 
indicated by the subjects in the majority of 'reason why' reactions, 
regardless of a possible resemblance to biological primary sex char­
acteristics. This does not mean, however, that in a mind mentally set 
towards genital sex, implements and tools could not have a sexually cym-
bolic meaning. 
In a check of the function of those stimulus words that produced the 
majority of sexually symbolic reactions as male or female symbols, as 
reported in section 4 of the preceding chapter — the words 'banana', 
'sausage' and 'stick' — the latter word is not considered. 'Stick' is too 
evidently related to the masculine activities and functions of fighting, 
hitting, punishing, and protecting to warrant the supposition that, unless 
this is explicitly expressed by the subject concerned, it was the sexually 
symbolic aspect that determined the functioning of the stimulus word 
'slick' as a masculine symbol; 'stick' can, however, also function as cex-
ually symbolic and evidently does so rather frequently as reported in the 
section mentioned above. 
'Banana' and 'sausage', having no intrinsic or generally accepted relation 
to an either male or female function or activity, are for the early adoles­
cent and adult groups, which produce almost no sex symbols, not out­
spokenly symbolic for either a masculine or feminine existence and 
produce in these groups a mixed picture of some male, some female and 
no symbolic meanings one way or the other. These stimulus words 
produce a majority of masculine symbolic meanings for the college 
group, which produces male sex symbols at a comparatively high rate. 
This leads to a supposition that a mental set towards sex symbolism seems 
to be conditional for a possible functioning of sex symbolism as sym­
bolism of the sexes. 
The aspect of possibility, discussed in the preceding chapter in relation 
to stimulus words functioning as sex symbols as such, seems also to be 
characteristic for sex symbols in relation to their functioning as symbolic 
of masculinity or feminity as such. Levy's findings that there seems ίο 
be no relation between sex symbols and symbolism of the sexes for ten-
year-olds (mentioned in the preceding chapter), is confirmed in our 
findings for early adolescents and adults ; but we find, in addition, that at 
the college level, at least some formanalogy sex symbols can function as 
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symbols for the sex concerned; the possibility of their functioning as 
such seems to depend on a mental set intentionally directed towards 
sexually symbolic thinking. 
We notice that Freud completely overlooks the influence of mental set on 
sexually symbolic thinking. It seems to have escaped his notice that 
drawing the attention of subjects in that direction — by inquiring if, 
and suggesting that, certain things might have a sexually symbolic meaning 
— implicitly entails a suggestion for sexually symbolic thinking. Freud 
overlooks the fact that these suggestions might have been responsible for 
the sexually symbolic thinking of patients undergoing psychoanalytic treat-
ment. Freud states his viewpoint that suggestions are not responsible for 
the sexually symbolic thinking of his patients in a report concerning the 
psychoanalytic treatment of a 19-year-old, intelligent, and educated girl 
suffering from neurosis. Freud describes an intricate ritual that the girl 
performed before going to sleep, and Freud, as the analyst, interpreted 
the details of this ritual in a sexually symbolic sense. He states: 
"I had to offer hints and suggestions of its interpretations which 
were invariably received by her with a positive denial or with 
scornful doubt. After this first reaction of rejection, however, 
there followed a period in which she herself took up the poss-
ibilities suggested to her, noted the associations they aroused, 
produced memories, and established connections until she her-
self had accepted all the interpretations in working them out for 
herself". (23, p. 235, 236) 
The noteworthy part of this quotation is the fact that Freud states that 
he suggested his sexually symbolic interpretations to the girl, and that 
ambiguously he also supposes that later the girl had worked out these 
interpretations by herself. After elaborating on the symbolism concerned, 
Freud states: 
"Horrible toughts, you will say, to run in the mind of a virgin 
girl. I admit that; but do not forget that I have not invented 
these ideas, only exposed them." (23, p. 238) 
Freud evidently overlooks the possible influence on sexually symbolic 
thinking of drawing an individual's attention towards sexual aspects. Freud 
evidently also neglects the possibly very strong suggestive influence of a 
specialist-therapist accepted or chosen by the patient who suggests sex-
ually symbolic interpretations in a psychoanalytic session to a patient 
who comes for help and cure. The tests described in this paper offer no 
evidence by which to check the possible influence of the latter, but 
evidence exists concerning the former, since our findings indicate, as 
discussed in section 4 of the preceding chapter and in this section, that 
sex symbolism is a 'possible' symbolism only — a possibility that can 
become an actuality in a sexually directed mind. 
The test shows unmistakable evidence of the influence of drawing at. 
individual's attention to sex differences in general on sexually symbolic 
thinking in the Freudian sense. Thus, in the 'free' symbolic meaning test 
(not pertaining to masculine or feminine symbolic meanings), our sub-
jects produced only 14 sex symbol reactions, but in the masculine or 
feminine symbolic meaning test, in which attention was drawn towards 
sex differential aspects, our subjects produced 71 sex symbol reactions. 
It is important to note that both groups of reactions were produced by the 
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same subjects, in reaction to the same stimulus words, in the same class-
room session. (Table 3, p. 80) . 
The evidence found in the investigation concerning the unmistakable 
influence of situational suggestive factors on sexually symbolic thinking 
forces us to raise the question, whether and to what extent the Freudian 
sex symbolism 'found' by psychoanalysts in the minds of their patients 
originates in the patients' mind, or whether and to what degree it origin-
ates in the preconceived sexually symbolic interpretations of the psycho-
analysts which are converged through therapeutic suggestions to the men-
tally-ill minds of the patients. As stated above, on grounds of the evidence 
found in the tests of the present investigation it cannot be doubted that 
stimulation towards sex differential thinking does influence sexually 
symbolic thinking among a group of supposedly normal college students. 
Summarizing the evidence concerning the relation of sex symbolism and 
symbolism of the sexes: the tests showed that generally such a relation 
does not seem to exist, but that with regard to the (as discussed in the 
preceding chapter) more sexually minded college group, some male sex 
symbols seem (at least possibly) related to masculine symbolism in 
general. Before discussing sexual differences in symbolism of the sexes, 
we will give some attention to the contents of masculine and feminine 
symbolism found in the reactions concerned. 
4. Symbolism of the sexes 
A survey of the reactions, given during the masculine and feminine 
symbolic meaning test, to stimulus words that obtained a total or almost-
total indication of having either a masculine or a feminine symbolic 
meaning, indicates as definite symbols of femininity: a rose, a flower, 
a bracelet, a dustpan, butterfly, and a jewelcase; and as definitely mas-
culine symbols: a stick, a necktie, a pocket, an eagle, a gun, a sabre, a 
hammer, and a machine. The symbols representing only femininity 
evidently represent: natural beauty, artificially enhanced attractiveness, 
attractive flightiness, and care for the home. Symbols representing only 
masculinity represent: male clothing, strength, boldness, fighting, 
protection, craftmanship, and technical production. 
It seems that despite the emancipation and a factual legal equality in 
politics, business and industry, the woman is still essentially considered 
by both sexes to be a "oeautiful, attractive homemaker with a tinge of 
delicate flightiness, and the man is essentially considered to be an csth-
etically unappealing, strong, courageous fighter and protector and the 
creator of a, crafimanship requiring, technical knowledge of the world. 
Within the framework of this study, we cannot consider the problem of 
whether psychological differences in male and female existence are 
primarily a product of cultural environment as Margaret Mead will have 
it (54) or are based on biological characteristics and realized as a 
natural psychological development in a given culture, as Buytendijk 
brings forward in his existential-phenomenological study of the woman 
(55). Also, we are not concerned here with the study of whether the 
symbolic sex differences are realized as actual sex differences in the 
concrete existence of man and woman (the latter as viewed from a 
psychological viewpoint is dealt with in historical perspective by Bierkens 
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in his psychological contribution to a recent, medically-oriented sym-
posium on the determination of sex differences) (56). We limit our 
consideration to the supposedly masculine and feminine appearance and 
character aspects, as indicated by the symbols concerned. 
A problem mentioned before involves the relation between a great 
number of varied conceptions of the masculine and feminine existence and 
the great variety of possible conceptions of what is indicated by the 
stimulus words. For instance, the earth, supposedly motherly, is more 
often seen as male than as female on the grounds of conceptions such 
as: strong, rough, science, compact, hard, expansive, productive. Also, 
but less often, it is seen as female on ground of such aspects as: life-
giving, mother, round, warm, loving. The fact that one must know the 
conception of the referent for the subject concerned to understand 
symbolism (as brought forward by Hall (31, 33)) creates, in fact, a com-
plicated problem. One must also be aware of the subject's conception of 
the object that functions as a symbol for the conception of the referent 
concerned, since otherwise there exists a further possibility of misunder-
standing. We will not deal with this problem any further as to do so 
would lead to an involvement with semantics with which we are not 
concerned in the present study and will proceed in the next section with 
the aspect of differences in symbolism of the sexes between the male and 
female participants. 
5. Sea; differences in symbolism of the sexes 
The differences found in sex symbolism between the male and female 
participants (as described in the preceding chapter) made us aware of 
the possibility of differences between the sexes in symbolism of the sexes 
as well. To check this possibility, the total number of the mide partici-
pants of the three age groups combined and their reactions with regard 
to symbolism of the sexes were compared with the reactions of the total 
number of female participants taken as one group. No striking differences 
were encountered, but some differences were discovered which seem to 
make a discussion of sex differential aspects in symbolism of the sexes 
worthwhile. 
The procedure for calculating the data for a comparison of sex differences 
in symbolism of the sexes was carried out as follows: the total number, 
respectively of reactions of male and female participants were calculated, 
as were the number of reactions indicating that the stimulus word 
concerned did not convey either a masculine or feminine meaning; the 
latter were calculated as percentages of the former (Table 5, p. 73) . 
Also calculated for male and female participants respectively were the 
number of reactions indicating that the stimulus word had been attributed 
a male meaning and the number of reactions indicating that a stimulus 
world had geen given a female meaning, and these numbers were compu-
ted as percentages of the total number or reactions given by male and 
female participants respectively. Then, according to the categories des-
cribed in section 1 of this chapter, the number of reactions per category 
were scored and calculated as percentages of the number of male and 
female participants respectively. 
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The groups were fairly well matched according to size (75 and 70) ; 
according to age (average age of male participants is 20 years, with a 
range from 13—30 years; average age of female participants is 22 years, 
with a range from 13—40 years) ; and, as reported before, all parti-
sipants are students at Catholic high schools, colleges, universities, and 
university summer schools on the Main Line in Pennsylvania. 
The data of Table 5 (p. 73) indicate that there is practically no dif­
ference between the groups in the percentage of reactions not indicating 
a masculine or feminine meaning (15 and 17 per cent). There is, however, 
a noticeable difference between both groups with regard to the number 
of the indications of either male or female meanings. The male group 
gave 46 per cent masculine meanings and 39 per cent feminine meanings, 
whereas the female group gave approximately equal percentages in 
Tabk 5 
Male and female symbol reactions of total number of male and female 
students tested 
men 
average age: 20 
number tested: 75 
no. reactions 3,750 
no. male or female meaning 
not indicated 556 15 % 
no. reactions 
male 1,721 46 % 
no. reactions 
female 1.473 3 9 % 
women 
average age: 22 
number tested: 70 
no. reactions 3,500 
no. male or female meaning 
not indicated 591 17 % 
no. reactions 
male 1.539 41 % 
no. reactions 
female 1,470 4 2 % 
male: female ι male: female: 
DO. 0/o ПО. 0/Q DO. 0/O DO. 0/0 
1) Association object used: 319 19 340 23 217 15 279 19 
2) Association activity: 247 14 145 10 179 12 156 11 
3) Association person 109 6 55 4 99 7 38 3 
4) Analogy appearance: 99 6 347 24 118 8 423 29 
5) Analogy character: 346 20 106 7 353 25 165 11 
6) Analogy function: 63 4 55 4 58 4 56 4 
7) Analogy sex: 43 3 23 2 4 0 1 0 
8) Not evident: 112 7 94 6 65 5 96 7 
9) (?) Question Mark: 384 22 308 21 346 24 256 17 
masculine and feminine meanings (respectively, 41 and 42 per cent). This 
seems to indicate a more self-centered attitude with regard to symbolism 
of the sexes on the part of men than of women and therefore might 
indicate a certain immaturity in sexual development among the male 
participants. 
The data for category 1 (pertaining to simple associations with objects 
used either by men or women) indicates no difference in relative 
relations between the percentages of masculine and feminine reactions 
but does entail a noticeable difference in absolute numbers between the 
two groups. The respective scores for masculine and feminine reactions 
are for the male group 19 and 23 per cent but for the female group 15 and 
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19 per cent, indicating clearly that the male group perceives symbolism 
of the sexes in simple object associations more than the female group. 
Category 2 (pertaining to association with male or female activity), 
category 3 (pertaining to association with male or female person), and 
category 8 (pertaining to reactions in which the reason why a masculine 
or feminine meaning is given is not evident) show such slight absolute 
and/or relative differences that conclusions or suppositions are not warr-
anted, and the figures for category 6 (pertaining to analogy with 
suppesedly male or female functions) show an equal 4 per cent straight 
down the line, so that the only conclusion possible is that there seems to 
be no difference in this respect between the two groups. 
The data for category 4 (pertaining to analogy with masculine or 
feminine appearance aspects) confirms the expectation that both men 
and women are exceedingly more interested in feminine than in mascu-
line appearance aspects, and also that women perceive symbolism of the 
sexes in appearance aspects more than men, especially in relation to 
their own sex (equal respective scores for the masculine and feminine 
reactions for the male group 6 and 24 per cent, and for the female group 
8 and 29 per cent). That symbolism pertaining to analogy with either 
masculine or feminine character aspects would be more perceived by 
both groups in relation to the masculine rather than to the feminine 
existence was to be expected and is confirmed in the data of category 5 
(respective scores for masculine and feminine reactions for the male 
group equal 20 and 7 per cent and for the female group, 25 and 11 
per cent). These figures also indicate that the female group thinks notice-
ably more in terms of psychological characteristics in both masculine 
and feminine symbolism, which entails the notion that members of the 
female group have a more mature attitude towards symbolism of the oexes. 
The findings concerning sex symbolism (category 7, giving masculine 
and feminine reactions respectively: for the male group, 3 and 2 
per cent and for the female group, zero per cent for both) are unmistak-
able evidence that obscene thinking (in the sense described by Calon 
and as discussed in section 3 of the preceding chapter) is predominantly 
a male absorbtion and entails another indication of a more immature 
attitude among men with regard to symbolism of the sexes. 
The reactions indicating 'no reason why' a masculine or feminine 
meaning was given to the stimulus words concerned of category 9 show 
no noticeable difference in total numbers per group but show an interest-
ing relative difference between masculine and feminine reactions between 
the two groups. For the male group, the percentages for masculine and 
feminine reactions for which 'no reason why' is given are almost equal 
(respectively, 21 and 22 per cent), but the female group gives 24 per cent 
reactions of 'no reason why' for the stimulus words indicated as mascu-
line as compared to only 17 per cent for the stimulus words indicated as 
feminine. In venturing a possible explanation for this noticeable dif-
ference, we refer to the remark of one of the participants — that a 
noticed male sex symbol was not explicitly expressed as such (mentioned 
in Chapter IV, section 1, p. 49) — in relation to our findings that the 
majority of the sexually symbolic answers pertain to male sex symbols 
(discussed in Chapter IV, section 4) , and that, at least at the college age 
level, there seems to be a relation between male sex symbolism and 
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masculine symbolism of the sexes (as discussed in section 3 of this 
chapter). From this we infer that participants of the female group might 
have been aware of more male sex symbolism than is explicitly ex-
pressed. We infer also from these findings that for female participants, 
the sexually symbolic aspects have been more integrated into the total 
person, leading to implicit awareness of sex symbolism as an aspect of 
and integrated in the explicitly perceived symbolic masculinity of that 
which was indicated by the stimulus words concerned. If this supposition 
is correct, it would explain the higher number of 'no reason why' indic-
ations given by the female group with regard to masculine reactions, and 
this would also infer an indication of a more mature attitude towards 
symbolism of the sexes of the female participants. 
In summarizing the sex-differential findings concerning symbolism of 
the sexes, we notice with regard to the male participants: a higher 
number of masculine than feminine meanings given, indicating a more 
self-centered attitude; a higher number of 'objects used' associations 
indicating a greater inclination towards simple associative thinking; in 
the dominant majority of sex symbols given, a much greater inclination 
towards immature obscene thinking. The female participants, on the other 
hand, show: by a greater number of analogy appearance reactions, 
especially in relation to their own sex, that feminine beauty is more 
valued by women than by men ; by a higher number of character analogy 
reactions, a keener interest in the psychological aspects of the masculine 
and feminine existence; and by a higher number of unexplained mas-
culine reactions, most likely a better integration of sexually symbolic 
aspects into the symbolism of the whole person. 
The pictures emerging from the above findings indicate that the picture 
of the female group seems to be much more in line with the attitude to-
wards symbolism of the sexes found in the educated mature adult group, 
described in section 2 in this chapter, than the picture of the male group. 
Insofar as the groups concerned can be considered to represent manhood 
and womanhood, there seems to be little doubt that women have a more 
mature attitude than men towards symbolism of the sexes. 
To conclude the discussion of group data concerning symbolism of the 
sexes; it is evident that this method leads only to evidence demonstrating 
the likelihood of differences between age and sex groups in the percep-
tion of symbolism regarding the masculine and feminine existence. As 
an illustration of the richness of personal attitudinal aspects in and 
beyond symbolism of the sexes as typical for groups, we shall in the next 
section report on some interesting reactions encountered in individual 
test protocols. 
6. Individual test protocols 
The picture of a masculine and feminine world for a thirteen-year-old 
boy can be vague and only roughly structured, as one of our young 
friends demonstrates by writing down more question marks than answers 
as reactions to the majority of stimulus words given. He explains his 
masculine and feminine indications in pointing to men as weapon-and 
tool-using workers, that have courage, are on the move, wear pants and 
neckties, run ships and own houses; and he describes women as beautiful 
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housekeepers, who use pocketbooks, hairpins and slippers, can be quaint, 
and are represented as queen bees. 
How masculine the male world and how very feminine the female world 
can be to a fourteen-year-old boy becomes evident upon studying a 
protocol which entails no question marks with regard to masculine and 
feminine meanings of stimulus words but includes thirty-three male 
reactions in which man is pictured as big six times; as hard five times; 
as fierce twice; and as wearing neckties and using guns and machines. 
Women are called ladies (and sometimes girls as girls wash the dishes 
and wear pins) and are described as sweet four times; as very delicate 
twice; also, as soft, gentle and little, as jewelry-wearers and house-
keepers but our little friend still seems to have experienced that a woman 
is not always a lady, for 'stick' is also given a feminine meaning as: 
"that is what she hits with". 
The masculine and feminine world can also be sharply observed and 
livelily pictured by a boy of fourteen, as shown in a protocol with three 
question marks, twenty-five female reactions and twenty-two male reac-
tions, the latter picturing the male world from a wide variation of ap-
proaches. For instance: the four stimulus words indicating numbers are 
described as male in association with the manly sport of betting and 
gambling. A ship is related to sailors, a sabre is for fighting, and an 
eagle is seen from his essential masculine aspect of domination. The boy 
does not know why he indicated a banana as masculine, but he does 
know that his father likes sausages and he likes apples, and that is why 
they are male. A balloon is a weather balloon and therefore male; the 
moon is male since it is studied by scientists; and the earth is male 
because it is God's earth. A chapel obtained a question mark, because 
"all have a religion"; mouth and foot are given question marks; but a 
hand is female because it is related to feminine beauty. His feminine 
indications are for the main part based on beauty, style and housework; 
but he can also call a stick a feminine pointer and see femininity in the 
essential playfulness of a cat as well as in the springtime message of a bee. 
The adolescent girl's view of the world of masculine and feminine exist-
ence shows the same rich variety as that of the boy's, ranging from prot-
ocols with a majority of question marks and protocols indicating feminity 
in a total number of fifteen female reactions, as gentle, love and soft only 
and indicating the male world in seventeen reactions, as rough, twelve 
times, as animal, once, and nothing else, to protocols showing a rich 
variation in essential and or associative relations. In one of the latter, 
the feminine world is described by beauty, sweetness, softness, tenderness, 
carefulness, helplessness, and loving care and the masculine world, by 
leadership, strenght and power; and in another one, 'sabre' is seen as 
fur and therefore female, a deer, male as the leader of a family, and a 
bee, male in the grounds of the essential resemblance seen between 
honey collector and tax collector. 
The richer possibilities and the greater sophistication entailed in the 
protocols of college students and adults case a wider range and a greater 
variety of reactions. An illustration of the influence of attitude and set on 
symbolic thinking is provided in a protocol of a young man of twenty-
two, who reveals conspicuously the influence of a mental set towards sex. 
Without any indication of a tendency towards representing masculinity by 
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protection, leadership, defense, creation, faithfulness, importance or friend-
ship, he sees the male world in power, strenght, cockiness, shooting, wealth 
and animalism and five times in explicit male genital symbolism. 
Feminity is seen twice as beauty, once as gentle, once as dainty, once as 
affection, but five times as roundness, three times as opening, once as 
womb, and further, as flighty, changing, trying encasing a victim. There 
seems to be no inclination towards seeing womanhood in relation to 
tenderness, sweetness, playful romance or loving care. 
Another illustration of the influence of attitude and set, but in a more 
positive and pleasant direction, is the protocol of a female student set 
towards her boyfriend and marriage in an attitude of happy love. The 
boyfriend colors her male and female world. He himself is seen about ten 
times: he makes the ships male because he is in the navy; he makes a 
mouth male because she thinks of his mouth; he makes a chapel male 
because that is the place where she will marry him; he also makes a 
house male because "when married my husband will buy one", and a foot, 
too, because she knits socks for him; a banana is masculine, but nothing 
Freudian seems to be involved here since she states . . ."my boyfriend 
likes banana cake". The masculine world signifies protection (stick), 
politeness (in the suitcase carried for and the door politely opened for 
the ladies), defense (gung), and romance (moon), and a one becomes 
masculine as representing the first male child; in this mental set is 'a 
square' not allowed to become masculine and receives a question mark. 
The feminine world is pretty and light and dainty, there is a feminine 
hand on which to place a diamond, and woman's domain is cleaning the 
house, sewing, and cooking; but women are also catty, changeable, and 
unpredictable, and 'a three' is feminine because of resemblance to "a 
love triangle caused by a woman." 
An adult, mature, and essentially integrated attitude towards sexuality is 
illustrated by the following protocol of an adult female summer school 
student (age thirty). The approaches entailed in the reactions of this 
protocol are varying and diverse and demonstrate a personal freedom in 
symbolic thinking. Twenty reactions indicate a stimulus word as feminine, 
and they show a rich variation in the contemplation of aspects of female 
existence. There is the feminine shape, represented by a three and a 
circle, the delicacy of a female mouth, the femininity of a sweet rose, 
the decorative aspect of a jewelcase, the delicateness of a bracelet, and 
the daintiness of a feminine slipper. A rich psychological picture of fem-
inity is given in reference to the vaniten of a peacock, the fluttering of a 
butterfly, the playful flightiness of a balloon, and also to the treacher-
ousness of a cat, the sting of a bee, the binding tie of a feminine pin, the 
womanly rich warmth of a chapel, and the benign blessing of a female 
sun. Represented is the dexterity of a woman's hand, the matter-of-
factness of a pocketboek as part of the female outfit, and the comfort of 
a woman's room. 
Masculinity in this protocol is also pictured in a rich variation oí 
symbolism. In his appearance, man is seen as broad like a square, 
compact like a pocket, weighty as a hammer, rough as a broom, ungrace-
ful as a foot, or as pure a quantity as an eight; a necktie can give him a 
gentleman-like appearance. Man's power is symbolically represented by 
a stick, a gun, a key, and a machine. Man can be domineering like an 
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eagle, important like a door, kingly like a deer, but he also can take 
rough handling like a suitcase and abuse like a shoe. He can be: the 
light protection of an umbrella and the strong protection of the earth; 
mighty like a ship, forceful like a sabre, and as faithful as a dog; as cool 
as the moon and as simple as a six. He can be as good as the one great 
God and as demonic as the lowest serpent. He eats food to get strength 
and can work work simply as a dishwasher. A banana is also given a 
masculine meaning, but as an explanation 'why', we find the only question 
mark in the protocol, which might possibly indicate an implicit awareness 
of sex symbolism that is not explicitly expressed. This mature and rich 
level of symbolic thinking is attainable in the development of symbolism 
of the sexes. 
In viewing the above in the light of Galon's definition of human 
development (as discussed in section 2 of this chapter), the aspects of 
increasing self-determination in the hierarchical structuring and more 
and more manifold and varied relations become an evident reality. The 
simple structure of a masculine world dominantly pictured by the early 
adolescents as hard, rough, fighting, fierce, providing leadership and 
power, and a feminine world pictured in beauty, tenderness, love and 
housekeeping (with individual variations of a somewhat richer nature) 
gives way to the more manifold relations and richer variation in the 
representation of masculinity and femininity, by late adolescents and 
young adults. We find that the lively symbolism of the sexes at this age 
can be stimulated and colored by a non personal interest in sexual 
aspects as opposed to an interest in playing a personal game of love and 
the representation of the masculine and feminine roles from the per-
spective of love and happy marriage. 
The richest variation in symbolism, with a most manifold hierarchical 
structuring of relations, is found in the attitude characterized by un-
conditional interest that can be attained by mature adults. Here we can 
encounter variations in the picture of femininity ranging from the 
daintiness of a slipper to the dexterity of a woman's hand, from the 
delicateness of a bracelet to the rich warmth of a chapel, from the 
treacherousness of a cat to the benign blessing of a female sun. Man's 
picture can vary from broom-like roughness to a gentlemanly, well-
dressed appearance, from resembling a kingly deer to resembling a 
trodden down shoe, from the devilish lowness of a serpent to the picture 
of an almighty great good God. 
The present investigation of developmental aspects of symbolism of the 
sexes leads to a confirmation of Heidegger's views (referred to by Galon 
and quoted in section 2 of this chapter, p. 68) that: 
"Development means to open oneself for the broad lights of 
heaven wilst remaining rooted in the darkness of earth; true 
veritable development can only by realized when the human 
being is truly, facing the challenge of the highest heaven whilst 
lifted up in the protection of the supporting earth." (52, p . 7, 
translation of quotation by author) 
In the next chapter, some aspects of the actual development of symbolic 
thought will be considered. The subject of actual development cannot be 
dealt with thoroughly in the present study, but the discussion entails 
vistas for a promising further empirical approach to symbolic thinking. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE ACTUAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF SYMBOLIC THINKING 
1. A psychological description of awareness 
In the preceding chapters there has been mention of different levels of 
awareness in connection with symbolism and it appears, in view of the 
involvement of different levels of awareness in the actual development 
of symbolic thinking, desirable to clarify what is meant by 'awareness' 
in the present study. 
The terms consciousness and awareness seem to be used interchangeably 
in psychology and we will try to make a distinction between these terms. 
William James in his description of 'the stream of thought' noticed that, 
"to give an accurate account of thought as a part of a personal 
consciousness is the most difficult of philosophic tasks." (57, 
vol. I, p . 225) 
Personal consciousness still seems to be a point of discussion among 
philosophers. Strasser, for instance in a philosophical phenomenological 
study of emotionality, criticizes Sartre's viewpoint, that awareness of 
the intended object entails the whole of consciousness, as too limited 
and he brings forward that consciousness of something entails also 
awareness of the self as being conscious of the consciousness of something 
(58, p. 32) . This seems to be a recent philosophical confirmation of 
James' viewpoint that a least within 'the natural science of psychology' 
thought must be seen as a part of a personal consciousness. 
We do not intend to take sides in a philosophical discussion of conscious-
ness, nor in a discussion of the physiological conditions of the nervous 
system that can or must be considered conditional for consciousness to 
be possible. The latter considerations present a problem when one tries 
to distinguish between awareness as a concept in philosophy and 
medicine both of which are cervered ben the term conciousness. In phil-
osophy the opposition conscious-unconscious can be used for distinguishing 
the mode of existence of inanimate objects which are seen as unconscious, 
from the existence of animal life as conscious, and human life as self-
conscious. Consciousness in a medical sense seems to pertain to a state of 
the organism in which the voluntary as well as the autonomic part of the 
nervous system is functioning and neurophysiological conditions which 
enable sense-perceptions and voluntary muscle control are fulfilled. 
When we use the term awareness we refer to forms of 'personal conscious-
ness' in the sense of James, and presuppose a conscious existence in the 
metaphysical sense along with a state of consciousness in the medical sense 
for the subject, who is more or less aware of psychological contents. In 
connection with the presupposed physiological condition, we should 
remark that from our viewpoint these conditions are even fulfilled in 
sleep, since one, even though this might be vague, can be aware of 
things while sleeping. 
It is not so much the use of the term consiousness in the above mentioned 
metaphysical and medical connotations, that gives ground for confusion 
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with awareness, but il is the use of the terms conscious and unconscious 
to indicate psychological contents of which one is more or less aware that 
can be confusing. Messer in his classical study of experience and thinking 
distinguishes several meanings of 'Bewusstsein' (a German term covering 
both consciousness and awareness), and we shall follow his line of thought 
in trying to clarify the meaning of awareness for this study. 
Messer distinguishes two meanings of unconscious. One pertains to 
psysiological occurrences as seen in the autonomic adjustment reflexes of 
the sense organs and the millions of impulses running along the network 
of the nervous system, about wich Messer states: "the whole of the 
physical world of the organism is unconscious". A second meaning of 
unconscious described by Messer is unconscious in a psychological sense 
and he views memory traces of earlier experiences, intentionalities result-
ing from attitudes and character dispositions as unconscious in this sense. 
Besides this state of psychological unconsciousness, Messer distinguishes 
or posits a state of consciousness which has no degrees, to quote: 
" 'Bewusstsein' (und 'bewusst') in diesem Sinne hat keine 
Grade: etwas ist entweder Bewusstseinsinhalt (bzw. bewusst) 
oder ist es nicht; aber es kann es nicht mehr oder weniger 
sein." (59, p. 90) 
Messer considers this (in our opinion philosophical) term, to be a sum-
marizing expression of all the 'experiences', 'sensations', or 'contents' in 
the broadest sense, as belonging to a subject that can have selfconscious-
ness, an 'ich' (in the Freudian terminology an 'ego') . 
It seems that Freud referred to conscious and unconscious in the above 
sense of two opposed states in regard to dream symbolism. As mentioned 
in section 2 of chapter IV, Freud states that: 
"The dreamer is not in the least aware that he is using symbol-
ism, and cannot be made aware of this by the process of free 
association; the dreamer is even actually unwilling to recognize 
the symbolism he used when it is brought to his notice by the 
analyst". (23, ch. 10) 
However, Freud refers to sex symbolism in symptoms, at least implicitly, 
in what appears to be a different level of form of unconscious, as is ceen 
in his use of the acceptance of his sex symbolic interpretation by one of 
his patients as possibly right as evidence that "He had not invented these 
ideas, only exposed them" (discussed in section 3 of the preceding 
chapter). The lack of a distinguishing clarity in the Freudian notions 
regarding 'unconsciousness' is confusing and, as Harding remarks: 
"It makes for confusion in this context that Freud within 
one notion of the unconscious included not only repressed ideas 
which could perfectly well have been conscious and introspectable 
if they had been tolerable but also the process he called the Id 
which never can be introspected." (60, p. 19) 
Returning to Messer's discussion of consciousness we notice that Messer 
distinguishes another form of conciousness which does have degrees, and 
is indicated by the term 'Gegenstands-bewusstsein', which literally means 
'object-consciousness'. Object is used here by Messer in the very broad 
sense of including objects of outer-perception as well as of inner-percept-
ion, such as fantasies, physiological changes, and awareness of ego or 
consciousness of self. In this study the term awareness pertains to the 
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latter concept of consciousness and thus closely resembles James' 'personal 
consciousness' theory which was previously mentioned. This psychological 
concept of awareness presupposes a conscious state of the organism in 
the medical sense and also a conscious existence in the philosophical 
sense. Awareness in this sense is distinct from a concept of consciousness 
that, as Messer states, has no degrees, since one can be aware of objects 
in varying degrees of awareness. This concept of awareness presupposes 
Strasser's notion of an awareness of the self as being more or less aware 
of something. 
This psychological awareness can be of an implicit nature, as described 
by Rohracher in connection with the implicit awareness of mental Bets 
(discussed in Chapter III, section 4 ) , or of an explicit nature, as is 
evident in the reactions to the question 'why' a masculine or feminine 
symbolic meaning was given to stimulus words. For instance, a subject 
could, at the moment of indicating that the stimulus word 'stick' had a 
masculine meaning for him, have been bardly, vaguely, not at all, or 
clearly aware of 'why' he indicated the word as masculine; but at the 
moment of considering the question why he did indicate this word as a 
masculine symbol, he could become explicitly aware that he was thinking 
of a policeman's stick and write down 'protection'; or he could become 
explicitly aware that he is not clearly aware of 'why' he did give this 
word a masculine meaning and thus write down a question mark. 
The actual development of symbolic thinking, as the picturalizing of the 
conception of a referent, and the contemplation of this embodied 
representation of a conception (as described in section 10 of Chapter I ) , 
involves different levels of awareness, as will be discussed in the following 
section. 
2. Levels of awareness in symbolic thinking 
As discussed in section two of the preceding chapter, the high number 
of 'no reason why' reactions for masculine or feminine indicated 
stimulus words did indicate that implicit awareness of male or female 
contents can play a role in the perception of masculine or feminine 
symbolic meanings, that do reach the level of explicit expression. Also, 
as brought forward in section five of the preceding chapter, the 
discrepancy found between the number of 'no reason why' reactions for 
masculine and feminine meanings given by the female participants, can 
be considered to be due mainly to the implicit awareness of sex symbolic 
aspects, that are integrated into the explicitly perceived masculine 
symbolism. The likelihood of the integration of contents that are only on 
a level of implicit awareness into explicitly expressed symbolism, is 
strengthened by Harding's notion that symbols might emerge as the 
result of 
"The emergence into focal definition of a selection of ideas 
belonging to a whole cluster of potential ideas that may perhaps 
never become conscious in its entirety". (60, p . 21) 
As mentioned in the preceding section, Harding objects to the lack of 
distinguishing clarity in the Freudian notions of 'unconsciousness', and 
in confronting this objection with the aspects of implicit and explicit 
awareness encountered in the reactions to the tests of the present study, 
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some grounds for critical observations are uncovered. The Freudian 
notion that complete unconscious contents determine the actual develop-
ment of symbolic thinking seems to have no empirical basis. The sup-
position of the existence of an unconscious psychological layer, is from 
the empirical viewpoint no more then a hypothetical construct, and 
Freud's claim that completely unconscious, as such inexperienceable, 
contents of the Id determine conscious thought or behavior can not be 
made an object of empirical verification. 
Freud seems to have been aware of the problem involved in his statement 
that, 
"On the one hand the patient or client is not at all aware of 
unconscious symbolism (and can not be made aware of this by 
means of free association), and on the other hand, the analyst 
who interprets this unconscious symbolism is well aware of 
these supposedly very active contents operating in a completely 
unconscious Id." (128) (quoted in section 2 of Chapter IV, 
p. 75, 76) 
Freud offers the following explanation: 
"Whence is our knowledge of this symbolism derived? The 
usages of speech cover only a small part of it, whilst the mani-
fold parallels in other fields are for the most part unknown to 
the dreamer: we ourselves had to collate them laboriously in 
the first instance." 
And further: 
"psychoanalytic work is so closely intertwined with so many 
other branches of science, the investigation of which gives 
promise of the most valuable conclusion: with mythology, 
philology, folk-lore, folk psychology and the study of religion." 
(23, p. 148, 149) 
Freud overlooks in this explanation that the products of mythology, 
philology, folk-lore, and so on can also not be approached empirically 
when they exist on a supposed level of complete unawareness. These 
manifestations can only be empirically studied insofar as they are 
realized by thinking human beings. Statements about complete uncon-
scious psychological contents determining these manifestations of culture 
and art are as hypothetical as statements about the influence of uncon-
scious contents on a by the dreamer supposedly realized symbolism in 
dreams. 
As brought forward earlier (in Chapter IV, section 4 ) , the reactions to 
our tests did not confirm the Freudian supposition that an unconscious 
Id universally determines the sex symbolic meaning of certain objects. 
Only some of the stimulus words pertaining to Freudian sex symbolism 
did indeed function as sex symbols, and insofar as the stimulus words 
did function as sex symbols, it was found that they did not confirm 
Freud's supposition of doing so on the ground of a resemblance with 
the genital aspects concerned. The majority of stimulus words functioning 
as sex symbols did so on other than resemblance grounds, and only some 
male sex symbols adhered, for some of the participants, to the Freudian 
doctrine of resemblance with genital aspects. The fallacy of a universal 
validity for Freudian sex symbolism is, from a cultural-historical view-
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point, brought forward by Verhoeven in a study of the symbolism of the 
foot. This study will be dealt with in the next section. 
Harding's observation of a confusing Freudian mixture of a completely 
unconscious Id with a not so completely unconscious repressed psychol-
ogical content was referred to in the preceding section. Another illu-
stration from which can be inferred that Freud implicitly included levels 
of unawareness in his notions of unconscious, might be seen in the 
remark : 
"The resistance of their sensitiveness to such an explanation 
(in casu a sex symbolic one), suggests the activity of a motive 
less present to consciousness, and the source of this excess of 
feeling can easily be found in relation to the castration 
complex." (In 'A connection between a symbol and a symptom', 
44 vol. II, p. 163) 
Freud seems also to blend the involuntary mechanism of repression with 
the voluntary act of suppression, and holds that repression occurs in 
normal as well as neurotic life, to quote: 
"Now psychoanalytic research finds no fundamental, but only 
quantitative distinctions between normal and neurotic life; 
and indeed the analysis of dreams, in which repressed complexes 
are operative alike in the healthy and the sick, shows a 
complete identity both in their mechanisms and in their sym-
bolism." (61, p. 73) 
The present study is not concerned with pathological mechanisms that 
might be operating in the symbolic thinking of neurotic patients, we 
notice, however, that the symbolic thinking of the normal human being is 
not determined by the involuntary mechanism of repression. The normal 
human being can voluntarily suppress explicit awareness of threatening 
or otherwise undesirable psychological contents; he can, on levels of 
implicit awareness, more or less control contents and direction of the 
actual development of symbolic thinking. The relative freedom to give 
meaning to what a symbol represents is, as brought forward in section 
10 of Chapter I (p. 28), an essential aspect of symbolic thinking. 
Freud's supposition that repression occurs in the normal as well as in 
the neurotic person is more understandable as he seems to blend in-
voluntary and voluntary aspects in the one notion repression. In the 
'Psychopathology of Everyday Life', for instance, in a passage in which 
Freud with a remarkable intricated reasoning links his own forgetting 
of the name of a painter to sexuality he states the following: 
"— that is, I wished to forget something, I repressed something. 
To be sure, I wished to forget something other than the name 
of the master of Orvieto; but this other thought brought about 
an associative connection between itself and this name, so that 
my act of volition missed the aim, and I forgot the one against 
my will, while I intentionally, wished to forget the other." 
(45, p. 11) 
The unconscious is open to empirical investigation insofar as the Freudian 
unconscious content pertains to suppressed undesirable experiences or 
thoughts, which are experienceable and or introspectable in levels of 
implicit awareness. This aspect of the Freudian unconscious is not a 
hypothetical construct and appears to be a suitable object for further 
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empirical research. As discussed above no evidence was found that the 
actual development of symbolic thinking is sex symbolically determined 
by a supposed universal unconscious meaning of certain objects, nor did 
we encounter evidence that the mechanisms of repression had any 
noticeable influence on the symbolic thinking of the supposedly normal 
subjects of our tests. Insofar as the Freudian notion of repression 
pertains in fact to suppression, and the notion of unconscious includes 
levels of implicit awareness as described above, our findings confirm the 
influence of psychological contents, active on levels of implicit aware-
ness, on the actual development of explicitly aware aspects of symbolic 
thought. As an instance of the influence of implicitly aware pscho-
logical contents on explicit symbolic thinking, the test-protocol of the 
happily engaged college student presents itself (reported in section 6 of 
the preceding chapter, p. 77). Attitude and set which (as discussed 
in section 4 of Chapter III), operate on levels of implicit awareness, 
evidently geared the actual development of symbolic thinking into 
positively colored directions, and influenced the selection of actual 
contents of symbolic thought into the fields of courtship and happy 
marriage. 
In concluding this discussion of levels of awareness in symbolic thinking, 
we are particularly aware of the lack of empirical investigations con-
cerning the problem of the assessment of the influence of psychological 
contenta on lower levels of awareness. It seems that, besides dogmatic 
psychoanalytic interpretative approaches, no explicit attempts have been 
made by empirical psychology to investigate lower levels of awareness 
in the actual development of the symbolic thinking of the civilized, 
educated adult man. Concept formation and problem solving have how-
ever been studied experimentally since the time of the Würzburgers. In 
the next section some attention will be given to the high developmental 
level of symbolic thinking, and in the last section we will return to 
aspects of the actual development of symbolic thought. 
3. Developmental level of symbolic thinking 
In the earlier mentioned study of the hinterland of thought, Harding 
indicates that a cluster of potential ideas from which symbols might 
develop, may be an aspect of normal thought development. He refers to 
the achievements of the Würzburg School in their studies of concept 
formation and problem solving thought, and comments on their over-
looking the personal aspects in thinking. Harding quotes a worthwhile 
remark of Thurstone on the intellectual organization of pre-rational 
thinking, but he does so in the manner of a literary scholar and turns 
his interest to an analysis of symbolism in English poetry; thus, he by-
passes the importance of this notions for the psychological development 
of symbolic thought. 
It is noteworthy that the experimental approaches to thinking employed 
by the Würzburg School and others have been directed mainly towards 
problem solving and concept formation and not to symbolism. Com-
parative developmental psychology also seems to overlook the higher 
levels of symbolic thinking and considers logical, categorical, scientific 
thought to be the highest form. We can not avoid the impression that 
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Descartes' stress on the importance of rational thinking has led to an 
overevaluation of the psychological importance of logical scientific 
thought. Werner, for instance, in a thorough discussion of primitive 
thought, seems implicitly to have noticed other high levels of thought, 
but he stresses explicitly logical, abstract scientific thinking, to quote: 
"The thought of primitive man differs from the higher and 
above all from the scientific thought of western man in that it 
has a concrete and in consequence syncretic character... Typical 
European reflection is universal in nature, abstract: it functions 
more or less independently of the immediate, concrete reality, 
and is governed by an awareness of general laws." (18, p. 299) 
Wemer evidently bypasses his implicit notion of other 'higher levels of 
thought'. Morris, bowever, in the statement, quoted in section 6 of 
Chapter I, states explicitly that human thought is characterized by 'the 
creation and use of symbols, (p. 17) 
Freud, although he introduced symbolism into psychology and stressed 
the importance of symbolic thinking, was too preoccupied with sex 
symbolism to contribute much to giving this form of essentially human 
thought its high developmental place. Freud, for instance, fulminates 
sharply against Jung and Adler for trying to elevate psychoanalytic 
symbolism above the biological genital level. Indications of this are seen 
in the following: 
"As is known, the principle of Adler's system is that the 
governing motive of self-preservation in the individual, his 'will 
to power', expresses itself pre-eminently in the form of a 
'masculine protest' in the conduct of life, in character formation 
and in neurosis." 
However : 
"Whatever of the masculine protest can be shown to exist is 
easily traceable to a disturbance in the primary narcism due 
to threats of castration or to early interference with sexual 
activities." 
Against Jung he states: 
"All the changes that Jung has wrought in psychoanalysis flow 
from the ambition to eliminate all that is disagreeable in the 
family complexes, so that it may not evidence itself again in 
ethics and religion." 
And further: 
"Thus a new religious-ethical system was created, which, just 
like the Adlerian system, must necessarily lead to new inter-
pretations of the actual results of analysis, or else distort or 
ignore them. In truth signifies but that a few of Culture's 
harmonics in the symphony of life have sounded again, while 
the daemonic forces of the instinct-melody have once more 
passed unheard." (44, Vol. I, p. 343, 344, 353, 354) 
From these quotations it is evident that an elucidation of high human 
levels in symbolic thinking had to come from studies critical of íhe 
Freudian viewpoint. 
After his breaking away from Freudian psychoanalysis, Jung seems to 
have tried to become the prophet of an analytic-psychological, religious-
ethical system, and he developed views on symbolism that seem to be far 
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removed from Freud's sexually symbolic thinking. Jung elevates sym-
bolism above the Freudian biological-genital level, in refering to mystical 
suprahuman referents of the symbol, but on the other hand he relates 
symbolism to mystic biogenetic aspects in his theory of archetypes. 
Archetypes are supposed to evolve phylogenetically in the historical 
biogenetic development of man. They are also supposedly active in ihe 
mystic region of the collective unconscious and are supposed to steer 
the actual development of personal symbolism in archetypical directions. 
(62, p. 40-^15, 50—59) 
It seems that Jung, in limiting symbolism explicitly to the expression of 
only partly conceivable suprahuman aspects (and implicitly in his 
doctrine of archetypes also to the expression of infrahuman aspects), 
deliberately turns his attention to only mystic and mysterious areas. The 
following provides such an indication: 
"Now a symbol is not an arbitrary or intentional sign standing 
for a known and conceivable fact, but an admittedly anthropo-
morphic — hence limited an only partly valid — expression for 
something suprahuman and only partly conceivable. It may be 
the best expression possible, yet it ranks below the level of the 
mystery it seeks to describe." (63, p. 152, 153) 
Despite the fact that Jung left the field of empirical scientific psychology, 
after dropping his original empirical methods of investigation by means 
of his word association test, he still claims to be an empirical psychologist 
as is seen in his statement: 
"Although I have often been called a philosopher, I am an 
empiricist and adhere as such to the phenomenological stand-
point... As this statement indicates, I approach psychological 
matters from a scientific and not from a philosophical stand-
point... I eschew any metaphysical considerations." (64, p. 5, 6) 
Since Jung, for the most part, indulges in an interesting game of what 
appears to be philosophing about his analytic-psychological inter-
pretations of myths, culture, religion, and the dreams and symptoms of 
his patients, his work can be considered to pertain to the realm of 
philosophical psychology. Perhaps in the face of his denial of philo-
sophical engagement his work might be considered to pertain to cultural 
anthropology. We are not in a position to judge the philosophical or 
cultural anthropological values of Jung's visions, but note that after 
Jung bypassed the scientific limits of his original, empirical, scientifically 
verifyable word association methods his visionary hypothetical sup-
position can no longer be considered to belong to the field of empirical 
scientific psychology. As an illustration of the need for an empirical 
verification of Jung's hypothetical theories, it should be noted that in 
this present investigation the supposedly archetypical 'motherly' earth 
was more often perceived as a masculine than as a feminine symbol 
(reported in the preceding chapter). 
In relation to the developmental level of symbolic thought it is noteworthy 
that Jung does not consider the symbol to be an expression of genital 
aspects, but rather an expression of contents on a suprahuman level. 
In a theological critical discussion of Freudian symbolism, Tuinstra 
notices the high developmental level of symbolic thinking. He quotes 
Baader's statement that a symbol is nothing less than the organic form 
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conditional for revealing the higher manifestations of life, to quote: 
"Das Symbol is nicht geringeres als die organische Form, 
welche Bedingnis der höheren Lebensoffenbarung ist." (65, 
p. 4) 
In addition to the revealing function of the symbol (seen in a sense 
analogous to Suzanne Langer's 'presentation symbolism', as described in 
section 10 of Chapter I, p. 28) , Tuinstra considers the Freudian notion 
that the function of a symbol is to mask or to hide the referent as also 
essential and he mentions the 'paradoxical' as a characteristic aspect of 
symbols (65, p. 9 ) . It is noticeable that Tuinstra's notions on symbolism 
are paradoxical indeed. We do not hold the symbol to be essentially a 
mask, nor do we feel that the function of hiding the referent is essential 
for symbolism (as brought forward in section 10 of Chapter I ) . 
Tuinstra implies in his final conclusions, that symbolism functions in 
myths and psychoses as a temporary, pious 'make-belief', leading to a 
constraining pseudo-reality; whereas symbolism in the Gospel, by the 
grace of God, leads to a liberating veritable reality, to God's reality 
(65, p. 230). Our pilot investigation of symbolism (not directed towards 
pathological or religious aspects), provides no data for an empirically 
based critique on Tuinstra's final conclusions; we doubt, however, that, 
from a psychological viewpoint, the essentially differing fields of psycho-
pathology, mythology, and christian theology are empirically bridged by 
a developmental difference in the function of symbolism, as Tuinstra 
seems to hold. However, in relation to the present study, it should be 
noted that Tuinstra in a theological critical approach, breaks through the 
Freudian sex symbolic limitations and stresses the high human level of 
symbolic thought. 
A cultural-historical approach to Freudian symbolism is, as mentioned in 
the preceding section, provided in Verhoeven's study of the symbolism of 
the foot (66). Verhoeven stresses abstract analogy symbolism and he 
considers only the symbolism in literature, religion, and art worthy of 
academic scientific discussion; thus, he gives this level of symbolism 
a high ranking place in human thought. Evidently irritated by Freud's 
exemplary and dogmatic sex symbolic interpretations of the sacred fields 
of myths, religion and cultural-historic literature, he opposes the Freudian 
deterministic sex symbolic interpretation of symbols by posing as a 
principle the infinite possibilities inherent in symbol interpretation. 
The Freudian viewpoint of a universal validity of symbols based on an 
invariable relation of comparison of resemblances (described in Chapter 
IV, section 2 ) , does in fact lower the symbol to the level of an indicator 
of cognition-contents, to the level of a sign, as described in section 1 of 
Chapter I. Since the function of the symbol is considered to be the pictur-
alized representation of the conception of a referent, an aspect of relative 
freedom to choose a certain conception of the referent is conditionally 
necessary for symbolic thinking (discussed in section 10 of chapter I ) . 
A rose, for instance, functions as a symbol of love, but the conception of 
love encountered in this symbol might be different for a teenager than 
for an old man. The principle of an infinite number of possibilities for 
symbol interpretation, posed by Verhoeven, might be applicable to a 
principle of an infinite possibility to create new symbols, but once a 
symbol is created in the inner-personal or inter-personal communication 
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of a person, the possibilities of its interpretations are limited to the con-
ceptions of the referent concerned for the person concerned. It seems to 
escape Verhoeven's notice that in demanding infinite possibilities of 
symbol interpretation, he appears to be as dogmatic as Freud, but in the 
direction of indeterminism. 
The evidence of the present investigation indicates that there seems to be 
little ground for dogmatism, one way or the other. Some stimulus words 
do (as discussed in section 4 of the preceding chapter), stimulate 
masculine or feminine symbolic meanings on the basis of associations 
with aspects of a supposedly masculine or feminine world. For instance: 
'hammer' and 'machine' are seen as male symbols on the basis of associ-
ation with craftmanship and engineering; 'dustpan' and 'jewelcase' are 
seen as female symbols on the basis of associations with housekeeping 
and the wearing of jewelry. Other stimulus words stimulate masculine or 
feminine symbolic meanings on the basis of analogy with supposed 
masculine or feminine aspects. Examples of the latter can be seen in such 
responses as 'rose' seen as female on the grounds of beauty, and an 
'eagle' representing the masculine world symbolically on the grounds of 
his power and majesty. Other stimulus words like 'apple' and 'three' do 
not apparently stimulate either masculine or feminine symbolism; the 
symbolic meanings given to these stimulus words seem to depend mainly 
on the attitude and set of the subject concerned. Some stimulus words 
do, in a mental set directed towards this, stimulate sex symbolism on the 
basis of analogy, while others function on the grounds of association 
(discussed in section 4 of chapter IV and in section 3 of the preceding 
chapter). The evidence of the present study indicates that certain aspects 
of what is indicated by the stimulus words, as well as aspects of the per-
sonal attitudes of subjects, and finally aspects of a situationally influenced 
mental set, do play a role in determining the content and nature of 
symbolic thinking. 
Verhoeven, in opposing Freud's viewpoint that dream symbols function 
as masks for latent dream thoughts, holds that symbols are not masks but 
veils, and he considers the veil to be the symbol of symbolism. We hold, 
however, with Hall and Suzanne Langer (as discussed in sections 9 and 
10 of chapter I ) , that, even when a person can use symbols as masks or 
veils, the function of symbols as means of inner-personal and inter-
personal communications is neither masking nor veiling but the pictur-
alized representing of conceptions of a referent. Verhoeven's criticism 
on the psychology of symbolism, evidently based on an orientation in 
psychoanalytical and analytic-psychological literature alone, appears to be 
of little theoretical value; but his rich and deversified approach to the 
symbolism of the foot, as encountered in cultural-historic literature, 
demonstrates vividly that the Freudian dogmatically determined sexual 
symbolic interpretation can at best be considered to be a possible inter-
pretation for a psychoanalytically minded interpreter. 
Calon, in his discussion of the development of symbolism in adolescence, 
refers to the perspective in abstract, analogous, symbolic thinking in 
which the worlds of the senses and of the intellect are perceived as one 
reality, as the highest form of human thought. To quote: 
"As the tendency towards objectivity in adolescent thinking is 
too much threatened by and sometimes even ovei whelmed by 
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emotional factors, the thinking of the adolescent can not be the 
harmonic union of abstract-logical concrete-pictorial, and 
emotional ways of approach. Only when this union is realised 
is, however, the highest form of human knowing attained, in 
which the worlds of the senses and of the intellect are perceived 
as one reality. Many adults will never attain this level." (30, 
p. 73, 74, translation of quotation by author). 
As brought forward in chapter III, the data of the symbolic meaning test 
indicated that abstract analogy symbolism is the dominating form of 
symbolic thought for the educated adult. Consequently this form of 
symbolic thinking, in which abstract-logical, concrete-pictorial, and 
affective aspects are united, is considered to be the highest developmental 
level of human thought. 
In summarizing the above discussions it should be noted that the symbolic 
thinking if the adult educated human being seems to be overlooked not 
only in experimental psychology, but also in comparative developmental 
psychological studies. Much attention is given to picturalized thought on 
the levels of primitive man and early childhood, but when the educated 
adult level is reached the attention shifts to logical, scientific, abstract 
thinking. The high developmental level of picturalized analogous sym-
bolic thought, seems to have escaped the attention of leading scholars in 
experimental and comparative psychology. It seems that empirical psych-
ologists have left the investigation of these higher developmental levels of 
picturalized thought, mainly, in the hands of scholars in the fields of 
religion, culture, literature, and art. 
Jung in his analytic-psychological interpretations of culture and religion, 
views the symbol as an expression of suprahuman contents. Tuinstra 
stresses the high developmental level of symbolic thinking and brings 
forward from a theological standpoint, that symbolism by the grace of 
Cod has the liberating function to lead man to Cod's reality. In a 
cultural-historical approach Verhoeven rejects any sexual symbolic or 
discursive determinism for the high developmental level of creative analo-
gous symbolic thinking in literature, religion, and art, and he refuses to 
consider any possible lower form of symbolism as truly symbolic. 
Galon mentions abstract, analogous, picturalized thought as the develop-
mental perspective of adolescent thinking, and he considers this form of 
thought to be the highest attainable level in human thinking. In the 
present study it was found that abstract-analogy symbolism typifies the 
symbolic thinking of the normal, mature, educated adult. Harding notices 
the possible relation between stages of implicitly aware pictorial thinking 
in the actual development of thought and the literary symbolism that he 
encountered in the literature of great English poets, and he suggests 
that a pre-rational organization of implicitly aware pictorial stages 
might be involved in the high level creative thinking of great artists. 
Important notions on the functional role of implicitly aware pictorial 
stages in the actual development of thought (along the line of Harding's 
observations), are brought forward in an almost forgotten article by 
Schilder in 1920, discovered and creatively related to a new viewpoint 
on dream symbolism by Riimke in an also unnoticed and by now for-
gotten article in 1934. The ideas brought forward in these studies will be 
discussed in the next section, and will be related to the integration of the 
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pictorial, logical-abstract, and affective aspects in the actual development 
of symbolic thought. 
4. Symbolism as thought and picture 
Schilder related the findings of the studies on the psychology of thinking 
of his days (the Würzburgers, G. E. Müller, Bühler, Lindworsky, Selz, 
Michette, and others), and of psychoanalytically oriented approaches Ίο 
dream symbolism (as Silberer's studies of dreams), to his own obser­
vations of the picturalized pre-rational thinking of patients suffering 
from schizophrenia (67). Rohracher and Werner also noticed the impli­
citly aware diffuse sphere of possible and related meanings described by 
the Würzburgers (18, p. 282; 38, p. 315), but Schilder analyzed this 
'cluster of potential ideas' and noticed that in thought preparing processes 
the central image is mixed with associative material that is reshaped on 
the basis of affective attitudes and often obtains a symbolic character. 
We notice that a similar process seems to have been at work in the 
implicitly given symbol responses in the word association test. The 
mental set directed towards association with the first word that came to 
mind resulted mainly in simple associations, but some of the reactions 
were of a symbolic nature (data in Table 1, p. 33) . A reshaping on the 
basis of affective attitudes of contents associated with the stimulus words 
appears to have been responsible for a spontaneous surpassing of the 
simple associative level by a creative symbolic level of thinking. For 
instance, the simple associative level of thinking involved in the asso-
ciation 'rose-red', is surpassed by a personal abstracted, affectively 
colored, more refined symbolic level of thought in the reactions 'rose-
spring' or 'rose-love'. 
Schilder's further analysis of the diffuse sphere of possible and related 
meanings, found in the thought development experiments, reveals the 
implicit awareness of an organizing direction and images-relating rules. 
Reactions that indicate the implicite awareness of an organizing direction 
towards categorizing in conceptual categories are encountered in our 
tests on two levels ; first on a level that does not develop beyond a diffuse 
pictorial stage, and secondly on the level of logical-abstract categorizing. 
The first type of thinking is encountered in the 'Concrete Category' react-
ions as described in Chapter II, p. 31. The organizing direction, in the 
latter, is towards the abstract category but the thinking remains on the 
concrete pictorial level, and is seen in the mentioning of something that 
belongs to the same category as that what is indicated by the stimulus 
word, for instance 'three-four', 'apple-peach', 'dog-cat', 'hammer-saw'. In 
the 'Abstract Category', however, the organizing direction leads as can be 
seen to an explicit, logical-abstract, categorical relation of stimulus word 
and reaction in 'three-number', 'apple-fruit', 'dog-animal', 'hammer-
tool'. 
The expected finding that a task oriented mental set towards symbolic 
thinking produced a higher number of symbolic reactions in the symbolic 
meaning test than in the word association test, is obvious evidence of die 
organizing directional function of the mental set. Mental sets direct, 
primarily, the more impersonal aspects in the development of thought, 
such as a development towards an intended level of thinking (e.g. simple 
associative or abstract symbolic), or towards a type of image-relations 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1) Concerning the distinction of sign and symbol 
Symbols have been distinguished in this study from signs and signals 
on the basis of their different functions. Both sign and symbol serve the 
recognition of cognition-contents. Signs an signals function as indicators 
of something that they are not themselves, and act as stimulators of 
behavior related to what they signify. They are in their cognitive and 
behavioral aspects servants of the functional relations of the individual 
and his world. The meaning of what the sign signifies (of what it refers 
to, or its referent), can be derived from a causal relation (e.g. smoke-
fire), can be the product of a social contract (e.g. traffic signs), or it 
can be based on the association of accidental or purposively brought 
about concepts of togetherness of sign or signal and referent (e.g. 
buzzer-food, in Pavlov's conditioning experiments). 
Symbols, however, function as picturalized representations of personal 
conceptions of the referent concerned. The relation symbol-referent can 
be based on association (e.g. the theme of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony 
since World War II a symbol of freedom and victory), or it can be based 
on the analogy between symbol and referent (e.g. rose-beauty). Symbols 
as picturalized representations of conceptions of referents serve contem-
plation and the imagined personal encounter of the personal conceptions 
of the referents concerned (e.g. the Dutch Royal Standard represents the 
Queen of the Netherlands at Dutch military ceremonies, the conception 
of royalty encountered therein might, however, be quite different for a 
loyal Dutch soldier than for a revolutionist). 
Signs and signals as indicators of cognition-contents and as (stimulators 
of behavior in relation to what they signify are primarily the domain of 
behavioristic psychology, and are fruitfully studied by behavioristic 
methods of approach. Symbols have been subject of much philosophical 
and literary discussion, and have been dealt with in linguistic-existential 
approaches. Especially Freudian oriented psychologists have made symbols 
and symbolism the subject of their psychoanalytic interpretations, by-
passing, however, the just demands of an empirical non-interpreted study 
of the meaning of symbols. The latter problem has been approached by 
Levy in his experimental approach to the symbolic meaning of sex symbols 
for elementary schoolchildren. We have applied Levy's mode of approach-
ing this problem, but, in the present study, we have employed words as 
stimuli and applied them to older age groups. 
We defined sybolism as the psychological function of picturalized inner-
personal and inter-personal communication, and distinguished as its 
essential characteristics: a) the picturalizing of the conception of a 
referent on the basis of associative relations or analogous resemblance; 
b) an appeal of this embodied representation on the imagination powers 
of its perceiver; c) a stimulation of a contemplative encounter of the 
picturalized conception of the referent represented. The distinction 
between association symbols and analogy symbols was followed up in the 
empirical investigations. We limited the concept of association, in this 
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factor capable of producing symbolic thought. Dream pictures, as far as 
remembered when awake, seem to be nothing more then images which are 
sometimes related in a concrete-pictorial associative way with one-
another, or in waking up sometimes associated with sensorial perceptions 
experienced when waking up. 
On the basis of the preceding we propose that the meaning of dreams is the 
symbolic meaning interpreted into the remembered dream images by the 
dreamer or dream interpreter when awake. The awake thinker can use 
the images of dream pictures as well as the images of actual perceptions 
to symbolize conceptions of the subjects his thinking is intentionally 
directed to. This theory includes a place for Riimke's vision which 
liberates the dreamer from the deterministic Freudian necessity of вех 
symbolic dreamthought, and brings the dream-images into a phase of 
normal human thought development. At a higher stage of actual thought 
development, a place can be given to Hall's notion of a symbolic represent­
ation of conceptions, in symbolic meanings picturalized in remembered 
dream-images, by the dreamer for the dreamer. This theory leaves the 
dreamer the freedom to interpret his own, and the psychoanalyst the 
freedom to interpret his patient's dreams in a sexual symbolic way, if they 
feel inclined to do so. 
The proposed theory widens the range of actual thought development 
since we encounter empirically an a-logical, associative cluster of dream-
images; which through a diffuse sphere of possible and related meanings 
can develop into either a logical pragmatic thought, in its higher forms 
leading to science, or into the harmonic union of abstract, analogous 
symbolic thought, leading in its highest forms to culture and art. 
Only then the highest form of human thinking can be attained, when, as 
Calon states, the worlds of the senses and of the intellect are perceived as 
one reality. Lasting creations of this level of symbolic thought can be 
encountered in the monumental riches of religion, culture, literature, 
and art. 
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thought, dreams, and phases in normal thought development; neither gave 
attention to the possibility that besides aspects of resemblance, as the 
syncretic nature and simple associations of concrete aspects, there might 
be essential differences in primitive thought, the thinking of schizo-
phrenics, dreams, and phases in the actual development of normal 
thinking. 
We had, within the framework of the present study, no opportunity to 
investigate the thought of primitive man, or of schizophrenics empirically 
but in observations of our own dreams and the dreams of some friends, 
who were good enough to report them, we noticed that the dream pictures, 
remembered after waking up, are either unrelated senseless images or 
images related on the basis of simple concrete associations. For instance, 
a remembered dream picture of falling was associated with fright, or a 
dream picture of laboring in a dry desert was after waking up associated 
with thirst. We refer in this connection to the notion of Calon and Prick, 
described in section 10 of Chapter I, that imagination can not always be 
clearly distinguished from perception and thinking; they report that in 
waking-up-dreams the image of a perception can give a false meaning 
to sensorial experiences. For instance one dreams about the rattle of a 
machinegun but in waking up one realizes that the alarmclock is ringing. 
Calon and Prick bring forward that this falling apart of aspects of the 
perception process occurs in sleep and in any situation in which critical 
thought is eliminated (35, p. 130). On the basis of the above we find no 
reason to believe that in sleepdreams intellectual thought or symbol 
creating factors could be active to such an extent that condensing, dis-
placing, masking, and symbolizing dream-work could be thus explained. 
The everyday observation of 'primitive' thought in children and educated 
western adults shows that primitive thinking has very logical aspects, and 
seems to be far removed from the associative related imagery of dreams. 
Once a child has accepted the premise that Santa Claus can ride on the 
rooftops and see through the chimney how you behave, it is logical and 
meaningful to behave well in the weeks that Santa Claus is around. Also 
the civilized western man (who in comparative studies is usually 
distinguished from primitive men on the grounds of his supposed logical-
scientific way of thinking), seems to accept the premise that the number 
13 brings bad luck, and consequently western hotelmanagers skip this 
number in the numbering of hotelrooms. This demonstrates that 'primitive 
thinking' entails a considerable element of logical connecting of meanings. 
The developmental stages of actual thought development are also, as 
Schilder and Thurstone bring forward, guided by intellectual logical 
aspects. Symbolism, and 'presentional symbolism' as Suzanne Langer 
brings forward, include an intellectual logical aspect (described in section 
10 of Chapter I) and whereas primitive thought and the phases of 
implicit awareness in actual thought development seem to be guided by 
logical intellectual factors that make symbolism at that levels a realistic 
possibility it appears that sleepdreams lack the intellectual factor necess-
ary to create symbolism. 
Direct observable behavior during sleep betrays at best a possible 
rudimentary activity of the intellect and sofar no evidence has been 
produced demonstrating that a supposed, not observable and not 
introspectable, thinking activity in dreams is carried by an intellectual 
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dream thoughts. Freud applies the function of the process of daydreaming, 
namely wishfulfillment in an imagery picturalized way, to the pictorial 
memories of sleepdreams. We notice in this connection that the process 
of daydreaming takes place on levels of implicit awareness, and can be 
empirically approached by introspective methods; in sleepdreams, however, 
only the memories of the pictures dreamed are introspectable. Therefore 
from the empirical psychological viewpoint, the psychoanalytic statements 
about unconscious non-introspectable dream-work, can only be valued as 
hypothetical interpretations. Freud supposes that the sleepdream functions 
as a wishfulfillment, and holds that the dream-censorship forces the 
manifest pictorial dreams to be a 'symbolic' representation of the latent 
dreamthought (wish) ; this is arrived at by means of the supposedly 
masking, condensing, and displacing dream-work (61). Riimke, however, 
in noticing the resemblance between the manifest dream and the stage in 
actual thought development of a diffuse sphere of possible meanings mixed 
with associative affectively colored images, considers the manifest dream 
as a developmental stage towards the formation of a latent dream thought. 
Riimke describes this new insight into dream thought development as 
follows : 
"If now we find the characteristics of the manifest dream-
content described by Freud: condensation, displacement, the 
visual, the symbolical, not only as characteristics of primitive 
thought, but also as intermediate phases in the course of devel-
opment of the thoughts as we think them every moment, then 
it is obvious that the manifest dream-content, at least in so far 
as it exhibits these characteristics, is not the product of an 
active transformation; but that we are dealing with a thought 
'in statu nascendi': The associations, which then are given later 
on, do not lead back to the original thought, but indicate the way 
along which the thought comes to full deveopment." (68, p. 780) 
This viewpoint, even when it overlooks the fact that Freud's suppositions 
about condensation, displacement and symbolism in dreams are only 
hypothetical, brings the explanation of dreams out of the dark regions 
of an unconscious sex symbol determining Freudian Id, and into the 
realm of normal human thought development. Riimke's notion that the 
dreamer develops the latent dream thought, with the syncretic pictorial 
material of the manifest dream as a development stage, throws a new 
light on Hall's observation, mentioned in section 8 of Chapter I ) , that 
dream symbols do not mask or obscure, but represent pictorially aspects 
of the conception of the referent for the dreamer by the dreamer. 
Riimke's theory concerning the explanation of dreams presupposes that 
in dream-work a non-pictorial logical driving force, which Schilder 
holds to be the carrying pillar of thought development, is active in 
steering the manifest dream towards the development of the latent dream 
thought. Also Hall's theory, critical of the Freudian notion of the 
masking function of symbols, presupposes that in dreams intellectual 
mental activities produce symbols that represent and clarify conceptions 
for the dreamer. We notice in this connection that Schilder stresses the 
resemblance of syncretic aspects in the thinking of schizophrenics with 
the diffuse sphere in the actual development of normal problem solving 
thought, and that Riimke notices the resemblances between primitive 
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It seems that Schilder overlooked that the organizing direction and the 
image-relating rules, which he noticed that on a level of implicit aware-
ness directed the diffuse sphere of possible meanings, could also direct 
the line of thought towards personal, picturalized, symbolic thinking, and 
that a pre-rational organizing could be of an intellectual high quality. 
This is, however explicitly stated by Thurstone and noticed by Harding 
who reports Thurstone's notion that intelligence is not limited to cognition 
but begins with an organizing of our motives, and he quotes the following 
from Thurstone's Nature of Intelligence: 
"The less there is of the impulse at the time when it is subject 
to rational acceptance or rejection, the higher is the mentality 
of the actor. Genius is essentially the capacity to deal effectively 
with impulses at the stage of formation when they are still only 
roughly defined affective states, before they have absorbed 
enough attributes to become the cognitive terms with which 
most of us are limited in our field of rational control." (60, 
p. 15) 
Thurstone indicates in the latter that rational, logical-categorical 
reasoning on a level of explicit awareness does not represent the highest 
intellectual level of human thinking, but rather it is revealed in the 
affective organizing of only roughly defined affective states at a stage 
of formation. It seems that Thurstone's notion pertains to the implicitly 
aware diffuse sphere of possible and related meanings described in the 
actual thought development experiments of the Würzburgers. Schilder 
presented this as a thought preparing process in which the central image 
is mixed with associative material which is reshaped on the basis of 
affective attitudes and often obtains a symbolic character. 
On the basis of the findings of the present investigation, we venture to 
offer, as a theory of the actual development of symbolic thinking, the 
following supposition: If in the actual development of thought the central 
image does not realize itself, but has to give way to associative material 
that is reshaped on ground of affective attitudes, and obtains a symbolic 
character, then the thought develops into the percipience of an association 
symbol. If, however, the central image remains to be carried by the non-
pictorial logical driving forces, which as Schilder brings forward are the 
carrying pillars of thought, and at the same time obtains on the basis 
of affective attitudes a pictorial-symbolic character, then the blending of 
logical, pictorial, and affective factor leads the thought development 
towards the percipience of analogy symbolism. 
The highest form of the latter is, as described in section 9 of Chapter I, 
the abstract-analogy symbol, in which the non-sensorial referent, of an 
abstract idea is incarnated as a perceptible cognition-content, in the 
picturalized conception of the symbol, and represents the highest form 
of human thinking attainable. We are aware of the fact that a further 
empirical verification of the above offered theory, concerning the actual 
development of symbolic thought, requires the creation of an appropriate 
method of approach to the problems involved, which, however, falls out-
side the scope of the present study. 
Schilder's analysis of the diffuse sphere of possible and related meanings 
mixed with associative, affectively colored image material is applied by 
Riimke to Freud's viewpoint on the relation between manifest and latent 
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(e.g. images related to masculinity or feminity). Value oriented attitudes 
also have a directional influence but of a personal affective nature. 
Attitudes, which as Rutten states always imply a personal concern 
(quoted in Chapter II, p. 46) , are influential in the affective selection 
and reshaping of images related to personal values. They direct the actual 
development of the diffuse sphere of possible and related meanings 
towards self-accepted, personally colored, expicit thought. 
The method of group comparison, followed in the present investigation, 
allows little opportunity to demonstrate the influence of personal aspects. 
An illustration of the influence of personal attitudes is seen in the in-
dividual test protocols reported in section 6 of the preceding chapter. 
The protocol of the happily engaged college student indicates clearly the 
influence of a personal attitude on the content and color of symbolic 
thinking. The attitude of love for her boyfriend directed the development 
of a cluster of potential ideas towards positive pictures of manhood (as 
protective, polite, defending, romantic), and also the development of the 
diffuse sphere of possible meanings was directed towards masculine 
meanings for objects related to masculinity on the basis of her personal 
attitude: e.g., a ship is male because her fiancee is in the navy; a chapel 
is male for there is where she will marry him; also a house for 'when 
married my husband will buy one'. It is evident from the above that 
attitudes do influence the actual development of thought in a personal 
affective way. A further investigation of these influences require an 
individual method of approach directed towards assessment of implicitly 
aware psychological contents. 
Schilder further notices that actual thought development is carried by an 
intention directed towards object relations. He sees the positive function 
of the crossing of this intention by pictorial affective processes in the 
compelling of the intended thought to clear itself of other than essential 
logical and pragmatic object relations, which might otherwise blurr the 
intended clear insight in the object relation which is its goal. Since the 
non-pictorial aspects are considered to be the leading ones in the actual 
development of logical pragmatic thought, Schilder does not attach much 
value to a possible further consideration of the quantitative relation 
between pictorial and non-pictorial aspects of thought, to quote: 
"Auch hier ist es gleichgültig, in welchem quantitativen Ver-
hältnis Anschauliches zu dem Unanschaulichen steht. Das Letz-
tere ist der tragende Pfeiler des Denkens." (67, p. 256) 
Satisfied with the notion that the stage of pictorial associative and sym-
bolic affective thinking can be considered to represent thought preparing 
processes, that pave the way towards non-pictorial abstract categorical 
thought, Schilder leaves his analysis at this point to follow the notion 
that the pictorial pre-rational stage in thought development resembles the 
mode of thinking of his schizophrenic patients. 
The interesting viewpoints on the development of thought brought forward 
by Schilder reveal, however, no suitable grounds by which to explain or 
understand the distinct quantitative domination of analogous symbolic 
thinking on the higher developmental level of the educated adult and the 
fact that the lower developmental group of early adolescents produced a 
slight but noticeably greater quantity of logical abstract categorical 
reactions (discussed in sections 2 and 3 of Chapter I I I ) . 
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study, to those relations that are based on repeated experience of simul-
taneous or successive togetherness of the coupled images. Association 
symbolism represents a lower level of mental activity than analogy Gym-
bolism, as the latter presupposes the abstraction of essential aspects of 
both symbol and referent. 
2. Concerning devehpmental levels of symbolic thought 
Whereas the word association test reactions hardly differentiated between 
the levels of thought employed by the early adolescent and the educated 
adult group, the symbolic meaning test reactions showed a wide difference 
in levels employed. The adolescent thinks in a much more concrete, 
somewhat more formal abstract manner, but he employs much less abstract 
analogy symbolism then does the educated adult, whose symbolic thinking 
is dominated by abstract analogy symbols. 
We offered as an explanation for the relatively high number of abstract-
category reactions of the early adolescent group the supposition that 
certain stimulus words might have had a signal-quality in Werner's 
sense, in respect to formal logical abstract thinking. We considered this 
tendency towards formal, abstract, categorical thinking to be the develop-
mental bridge leading from a dominant, concrete, associative mode of 
thought towards the dominant abstract, analogous, symbolic mode of 
thought of the educated adult. The development of thinking from early 
adolescence to adulthood does not move towards more formal abstract ca-
tegorical thinking, but towards integrating abstraction powers into the 
personal, picturalized, contemplative mode of thinking evidenced in 
analogy symbolism, which characterizes the mode of thought of the educ-
ated adult. 
The influence of attitude and set upon level and contents of symbolic 
thinking was noticed and these two modes of intentional subject existence 
were distinguished on the grounds of the following aspects. A mental set 
is a task oriented mode of intentional subject existence, and is primarily 
directed towards the actual situation. The mental set is not of stable 
endurance as changes in the external or internal situation can change the 
mental set. Mental sets involve the, in principle and in fact observable and 
introspectable, neurophysiological changes of the organism. Attitude is 
a value oriented made of intentional subject existence, and is primarily 
directed towards the inner-self. The personal aspect of involving self-
accepted values explains the motivational force and emotional load of 
attitudes. Attitudes do not change with changes in the external or internal 
environment and are of stable endurance. Only changes in values result 
in a change of the attitudes involved. Attitudes entail no experienceable 
or observable neurophysiological aspects. Attitudes and sets are related 
insofar that both are modes of intentional subject existence, operating 
on higher or lower levels of implicit awareness and becoming explicitly 
aware only in unusual or experimental situations. Under the conditions 
of the tests of the present investigation, the task oriented mental set 
operated primarily in selecting the type of reaction (word association, 
symbolic meaning, or masculine or feminine meaning), whereas value 
oriented attitudes were involved primarily in selecting the content and 
the meaning of the reactions concerned (e.g. suitcase-masculine, carried 
by gentlemen for ladies). 
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3. Concerning developmental and sex differential aspects of symbolism 
of the sexes 
We made an explicit distinction between symbolism of the sexes as per-
taining to symbols representing the masculine or feminine existence, in 
male or female persons, in masculine or feminine appearance aspects, 
character qualities, and in masculine or feminine activities or functions, 
from the sex symbolism in the Freudian sense, as the latter pertains to 
symbols representing masculine or feminine genital appearance aspects 
and genital activities or functions. 
The development of symbolism of the sexes from early adolescence to 
mature adulthood shows an interesting picture. For the early adolescent 
the masculine and feminine world is already roughly structured and 
symbolized in objects used by men or women, supposedly male or female 
activities and functions, male or female persons, male or female appear-
ance aspects, and supposed masculine or feminine character traits. At 
the college age the range of symbolism of the sexes is widened with the 
addition of expressed sex symbolism, and values involved in the dif-
ferential aspects of a masculine and feminine existence take a more 
dominant place. In mature adulthood differences between the sexes are 
given a place of much less dominant importance. Symbolism of the sexes 
as such changes in hierarchical structuring from a dominance of asso-
ciative and analogous symbolism, related to concrete aspects in early 
adolescents and at the college age, towards a greater appreciation of mas-
culine and feminine character aspects. At the mature adult age in which 
character-analogy symbolism takes the lead over the other categories of 
expressed symbolism of the sexes. 
The contents of the masculine or feminine symbolic meaning reactions 
indicated that despite the emancipation and a factual legal equality in 
politics, business, and industry the woman is still essentially considered 
by both sexes to be a beautiful, attractive homemaker, with a tinge of 
delicate flightiness. The man is essentially considered to be an esthetic-
ally not appealing, strong, courageous fighter and protector and the 
creator of a craftmanship requiring technical world. 
There are no striking differences between the sexes, except for the fact 
that sex symbolism in mainly expressed by men. Further, men show a 
somewhat more self-centered attitude in regards to symbolism of the 
sexes, a greater inclination towards simple associative thinking, and seem 
in general to have a somewhat less mature attitude towards symbolism 
of the sexes then do women. The female participants in our experiments 
showed a greater number of analogy appearance reactions, especially in 
relation to their own sex, which seems to indicate that feminine beauty 
is even more valued by women then by men. A relative higher number 
of character-analogy reactions in the latter group indicates a keener 
interest in the psychological aspects of the masculine and feminine 
existence, and a higher number of not explained masculine reactions is 
most likely an indication of a better integration of sexually symbolic 
aspects into the symbolism of the whole human person. As far as the 
groups concerned can be considered to represent manhood and woman-
hood, there is little doubt that women have a more mature attitude 
towards symbolism of the sexes then do men. 
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4. Concerning sex symbolism 
Relatively few expressions of sex symbolism were encountered and those 
encountered were mostly produced by male college students. 
Freud's ideas on sex symbolism were checked in some of his publications 
and their is no doubt that Freud considers sexual symbolism to pertain 
to symbols that represent genital appearance aspects or genital functions. 
Freud's idea that sex symbols are universally valid and that their sexually 
symbolic function must be based on resemblances between the symbol and 
genital aspects had to be refuted on the basis of the findings of the 
present investigation. The universal value had to be refuted on the 
grounds that only some of the participants showed signs of sexually 
symbolic thinking. The claim of sex symbolic functioning on the basis 
of resemblance only was refuted on the grounds that the majority of tex 
symbols used functioned as such on the basis of relations other than 
resemblance. The conclusion drawn was that sexually symbolic thinking is 
not universal but rather a possibility for sex-minded persons, particularly 
in a situation that stimulates sexual symbolic thinking. The latter became 
evident in the finding that in the symbolic meaning test only a few sexual 
symbolic reactions were produced, while the majority of sexually lym-
bolic answers were given in the masculine or feminine symbolic meaning 
test, which steered the attention in a sex differentiating direction. 
The relation of sexual symbolism and symbolism of the sexes proved ίο 
be only a slight one. Some indications of a possible perception of mas­
culine symbolism, on the basis of sexually symbolic aspects in some male 
sex symbols were observed in the more sex-minded college group. 
The danger of mistaking the hypothetical classical Freudian sex symbol 
interpretations for scientifically established universally valid sexual sym­
bolic facts was demonstrated in a critical exposé of a modern experiment 
concerning the sex symbolism stimulating influence of the showing of 
pictures of nude attractive females to sober and beer drinking college 
students. Aside from the question of whether this type of experimentation 
is tolerable from an ethical point of view, it became obvious, from a 
scientific viewpoint, that conclusions not based on established facts, but 
on sexual symbolic interpretations that might or might not have pertained 
to factual sexual symbolic thought, have no empirical value. 
5. Concerning the actual development of symbolic thinking 
Awareness as a psychological concept includes levels of being hardly, 
vaguely, implicitly or clearly and explicitly aware of something, in an 
individual who is aware of being aware of something, however vague 
this might be. 
Symbolic thinking, as encountered in the present investigation, appears 
to include at least the levels of implicit awareness and explicit awareness. 
No indication was found of the possible influence of psychological 
contents supposedly active on a hypothetical level of complete unaware-
ness; the Freudian claims, in this respect, were exposed as being only 
hypothetical. 
No indication was found that the pathological mechanism of repression, 
which Freud holds to operate in the same way in normals as in neurotics, 
did influence the actual development of symbolic thinking of the suppos-
edly normal participants in our experiments. 
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It seems that Freud mixes his notion of unconciousness with levels of 
vague and implicit awareness, and that he blends the mechanism of 
repression with aspects of voluntary suppression. In this latter regard, 
we found evidence of the influence of suppression and of psychological 
contents active on levels of implicit awareness, on the actual development 
of symbolic thought. In so far as the Freudian notion of the unconscious 
pertains to levels of implicit awareness and contents which are experience-
able and introspectable, his suppositions are open to empirical verific-
ation: a possibility that sofar seems to have escaped the attention of 
experimental psychology. 
The notion of the high developmental level of analogous symbolic 
thinking seems to have been bypassed in comparative developmental 
studies, as well as in experimental approaches to thinking, as they seem 
to have been directed towards abstract concept formation and logical, 
pragmatic, scientific problem solving thought as the supposed highest 
level of thought of the educated western adult. In a developmental 
psychological approach, Galon mentions the perspective of abstract, 
analogous, symbolic thinking, as the highest form of human thought 
attainable, but his voice seems to have been a lonely one among empirical 
psychologists, who seem to have left the approach to this high form of 
typical human thought to scholars in the fields of religion, culture, 
literature, and art. 
Schilder's thorough analysis of a phase of implicit awareness in the 
actual development of logical, pragmatic, problem solving thought, in 
which the central image is mixed with associative material that is 
reshaped on the basis of affective attitudes, opened up the possibility of 
suggesting a theory concerning the actual development of symbolic 
thinking. Stimulated by the empirical findings of the present pilot 
investigation of symbolic thinking that abstract-analogy symbolism is the 
characteristic mode of symbolic thinking of the educated adult, and 
enlightened by Thurstone's notion that not explicit rational control, but 
implicit intellectual organization of roughly defined affective states at a 
stage of formation represents the highest level of human thought, we 
offered a hypothetical theory concerning the actual development of cym-
bolic thinking. According to this theory, if in the actual development of 
thought the central image does not realize itself, but has to give way to 
associative material that is reshaped on the basis of affective attitudes 
and obtains a symbolic character, then the thought develops into the 
percipience of an association symbol. If, however, the central image re-
mains to be carried by the non-pictorial logical driving forces, and at the 
same time obtains on the basis of affective attitudes a pictorial-symbolic 
character, then the blending of logical, pictorial, and affective factors 
leads the thought development towards the actualization of analogy 
symbolism. 
A critical evolution of Riimke's creative application of Schilder's vision 
on the actual development of thought, on the Freudian theory of dreams, 
leads to the suggestion of a hypothetical theory concerning dream inter-
pretation. Riimke suggests reversing the developmental direction of the 
Freudian dream thought hypothesis (a latent dreamthought that develops 
'symbolically' into the manifest dream), and holds that the manifest 
dream is a stage in the development towards the latent dream thought. 
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This vision liberates the dreamer from the deterministic Freudian 
necessity of sexually symbolic dream thought and brings the dream-
images into a phase of normal human thought development. Riimke 
overlooked that Freud's idea of an actual dream thought development is 
a hypothetical interpretation, and that sofar there has not been any 
evidence that during sleep intellectual-logical factors capable of producing 
symbolic thought could be active in dreams; thus in an empirical view-
point, dreams can be considered to be nothing more than images in 
concrete-associative relations. This leads us to the theory that the meaning 
of dreams is the symbolic meaning given to the remembered dream-
images by the dreamer (or dream interpreter) when awake. The awake 
thinker can use the images of dream pictures as well as the images of 
actual perceptions to symbolize conceptions of the subjects his thinking 
is intentionally directed towards. This theory based on the empirical 
experienceable and introspectable pictorial contents of dreams, remains 
in need of further investigation. 
In concluding this attempt at an empirical pilot investigation of develop-
mental aspects of symbolic thinking, we realize the actuality of the 
earlier quoted observation of Gordon Allport, 
". . .we are beginning to study symbols both in their own right, 
and as the basic ingredients that they are in all complex con-
duct, including all morally relevant thought and behavior." 
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SAMENVATTING 
De onderhavige studie is het verslag van een empirisch psychologisch 
onderzoek aangaande enkele ontwikkelingspsychologische aspecten van het 
symbolisch denken. 
Symbolen zijn onderscheiden van tekens en signalen op grond van 
psychologische functieverschillen. Teken zowel als symbool dienen het 
kennen en herkennen van keninhouden door middel van beeldwerking. 
Tekens en signalen fungeren als aanduiding van iets dat zij zelf niet zijn, 
en stimuleren een wijze van gedragen die betrokken is op de keninhoud 
die zij als beeld in zich dragen. De zin, die het teken heeft, kan berusten 
op een causale verhouding (bijv. rook-vuur), of op conventie (bijv. ver-
keerstekens). Ook kan het teken zijn betekenis verkrijgen door middel 
van een associatie die kan berusten ofwel op een toevallige of op een 
doelbewust bewerkstelligde gelijktijdige ervaring van teken en betekenis 
(bijv. zoemer-voedsel, in de experimenten van Pavlov) (I, Par. 1—5). 
Terwijl het teken fungeert als aanduiding van een keninhoud, fungeert 
het symbool als aanschouwelijke voorstelling van persoonlijke opvattingen 
over datgene wat het in beeldvorm vertegenwoordigt. De betekenis van 
een symbool kan berusten op een associatieve verbinding (bijv. het 
thema van Beethoven's Vijfde Symphonie, sinds de tweede wereldoorlog 
het symbool van vrijheid en overwinning), of kan wortelen in een op 
analogie berustende overeenkomst (bijv. roos-schoonheid). Het symbool 
staat, als aanschouwelijke voorstelling van persoonlijke opvattingen ten 
dienste van het beschouwen en van een 'verbeelde' psychologische ont-
moeting van de persoonlijke opvattingen over datgene wat het symbool 
in beeldvorm vertegenwoordigt (bijv. tijdens militaire plechtigheden 
wordt Hare Majesteit de Koningin vertegenwoordigd door de Koninklijke 
Standaard; de beelden van de opvattingen over het koningschap die hier-
door worden opgeroepen, zijn voor een oranjegezind Nederlander echter 
van geheel andere aard dan voor een revolutionair) (I, par. 6—9). 
Symboliek heeft als essentiële eigenschappen: a) het veraanschouwelijken 
van opvattingen over datgene wat het symbool in beeldvorm vertegen-
woordigt op grond van associatieve verbindingen of analoge overeen-
komsten; b) een appèl van de aanschouwelijke in het beeld belichaamde 
voorstelling op de verbeeldingskracht van de waarnemer; c) het stimule-
ren door een 'verbeelde' beschouwende ontmoeting van de aanschouwelijk 
voorgestelde opvattingen over datgene wat het symbool in beeldvorm ver-
tegenwoordigt. 
Symboliek werd gedefinieerd als de psychologische functie van aan-
schouwelijk verbeelde binnen-persoonlijke en tussen-persoonlijke com-
municatie (I, par. 10). 
Het experimentele gedeelte van dit onderzoek over het symbolisch denken 
bestond uit een woordassociatietest, een symboolbetekenistest, en een test 
betreffende specifiek mannelijke of vrouwelijke symboliek van vijftig 
stimuluswoorden, betrekking hebbende op de Freudiaanse sexuele sym-
boliek. Het resulteerde onder meer in de volgende bevindingen: 
a) er konden geen duidelijke verschillen in denkniveau worden vast-
gesteld tussen de resultaten behaald in de woord associatietest door 
een groep van 34 cultuurpubers (gemiddelde leeftijd 14 j aa r ) , en die 
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door een groep van 30 academisch gevormde volwassenen (gemiddelde 
leeftijd 28 jaar) (II, par. 1—4). 
b) er werden opvallende verschillen in denkniveau gevonden tussen 
de groep cultuurpubers en de groep academisch gevormde volwas-
senen hij het aangeven van de symbolische betekenis van de betref-
fende stimuluswoorden. Niet alleen denken de volwassenen aanzienlijk 
meer in symbolische relaties dan de pubers, maar binnen het kader 
van het symbolische denken denkt de volwassene meer in analogie-
symboliek. De ontwikkeling van het denken van de puberteit tot de 
volwassenheid verloopt niet in de richting van een meer habitueel 
formeel-logisch-abstract-categoriaal denken, maar in de richting van 
het integreren van het abstractievermogen in het persoonlijke beschou-
wende 'beeld-denken' dat vervat ligt in het analoog symbolisch denken, 
zoals dit in de academisch gevormde volwassene domineert (III, par. 
1, 2, 3). 
Freud's opvattingen over sexuele symboliek werden aan de hand van 
enkele van zijn publikaties nader beschouwd, en het is niet aan twijfel 
onderhevig dat sexuele symboliek voor Freud betrekking heeft op eym-
bolen betreffende verschijningsvormen van genitale organen en genitale 
functies. 
Freud neemt aan dat sexuele symbolen algemeen geldig zijn, en dat hun 
functie als sexueel symbool moet berusten op een analoge overeenkomst 
van symbool en genitale aspecten (IV, par. 2). 
De bevindingen van ons onderzoek weerleggen zowel Freud's opvattingen 
betreffende de algemene geldigheid van het sexuele symbool als zijn à tort 
et à travers vasthouden aan de noodzaak van een analoge overeenkomst 
van symbool en genitaal. De groep cultuurpubers geeft geen enkel blijk 
van denken in sexuele symboliek, de groep academisch gevormde volwas-
senen nauwelijks, maar een groep van 81 laat-adolescente en jong-volwas-
sen universiteitsstudenten (gemiddelde leeftijd 21 jaar), geeft wèl blijk 
van denken in sexuele symbolen. De meerderheid der stimuluswoorden 
fungeert niet als sexueel symbool op grond van analoge overeenkomsten, 
maar op grond van associatieve verbindingen. Op grond van de empi-
rische bevindingen moest geconcludeerd worden dat: a) de Freudiaanse 
sexuele symbolen geen algemene geldigheid bezitten; b) sommige van de 
door Freud als sexuele symbolen aangeduide voorwerpen inderdaad, en 
in het bijzonder voor meer op het sexuele ingestelde personen, als zodanig 
kunnen fungeren; c) sommige sexuele symbolen berusten op een over-
eenkomst van symbool en genitale aspecten, en de meerderheid ervan be-
rust op een associatieve verbinding; d) de klassieke Freudiaanse eexuele 
symbolen noch constant zijn, noch onveranderlijk betrokken op het 
sexuele, en het gebruik van deze 'symbolen' in het denken niet beschouwd 
kan worden als een betrouwbare aanduiding dat het denken inderdaad op 
het sexuele betrokken is (IV, par. 3, 4). 
Sexuele symboliek, voorzover deze betrekking heeft op genitale aspecten, 
werd expliciet onderscheiden van symboliek der geslachten, welke betrek-
king heeft op de verschijningswijzen van het mannelijk en vrouwelijk be-
staan als zodanig (V, par. 1). Het verband tussen sexuele symboliek en 
symboliek der geslachten blijkt zeer betrekkelijk te zijn; slechts voor enkele 
mannelijke sexuele symbolen, en voornamelijk in de betrekkelijk meer op 
het sexuele ingestelde groep van universiteitsstudenten, werden aandui-
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dingen gevonden die voedsel geven kan de veronderstelling dat de man-
nelijke symboliek in bepaalde antwoorden gegrond zou kunnen zijn op 
sexueel symbolische aspecten (V, par. 3 ) . 
De inhoud der antwoorden, die de symboliek der geslachten betreffen 
toont aan dat ondanks de emancipatie het symbolische beeld van de 
vrouw voornamelijk gekenmerkt wordt door de aspecten van schoonheid 
en aantrekkelijkheid, verweven met aspecten van wispelturigheid en teder-
heid, en dat haar taak nog steeds primair wordt gezien in het scheppen 
van een gezellig en warm tehuis. In het symbolische beeld van de man 
spelen schoonheidsaspecten een zeer ondergeschikte rol; de man wordt 
primair gezien als de sterke, moedige vechter en beschermer, en de 
schepper van een technische wereld die een beroep doet op vakmanschap 
(V, par. 4 ) . 
De ontwikkeling van de symboliek der geslachten toont in een ver-
gelijking van de reacties van de drie leeftijdsgroepen (de gemiddeld 
14-jarige pubers, de gemiddeld 21-jarige laat-adolescenten en jong-
volwassenen, en de gemiddeld 28-jarige geheel volwassenen), het volgende 
beeld: in de puberteit wordt de symboliek van de mannelijke en 
vrouwelijke wereld in grote lijnen gestructureerd en gezien in beelden 
van een in het algemeen uitgesproken mannelijk of vrouwelijk karakter. 
In de periode der late adolescentie en jonge volwassenheid wordt hieraan 
het aspect van sexuele symboliek toegevoegd, en doet zich een verhevigde 
belangstelling voor verschillen tussen de geslachten voor. Waarden die ver-
ankerd liggen in de verschillen tussen de mannelijke en vrouwelijke 
bestaanswijze, gaan een meer dominerende plaats innemen. Op de geheel 
volwassen leeftijd neemt de belangstelling voor verschillen tussen de 
geslachten af, en tegelijkertijd vindt er een hiërarchische waarden-
verschuiving plaats in de richting van grotere waardering van psycho-
logische verschillen tussen de mannelijke en de vrouwelijke bestaanswijze. 
Het waarnemen van andere dan karakterologische verschillen tussen man 
en vrouw bereikt een hoogtepunt in de late adolescentie en de jonge vol-
wassenheid ; de symboliek betreffende verschillen in karakter bereikt haar 
hoogtepunt op de leeftijd der volledige volwassenheid. Niet alleen is er 
ontwikkelingspsychologisch gezien een gestadige toename in symbool-
gebruik betrokken op psychologische verschillen tussen de geslachten, 
maar dit aspect neemt op de volwassen leeftijd een onbetwistbaar leidende 
plaats in (V, par. 2 ) . 
In de vergelijking van de reacties van de mannelijke en vrouwelijke 
proefpersonen van de drie leeftijdsgroepen tezamen, komen markante 
verschillen tussen de geslachten wat betreft de symboliek der geslachten 
naar voren. De mannelijke proefpersonen vertonen een wat meer ego-
centrische blik in het waarnemen van geslachtssymboliek, voorts een veel 
grotere geneigdheid tot sexueel symbolisch denken, en veelvuldiger 
gebruik van simpel associatief denken, hetgeen wijst op een minder rijpe 
houding ten opzichte van de geslachtssymboliek. In het gebruik van een 
groter aantal symbolen betrekking hebbende op uiterlijke verschijnings-
aspecten (in het bijzonder in relatie tot het eigen geslacht), tonen de 
vrouwelijke proefpersonen dat zij in het aspect van uiterlijke schoonheid 
meer geïnteresseerd zijn dan de mannen. Een veelvuldiger gebruik van 
symbolen berustend op karakter-analogie wijst op een grotere interesse in 
de psychologische verschillen tussen man en vrouw; een groter aantal 
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stimuluswoorden die als mannelijk werden aangeduid zonder verklaring 
van het waarom, wijst waarschijnlijk op een betere integratie van 
sexucel symbolische aspecten in de symboliek van de gehele persoon. 
Deze bevindingen indiceren dat de vrouwelijke proefpersonen in het 
onderhavige onderzoek een rijpere houding vertonen ten opzichte van de 
symboliek der geslachten dan de mannen (V, par. 5 ) . 
Hoofdstuk VI werd gewijd aan beschouwingen over enkele aspecten van 
de 'Aktualgenese' van het symbolisch denken. Bewustzijn ('awareness'), 
werd omschreven als inhoudende een persoonlijk min of meer vaag, min 
of meer impliciet of expliciet „weet hebben van" iets, en tegelijkertijd 
op een min of meer vaag en min of meer expliciet weet ervan hebben, 
dát men weet heeft van iets. In zoverre de actuele ontwikkeling van het 
symbolisch denken zich openbaarde in het onderhavige onderzoek, blijken 
hierbij meerdere niveaus van „weet hebben van" te zijn betrokken (VI, 
par. 1, 2 ) . 
De experimentele zowel als de vergelijkende psychologie blijkt zich wel 
met het begripsvormende en logisch-pragmatische denken te hebben 
bezig gehouden, echter nagenoeg geen aandacht te hebben geschonken 
aan de hogere vormen van symbolisch denken. De wetenschappelijke 
benadering van de symboliek schijnt voornamelijk te zijn overgelaten 
aan onderzoekers op het gebied van godsdienst, kuituur en kunst. De door 
Calon in ontwikkelingspsychologisch verband naar voren gebrachte op-
vatting dat in de harmonische verbinding van abstract-logische, concreet-
beeldende en emotionele benaderingswijzen de hoogste vorm van mense-
lijk kennen wordt bereikt, vond in de empirische psychologie weinig of 
geen weerklank (VI, par. 3 ) . 
Schilder's gedegen analyse van de 'Aktualgenese' van logisch, op het op-
lossen van problemen gericht denken opende een mogelijkheid tot het 
opstellen van een theorie betreffende de actuele ontwikkeling van het 
symbolisch denken. 
Schilder merkt op dat de actuele ontwikkeling van het denken gedragen 
wordt door niet aanschouwelijke logische factoren, en dat zij verloopt 
door een phase van min of meer vaag en impliciet weet hebben van een 
zich diffuus vermengen van meerdere betekenismogelijkheden met 
geassocieerde voorstellingen die omgevormd worden op grond van affec-
tieve houdingen. De centrale voorstelling, gedragen en gestuwd door de 
logische factor, wordt hierdoor gezuiverd van nevenbetekenissen en komt, 
op het niveau van expliciet "weet hebben van", naar voren als de gezochte 
oplossing van het gestelde probleem. Thurstone stelt in verband hiermee 
vast dat de hoogste vorm van menselijk denken niet wordt bereikt door 
rationele controle op het niveau van expliciet „weet hebben van", maar 
door intellectuele organisatie van slechts ruw bepaalde, emotioneel 
gekleurde psychologische inhouden, op het niveau van min of meer vaag 
impliciet „weet hebben van". Steunend op de empirische bevinding Van 
het onderhavige onderzoek dat abstracte analogiesymboliek kenmerkend 
is voor het symbolisch denken van de academisch gevormde Volwassene, 
kwamen wij aan de hand van Schilder's analyse tot de volgende theorie 
betreffende de 'Aktualgenese' van het symbolisch denken: wanneer in het 
proces der gedachtenontwikkeling de centrale door niet-aanschouwelijke 
intellectuele factoren gedragen voorstelling zich niet realiseert op het 
niveau van expliciet „weet hebben van", maar overspoeld wordt door 
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geassocieerde voorstellingen die op grond van affectieve houdingen een 
symbolisch beeldkarakter verkrijgen, dan ontwikkelt de gedachte zich in 
de waarneming van een associatiesymbool. Wanneer echter de centrale 
voorstelling, gedragen door niet-aanschouwelijke intellectuele factoren, 
wèl doorgestuwd wordt naar het niveau van expliciet weet hebben van 
en tegelijkertijd op grond van affectieve persoonlijke houdingen een 
symbolisch beeldkarakter verkrijgt, dan leidt de verbinding van abstract-
logische, concreet-beeldende en affectieve factoren de denkontwikkeling 
naar de waarneming van analogiesymboliek (VI, par. 4 ) . 
Een kritisch doordenken van Rümke's creative toepassing van Schilder's 
visie op de 'Aktualgenese" van het denken op de droomtheorieën 
van Freud, leidde tot een hypothetische theorie betreffende droom-
beeldverklaringen. Rümke stelt een omkering voor van de Freudiaanse 
ontwikkelingsrichting van de droomgedachte; namelijk niet van de latente 
droomwens naar de 'symbolische' vervulling hiervan in de manifeste 
droom, maar van de manifeste droom, als phase in de 'Aktualgenese' van 
het denken, naar de latente droomgedachte. Deze visie bevrijdt de dromer 
van de deterministische Freudiaanse noodzaak tot sexueel symbolisch 
dromen, en brengt de droombeelden in het kader van de normale 
gedachtenontwikkeling. Rümke ziet echter over het hoofd dat Freud's 
droomtheorieën slechts hypothetische veronderstellingen zijn, en dat tot 
nu toe nimmer is aangetoond dat in slaapdromen inderdaad intellectueel-
logische factoren werkzaam zijn, die de dromer in staat stellen symbo-
lische gedachten te ontwikkelen. 
Op grond van het feit dat observatie van gedragingen gedurende de olaap 
slechts een zeer rudimentaire activiteit van de intellectuele vermogens 
te zien geeft, en dat er bij het empirisch nagaan van droombeelden alleen 
beelden en voorstellingen gevonden worden die op zijn hoogst concreet-
associatief verbonden zijn, nemen wij aan dat de 'droombetekenissen' de 
symbolische betekenissen zijn, die de dromer (of droomuitlegger) geeft 
aan de droombeelden die de dromer zich herinnert na het ontwaken. De 
dromer benut dan in wakende toestand, wanneer de intellectuele ver-
mogens actief zijn, de voorstellingen van zijn dromen (zowel als actuele 
waarnemingsbeelden) in het symboliseren van opvattingen waarop zijn 
denken intentioneel gericht is. Deze theorie, gebaseerd op de empirisch 
ervaarbare en voor introspectie toegankelijke aspecten van het dromen, 
vereist nadere verificatie (VI, par. 4 ) . 
In Hoofdstuk VII werd een overzicht gegeven van het in de voorafgaande 
hoofdstukken behandelde. Dit besluit met een verwijzing naar de actuali-
teit van een reeds eerder aangehaalde opmerking van Gordon Allport, 
dat wij beginnen het symbool empirisch psychologisch te benaderen. 
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S T E L L I N G E N 
I 
Het in de neurotische existentie op complexen betrokken 
denken voltrekt zich in wisselwerking met signaal- en actierelaties 
in de zin van Werner. 
II 
In het moderne marktonderzoek wijst de psychologische 
analyse van de gedragsmotivatie van consumenten op de behoefte 
aan dieptepsychologische benaderingswijzen, die niet op het patho-
logische denken maar op onderbewuste invloeden in het normale 
symbolische denken zijn gericht. 
(George Horsley Smith, Motivation Research, New York, McGraw Hill, 1954) 
III 
Allport's stelling : "Normal people are not prisoners of 
the past" (1946), geldt voor de mens in zoverre hij symbolisch 
denkt. 
IV 
Het nagaan van de genitaal-symboliek in uitdrukkingen, 
voorkomend in woordenboeken betreffende het buiten het algemeen 
beschaafd staande taalgebruik (Hall 1953), kan worden uitgewerkt 
tot een philologisch-psychologische onderzoekmethode, die bruik-
baar zou zijn voor het nagaan van bewuste aspecten in het genitaal-
symbolisch denken. 
V 
De symbolische woordbetekenistest is beter geëigend voor 
het diagnostiseren van persoonlijkheidsaspecten dan de woord-
associatietest. 

VI 
Niet het aantal proefpersonen maar de wijze van steek-
proefneming bepaalt primair op welke sociale of psychologische 
groeperingen een psychologisch onderzoek betrekking kan hebben. 
VII 
De psychoanalytische opvatting dat het christelijk denken 
een ontwikkelingstrap is op weg naar het psychoanalytisch denken 
(Tuinstra 1933), steunt enkel op psychoanalytische interpretaties 
van godsdienst en mythen. 
VIII 
In Tuinstra's theologische critiek op het symbool in de 
psychoanalyse wordt het symbolisch denken, in overeenstemming 
met onze empirische bevindingen, als een hoge vorm van menselijk 
denken voorgesteld. 
IX 
De psychologie van de reclame - het scheppen van een 
gunstige waarderingssfeer voor het aangeprezen artikel door 
psychologische beïnvloeding (Roels) - verdient meer aandacht 
van academische sociaalpsychologische centra. 
(F. Roels, Psychologie der Reclame, Amsterdam, Becht, Í938). 
8 Juni 1962. G. A. DE WIT. 



